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# **Daily Report**

## **East Asia**

FBIS-EAS-89-228  
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# Daily Report

## East Asia

FBIS-EAS-89-228

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29 November 1989

**NOTICE TO READERS:** An \* indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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## Japan

### Japan, USSR Discuss Ways To Increase Trade

OW2811152989 Tokyo KYODO in English 1343 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—Japanese and Soviet trade negotiators on Tuesday explored ways of expanding bilateral trade and investment despite problems with infrastructure and the need for hard currency in the Soviet Union.

Delegations from the two countries discussed trade impediments and prospects for the future for over five hours at the opening of the two-day regular economic forum at the Foreign Ministry, ministry officials said.

Deputy Foreign Minister Koji Watanabe, head of the multi-ministerial Japanese delegation, welcomed Moscow's recent moves to relax regulations covering joint ventures and introduce currency auctions as a step toward eventual convertibility of the ruble. But Watanabe said that in terms of setting up an attractive environment for trade and investment, the progress charted so far has not been far reaching enough to make the Soviet Union appealing to Japanese business investors, the officials said.

Compared with their operations in other countries, Japanese companies are often unable to secure promising conditions from the Soviet Union and the living situation for those residing in Moscow is far from satisfactory, he was quoted as saying.

Yu.N. Chumakov, deputy Soviet minister for foreign economic relations, welcomed the fact that trade figures between the two countries have steadily improved. Japanese exports to the Soviet Union in 1988 totaled some 3,130 million dollars, while imports during the same year registered some 2,766 million dollars, the officials said.

But the Soviet bureaucrat expressed dissatisfaction that there has been little change in the composition of Japan-Soviet trade, adding that the recent growth was attributable to a boost in prices and deliveries of traditional goods rather than in new areas of trade, they said.

Soviet exports continue to consist largely of primary goods such as timber, oil and coal, while Japanese exports remain primarily steel, machinery and chemical products, they quoted him as saying.

Watanabe countered that there has been a notable upsurge in Japanese imports of manufactured goods from abroad due to the government's emphasis on economic growth through expansion of domestic demand, the officials said. He said that if there are any Soviet products of sufficient quality that would appeal to Japanese consumers, Japan would be more than happy to buy them.

Chumakov pointed out that while there are some 1,000 international joint venture enterprises under way in the

Soviet Union, only 22 of them are with Japanese companies. Conditions for Japanese investment are improving and Moscow hopes the Japanese will respond positively, he was quoted as saying.

Watanabe agreed with Chumakov's assessment that Japanese companies are especially reluctant to take risks. But he added that Japanese firms cannot be expected to be attracted to a business environment lacking infrastructure, where profits cannot be easily remitted and where procurement of materials for production is problematic, the officials said.

Chumakov said the convertibility of the ruble is a major task, entailing an increase in production of goods and a closer approximation between domestic and external prices. He said the Soviet Union's extensive barter trade with other socialist countries must also be taken into consideration.

Chumakov said that perestroika (restructuring) in the Soviet Union is proceeding in the face of great challenges. Despite the "confusion" that normally accompanies change, "tragedy" is not imminent and there will never be a return to the past, he said. He said that while the Soviet Union is decentralizing its economy and implementing free market principles in a socialist context, it is not attempting to import capitalism, the officials said.

### Differ on Pace of Expanding Ties

OW2911121789 Tokyo KYODO in English 1142 GMT  
29 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 29 Tokyo—Japanese and Soviet negotiators wrapped up two days of trade talks on Wednesday with differing views over the pace at which to expand economic ties, but reached a general agreement on renewing two trade treaties, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said.

Deputy Foreign Minister Koji Watanabe, head of the multi-ministerial Japanese delegation, told his Soviet counterpart Veniamin Korolev that it would be hasty to enter into long-term economic commitments without taking into account the political aspects of the relationship. But Korolev, deputy minister for foreign economic relations in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, emphasized the Soviet Union's desire to boost economic and commercial ties with Japan without a "politicization" of the relationship.

Officials said the differences of opinion expressed by the two sides were rooted primarily in the bilateral dispute over three islands and a group of islets off Hokkaido occupied by the Soviets since the end of World War II. Japan has traditionally held that the territorial issue must be cleared up before full-fledged economic relations get under way.

The two delegations agreed in a memorandum issued at the end of the talks to conclude a new Japan-Soviet trade and payment agreement for 1991-1995, to be finalized

before the present one expires at the end of 1990. Outside the memorandum, the Japanese side also offered to positively consider a Soviet request for a new agreement on coastal trade to replace the present one when it expires at the end of next year. Officials said it is possible that the two agreements will be concluded during the same time period.

Saying that "stable political relations over the long term" are an important prerequisite for the development of cooperative economic relations, Japanese negotiators frowned on several Soviet requests, officials said.

Turning down Korolev's request for a treaty on mutual protection of investment, Watanabe said it is more important at this time for Moscow to work on improving the country's poor investment environment. The Soviets also had their hopes dashed on a proposed "long-term agreement on principles of economic and industrial cooperation." Likewise, Japan spurned a Soviet request for a change in the Soviet presence in Tokyo to allow for an expansion of activities.

As part of the proposed plan, the Soviets wanted to set up several new economic organizations, including a Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a branch of the Vneshekonombank of the Soviet Union.

Watanabe explained that it would be hasty to undertake changes with long-term implications at this time when it is still not clear what will arise out of the rapid changes now under way in the Soviet Union, officials said. He told the Soviets that view applies to the larger picture of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union as a whole.

#### **Former Envoy to U.S. Comments on Relations**

*OW281102589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0857 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—Japan's former ambassador to the United States, Nobuo Matsunaga, Tuesday urged Japan to respond to demands by the U.S. to take responsibility proportionate to its economic power.

"Japan-U.S. cooperative relations are at a crucial point. There has never been a time when Japan's existence was felt more in the U.S.," said Matsunaga, who returned from Washington November 19.

"To America, relations with Japan have never been as important as they are today, and the U.S. is paying very close attention to how Japan responds to various problems facing the two nations," Matsunaga told reporters at the Japan National Press Club.

"I do not think any nation will replace in the future the role the U.S. has played globally... It is important that the U.S. feels confident about its traditional global responsibility and Japan must offer support in areas where the U.S. can no longer fulfill the role," Matsunaga, 66, said.

Reflecting on his nearly five-year tenure as Japan's top diplomat in the U.S., Matsunaga said about 80 percent of his work consisted of handling bilateral economic issues, most notably, trade and investment friction. He called attention to areas in which he said the U.S. is expecting a Japanese response.

They include demands to open the Japanese market, to sustain Japan's current growth in domestic consumption, to try for a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks, to increase Japan's official assistance and to shoulder more of the cost of maintaining the U.S. military force in Japan.

Matsunaga said it would be "unavoidable" for the U.S. to invoke the so-called Super 301 provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade law if there were no progress in the Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks by next spring.

Matsunaga also stressed that Japan-U.S. relations are evolving at an "incredible rate" in trade, investment, cultural, academic and personnel exchanges. He downplayed mutual criticisms in Japan and the U.S. and called for a reassessment of bilateral relations, asserting that congressional, administrative and economic leaders in the U.S. agree on the importance of relations.

With regard to debates on opening Japanese markets, Japan must distinguish arguments by the so-called Japan bashers and by those who do so in belief that it is important for present bilateral relations, as much of their opinions coincide, Matsunaga said. In addition to improvements in bilateral relations, Japan must consider promoting cooperation with the U.S. in the global concerns, he said.

"Bilateral issues entail frictions, but in discussing global issues, such frictions can be avoided and at the same time can deflect public interest from such frictions," Matsunaga said. In this context, Japan should extend aid to the democratic and freedom movements in East Europe, and tackle such issues as concerns in Central America, drugs and environment, he said.

On the issue of increased financing to the U.S. military forces in Japan, Matsunaga said Japan should put up utmost efforts to help the U.S. ease the burden of maintaining its forces within the framework of the present status of forces agreement.

Matsunaga called for more incentives from Japan in diplomacy and depart from what he said was a traditional way of pursuing diplomatic policies by outside pressures.

#### **Justice Minister Reproves Kaifu on Remarks**

*OW2811085289 Tokyo KYODO in English 0801 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—Justice Minister Masao Goto said on Tuesday that Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu should have been more prudent toward

such a sensitive issue as increasing incidents of harassment and bullying of Korean residents' children.

Goto told reporters after a cabinet meeting that Kaifu's recent remarks, in which he said he had nothing to do with the incidents, were not suitable in terms of protecting human rights.

Anti-Korean acts by Japanese have reportedly intensified after allegations that the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents of Japan (Chongnyon) illegally made political donations to Japanese politicians were taken up for discussion in the Diet. Chongnyon lodged a protest with Kaifu on November 20, urging the Japanese Government to take appropriate steps swiftly on the issue.

Kaifu told reporters the following day that he had nothing to do with the incidents, and that there are many cases of bullying and harassment occurring in Japanese schools, not only against Korean students. After he came under fire for his statements from the South Korean mass media and other related bodies, Kaifu later said he would make all-out efforts to settle the problem.

Meanwhile, mothers of children attending schools affiliated with the Chongnyon in Nagoya on Tuesday called on the governor of Aichi Prefecture in a letter to take measures to stop discrimination and violence against their children.

### Second Recruit Trial Opens in District Court

OW2911034689 Tokyo KYODO in English 0256 GMT  
29 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 29 KYODO—The Tokyo district court on Wednesday held the first hearing in the trial of a former Labor Ministry official indicted for involvement in the Recruit bribery scandal.

This is the second in five separate trials of 12 defendants indicted in the Recruit case. Two defendants, Takashi Kato, a former vice labor minister, and Masao Tatsumi, a former Recruit Co. executive, went on trial last Friday.

On trial Wednesday was Shigeru Kano, 56, a former director of the employment service division at the Labor Ministry. Kano is charged with leaking a confidential draft of a Labor Ministry bill aimed at tightening control of job-placement magazines, several of them operated by Recruit Co. The indictment says he was frequently entertained by Recruit executives between April 1984 and May 1986. Kano admitted the facts as charged during the hearing. A verdict is expected before the end of the year.

Recruit is suspected of having launched an intense lobbying campaign which led the Labor Ministry to drop the proposed bill in 1985. Among those on the Recruit lobbying list was Kato, 59, who allegedly made a substantial profit through insider stock trading involving shares of Recruit's real estate subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos.

Kato told the court last Friday that he had received the shares but denied he had known they constituted a bribe. The scandal surfaced in June 1988 and rocked the government, political, and business worlds. It led to the resignation of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita in June. More than 40 other politicians, civil servants, businessmen, and journalists implicated in the scandal have also resigned.

The next trial, slated for December 11, is of four defendants, including Kunio Takaishi, 59, a former vice education minister, and Ei Shikiba, 55, a former executive of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT).

### IMF To Review Quotas; Japan Wants More Presence

OW2911013189 Tokyo KYODO in English 2356 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Washington, Nov. 28 KYODO—The International Monetary Fund (IMF) said Tuesday it will decide by December 28 on whether to complete a general review of quotas by next March 31. The quota for each member is equal to its subscription to the fund, and determines its voting power.

The IMF said its executive board made the proposal for extending the deadline for ending the review by the end of next March to the Board of Governors "in light of the progress being made in the discussion of the ninth general review of quotas."

The brief announcement came amid growing indications that key IMF member countries are close to an agreement on a boost in IMF resources via members' increased capital subscriptions.

Japan, ranked fifth in IMF voting power with a 4.69 percent quota share, hopes to strengthen its presence in the fund as the world's No. 2 economic power after the United States, which has a 19.91 percent share. Britain is currently second with 6.88 percent, followed by West Germany with 6.0 percent and France with 4.98 percent.

The United States, which had originally opposed an expansion of IMF resources, is now said to favor such an increase.

### Government Report Warns Against Protectionism

OW2811021289 Tokyo KYODO in English 0036 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—The world economy is in for a soft landing without a recession following seven years of vigorous expansion, but a possible upsurge in protectionism is threatening stable growth, the 1989 White Paper on the World Economy, released Tuesday by the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), said.

The report said forestalling protectionist sentiment and keeping the economy on a steady uptrend would require the United States to tackle the causes of its huge trade

imbalance head-on, and to carry out macroeconomic and structural measures to redress the imbalance.

In addition, the functions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the international arena for trade talks, should be augmented to promote free trade, the report said. It said Japan should ensure this by continuing its current efforts to boost domestic demand, expand imports and promote structural reforms.

The report said the United States needs to become a more powerful exporter by bolstering the international competitiveness of its industries through its own efforts. West European nations, for their part, should contribute to maintaining free trade by achieving a greater degree of flexibility in their economies and preventing the 1992 European Community market integration from resulting in a closed trade bloc.

The report described current moves in Soviet bloc countries toward more democracy and market-oriented economies as crucial to determining the future course of the world economy. It said these are a welcome trend that could expand the scale and scope of free enterprise economy and free trade.

Prices worldwide have stabilized following earlier upward pressures from higher capacity utilization, a tighter labor market, and rises in crude oil prices. These have eased as a result of tighter monetary policy by major central banks, higher productivity due to heavy capital spending, and structural changes in the labor market.

On the recent spate of mergers and acquisitions in the United States, the report said these can contribute to improving production efficiency, but that recent highly leveraged mergers and acquisitions have apparently tended to resemble money games. The report said measures to stem the practice should be introduced, since excessive indulgence in such games is likely to have a harmful effect on the financial system and the economy as a whole.

The report diagnosed reform-minded leader Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to restructure the Soviet economy as having so far failed, resulting in shortages in consumer goods, surging inflation, and an increased budget deficit.

The report analyzes the key auto and semiconductor industries in Japan and the United States and concludes that the United States lost much of its competitive edge to Japan mainly because U.S. companies focus more on short-term profits to satisfy shareholders.

#### **Sumita Says Recent Yen-Dollar Rates Tolerable**

*OW2711084889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0805 GMT  
27 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 27 KYODO—Bank of Japan Governor Satoshi Sumita indicated Monday that foreign-exchange rates in recent weeks have remained within a tolerable range, but still called the currency market

rather unstable and directionless. The central bank governor said, "I have recently refrained from using the word 'excessive' in referring to the current foreign-exchange market."

His remarks at a press conference were perceived as endorsing the current strength of the U.S. dollar against the yen, moving in a range of 143-144 yen. Sumita, however, reiterated that the central bank will continue taking measures to contain any "excessive" rise in the dollar's value in concert with other major industrial nations.

He also told reporters that the recent sudden changes in Eastern Europe countries are strengthening the West German mark against the dollar, the British pound and the Japanese yen.

Sumita described the recent upswing in the mark's value as "fairly speculative," and based on speculation that West German interest rates would eventually rise due to the nation's growing expenditures as a result of the continuous inflow of East Germans into the country. Sumita also discounted the possible effects of the drastic changes in Eastern Europe on foreign-exchange markets, saying that it was still too early to predict any impact.

Commenting on domestic price trends, the central bank governor said the recent wholesale price levels were within the "extremely stable" ranges. Sumita, as the head of the inflation-wary central bank, had previously said that domestic prices were on a rising trend amid unabated pressure on prices and interest rates stemming from uncertainty over future currency movements.

Sumita, however, insisted the central bank would assure price stability in its management of monetary policy at times of continued tightness in the labor and product markets, as well as rising import costs stemming from the lower yen. The central bank chief said the money supply growth rate remains high-paced and expressed strong hope that it would decelerate in the coming months following two discount rate hikes at the end of May and in mid-October.

On the likely course of the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed)'s monetary policy, Sumita said the Fed still appears to be heading in a moderate credit-loosening direction amid evidence of weakness in the U.S. economy, in particular in the manufacturing sector. He added the Fed would likely stay cautious about any major change in its monetary stance at the moment.

#### **Japan Urged To Buy U.S.-Made Satellites**

*OW2811150989 Tokyo KYODO in English 1359 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—The United States on Tuesday advised Japan against letting the development of its own technology for communications satellites impede the import of U.S. versions. The U.S. renewed its position on the first day of a bilateral meeting of

experts on Japanese imports of satellites and supercomputers, against which Washington had invoked the "Super 301" clause of its omnibus trade and competitiveness act of 1988, government sources said. The clause provides for sanctions against a country if the U.S. determines it is guilty of unfair trade practices.

At Tuesday's session, the U.S. specifically took up the Japanese plan for the independent development of the next-generation communications satellite "CS-4." The U.S. said it cannot fault Japan for its eagerness to develop communications technology but that such eagerness should not become a barrier to imports.

Japan countered that it does not intend to impede imports and pointed out that five of Japan's eight satellites, including those yet to be sent up, are American-made, the sources said. On Wednesday, the U.S. will seek Japan's explanation for the withholding of a license for Satellite Japan Corp., a satellite communications firm set up by Sony Corp. and other Japanese firms with the RCA group of the U.S. There is concern here that the addition of a new satellite communications firm to the two already in operation could crowd the Japanese market.

The Japanese and U.S. experts will deal with the problem of supercomputers on Thursday and Friday, the sources said.

#### Globally Oriented Management Urged for Firms

OW2711130589 Tokyo KYODO in English 1107 GMT  
27 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 27 KYODO—Japanese manufacturers should orient operations at their headquarters to be more global to prevent foreign criticism of Japanese investments, a group of business leaders said Monday. In announcing globally oriented criteria for management, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives called for creating headquarters that can supervise domestic and overseas operations equally.

To that end, the group urged Japanese firms to hire more foreigners, accept foreigners on their boards and set up an advisory committee with foreign participation. The criteria also suggest that important in-house letters be written in English.

The proposals came amid growing U.S. criticism of Japanese direct investments following a wave of Japanese buy-outs of U.S. concerns, such as Sony Corp.'s 3.4 billion dollar purchase of Columbia Pictures Entertainment Inc.

In analyzing the cause of the U.S. criticism, the group cited market share-focused business strategies among Japanese firms seeking results in the long run. It also criticized group behavior seen among Japanese businessmen in the United States, saying the practice serves as a barrier to mutual understanding between the two countries.

Regarding the group-oriented behavior, the group urged that Japanese businessmen abroad serve as good corporate citizens in local communities and that Japanese corporations be localized and contribute more to local communities. The Japanese should depart from being isolated from local communities abroad, it said.

#### Government Approves New Trade Group Leader

OW2811052589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0242 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—The cabinet approved the appointment Tuesday of Minoru Masuda, a 66-year-old former bureaucrat specializing in trade, as new president of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).

Masuda, former deputy vice minister of international trade and industry, will replace Shoichi Akazawa who will retire Friday at the age of 70 as head of JETRO, a semiofficial Japanese trade promotion agency, officials said.

Also the former director general of the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, Masuda has been adviser to Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the world's largest private power firm for the past six months.

The Tokyo-born Masuda joined the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the predecessor of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), upon graduation from the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law in 1949.

After leaving MITI in 1978, Masuda joined TEPCO in 1980 as its adviser before being promoted to standing director and vice president, and then becoming adviser again last June.

#### Keidanren Chief Opposes Stricter Antimonopoly Law

OW2411115589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0919 GMT  
24 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 24 KYODO—Making the antimonopoly law stricter may cause confusion in Japan's industries, a top Japanese business leader warned Friday. Eishiro Saito, chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), said the fundamental idea of the antimonopoly law is that it should "go in a package with free business activities." However, there are too many rules and regulations in Japanese industries, so Japan cannot make its antimonopoly law stricter under pressure from the United States.

Speaking to reporters, Saito made the comment in connection with the ongoing Japan-U.S. talks on structural impediments to trade and investment. The U.S. has been pressing Japan to make its antimonopoly law tougher and increase the budget for the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) to help that body to more effectively perform its task.

Saito said he believes that the nature of Japanese society, including industries, was originally very competitive. Japan created many rules and regulations to bind larger

enterprises so as to enable smaller businesses to obtain opportunities in the intense competition, he said. The situation in Japan is different from that in the U.S. where industries are basically freer, Saito said.

### Firms Propose Carbon Dioxide Emission Control

*OW2711031089 Tokyo KYODO in English 0247 GMT 27 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 27 KYODO—Japanese electric power companies have jointly proposed the establishment of an international market for trading planned national quotas for carbon dioxide emissions, the main cause of the so-called greenhouse effect, or global warming. The proposal was made in a report compiled by the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, a joint research body for the country's nine electric power firms.

The report recommended establishing a market in which countries could freely trade their quotas for carbon dioxide emissions. The quotas would be allocated according to each country's expected population in the year 2000.

The countries that sell their emission quotas would be required to spend the money they get on environmental protection projects, according to the report. This would allow developing countries to cash their unfulfilled emission quotas to obtain funds for such purposes as boosting their environmental protection technology and promoting afforestation, the report said.

The proposal would help to solve the environmental problems and the North-South problems at the same time, it said. It also called for establishing an international organization to supervise the proposed market. Electric power companies are the nation's largest single producer of carbon dioxide, accounting for about 30 percent of Japan's total emissions.

Kenji Yamaji, manager of the research institute's Energy System Section, which compiled the report, said, "The best way to promote reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is to let the principle of the market economy to play."

### Vehicle Exports Show Decrease in October

*OW2811101089 Tokyo KYODO in English 0807 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 28 KYODO—Japan's exports of cars, trucks and buses fell 11.4 percent in October from a year earlier to 462,548 units, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association said Tuesday. The decline came largely because of slack exports to North America, the largest overseas market for Japanese vehicles, association officials said.

Exports to North America dipped 23.2 percent, to 212,471 units. Exports to Europe and Oceania, however,

increased 15.4 percent and 13.7 percent, respectively, to 128,792 units and 28,846 units.

By maker, Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. was a major loser in the month, suffering a 50.2 percent plunge in exports. By contrast, Hino Motors Ltd. scored a 38.6 percent increase.

Exports by the top two automakers, Toyota Motor Corp. and Nissan Motor Co., slid 21.7 percent and 20.1 percent.

### Slow Growth Noted in Industrial Production

*OW2411144089 Tokyo KYODO in English 1258 GMT 24 Nov 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 24 KYODO—Japan's industrial production in the July-September period posted a slight 0.2 percent growth from the previous quarter and shipments a small 0.7 percent increase, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) announced Friday. Officials attributed the slowdown in the output growth chiefly to reduced production of electric machinery, centering on general-purpose computers.

The decelerated shipment growth resulted mainly from reduced domestic shipments of steam turbines and other capital goods, they said. The officials forecast a mild increase in industrial production for some months to come despite a slowdown in the growth rate. The production level is already very high, they said.

In the July-September quarter, the production of transport machinery made a good showing, thanks mainly to increased output of passenger cars and ships. Also higher was the output of both precision machinery and nonferrous metals. By contrast, the output of chemicals and steel products decreased, because the operation of some production facilities was suspended for periodical repair.

Domestic shipments of industrial products increased 0.2 percent from the previous quarter for the 21th consecutive quarter—since the October-December period of 1986. A 2.2 percent fall in domestic shipments of capital goods, excluding transport machinery, held down the overall growth rate in domestic shipments.

Export shipments showed a 3.8 percent increase—the highest growth rate since the July-September quarter of 1988. Inventories posted a small 0.7 percent increase, reflecting continued high-levels of production.

### Komeito Leader Inspects Okinawa Facility

*OW2811064789 Naha NHK Television in Japanese 0300 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] The Komeito Party inspection team led by Chairman Ishida, which arrived in Okinawa yesterday, inspected the urban combat training facility in Onna Village today and listened to the comments of local residents.

The Komeito inspection team is composed of 22 members and led by Chairman Koshiro Ishida. It inspected

the urban combat training facility in Camp Hansen, Onna Village today. The group first viewed the watch post near the gate and listened to the comments of village head Higa and other villagers. During the meeting, Higa stated that the training facility is close to residential areas and that the dam, which is the residents' "water pitcher," is located inside the base, and related the opposition of all the villagers. In response, Chairman Ishida said: Amid the worldwide trend toward disarmament, live ammunition military exercises are dangerous. We will work for the dismantling and retrenchment of the bases.

Subsequently, the Komeito inspection team, guided by U.S. military personnel, toured the base for about 1 hour. After the inspection, Komeito Central Executive Committee Chairman Yaoi said: The U.S. military explained that ammunition is only fired in the direction of the mountains. We understand that they give consideration to safety. However, since the site is close to residential and resort areas, no matter how safe it is, the possibility of danger cannot be completely dismissed.

#### H-2 Rocket Engine Fire Delays Combustion Tests

OW2411143089 Tokyo KYODO in English 1211 GMT  
24 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 24 KYODO—The stage-one engine for Japan's next-generation rocket caught fire during testing Wednesday at the Tanegashima Space Center in Kagoshima Prefecture, the National Space Development Agency said Friday.

It was the second time a first-stage LE-7 booster of the H-2 satellite-launching rocket caught fire. Designed with a turbopump used for injecting liquid hydrogen and oxygen into the combustion chamber, the booster first caught fire on September 27. The fire delays all combustion testing scheduled this year and enables testing of a new engine after February.

Agency officials said, however, the delay would not prevent the initial launch of the H-2 in early 1993.

Officials said the fire occurred because the amount of liquid hydrogen ignited in a preburner before being injected through a turbopump was less than scheduled. It produced excessively high temperatures and caught fire, the officials said.

Though the fire was extinguished in 30 seconds, the gas emitted from a 50-centimeter pipe connecting a preburner and the combustion chamber fumed for two hours, eventually burning the pipe, officials said. The earlier accident also occurred when engineers were igniting a preburner device on the LE-7.

The three-stage H-2 is to serve as Japan's main space transportation system in the 1990s.

#### North Korea

##### Ninth Round of N-S Parliamentary Talks Begin

SK2911014389 Pyongyang Domestic Service  
in Korean 0100 GMT 29 Nov 89

[News report from Panmunjom by reporter Kim Yong-song]

[Text] The ninth meeting of the delegates of the two sides for the North-South joint parliamentary conference is now underway at Tongilgak, a building in our area of Panmunjom. Many domestic and foreign reporters have come to Tongilgak to report the news of this meeting.

Attending the meeting, from our side, are Chon Kum-chol, head of the delegation, and delegates An Kyong-su, Yi Tong-chol, Yi Chu-ung, and Pak Mun-chan, all of whom are deputies to the Supreme People's Assembly. Present at the meeting, from the South side, are five delegates including Chae Mun-sik, chief delegate.

The meeting continues.

#### Report on Meeting

SK2911053289 Pyongyang Domestic Service  
in Korean 0246 GMT 29 Nov 89

[Text] This is a report of Central Broadcasting Station reporters Kim Yong-song and Han Kwang-to from Panmunjom. At the Tongilgak, one of our sides buildings in Panmunjom, the ninth meeting of the delegates of the two sides for the North-South parliamentary combined meeting [haptong hoeui] is underway at present.

Chon Kum-chol, chief delegate of our side, spoke first at the meeting.

[Begin Chon Kum-chol recording] Chief delegate Mr Chae Mun-sik, lawmakers from the South side: I welcome you, the delegates from the South side who have come to the Tongilgak for the fifth time to participate in the ninth meeting of the lawmakers of both sides to give birth to a North-South combined parliamentary meeting.

During the many meetings we have had so far, the two sides narrowed their difference of views on a number of issues and came close to agreement, but they still have conflicting views on several matters, and have been unable to fulfill the expectations of all the fellow countrymen who desire the convocation of the North-South combined parliamentary meeting at an early date.

Looking at the international situation worldwide today, we note the common trend toward independence, democracy, reconciliation, unity, and peace, and long-standing disputes are being solved practically, through dialogue. Nevertheless, abnormal is the situation where between the North and the South, a single nation, a wall of distrust resulting from confrontation is getting higher with each passing day, we are experiencing twists and turns in which the dialogue that began was suspended,

and even those who intended to do good things for peace and reunification of the fatherland are persecuted.

Hoping that this abnormal situation will not continue any more, and to promote the dialogue that has been interrupted, we wholeheartedly urged your side, during the eighth round of meeting, to suspend the large-scale joint military exercises, which hinder the dialogue, and not to arrest those who committed themselves to the sacred cause of reunification.

However, no appropriate action has been taken yet. Consequently, the relations of confrontation between the North and the South have been continuing, still laying an obstacle to dialogue. We think that this is regrettable, and hope that this situation will be corrected even now.

**Delegates from the South side:** The important mission of those of us who are sitting here face to face representing the North and South parliaments is to complete the working-level contact and discussion for the North-South combined parliamentary meeting and to give birth to a full-dress parliamentary meeting at an early date. To this end, I think that the two sides should, above all, engage in the discussion of issues giving priority to the common national desire and interests with a broad-mindedness to make concessions and to understand each other on that basis.

As you know, at the outset, in connection with the form of the meeting, we proposed the convocation of a joint meeting [yonsok hoeui] participated in by all parliamentarians of the two sides in consideration of the fundamental mission and way of operation of the parliaments of the North and the South, proposing that 50 delegates of the political parties and figures of all strata participate in it. However, your side insisted that you cannot accept this. We, therefore, made a concession to make it a combined meeting instead of a joint meeting, withholding [poryu] the issue of participation of the delegates of political parties and figures of various strata.

As to the issue of the number of persons participating in the meeting to discuss the basic issues, we took into consideration your repeated proposal to decrease the number and proposed that the number be 50 from each side, and this has been agreed upon.

The same can be said for the process of the discussion of the agenda. In consideration of the acute situation in our country, we introduced the urgent issue of announcing a joint declaration for nonaggression.

However, because your side insisted that the issue of accelerating human and material exchange and cooperation between the North and South and the issue of resuming existing dialogue be chosen as the agenda, after accepting these two issues, we put forth the issue of facilitating multifaceted cooperation and exchange between the North and South as the agenda. I think that your side, too, cannot deny the fact that if we look at the issues upon which an agreement was reached, an agreement could be reached upon many of them because of

our side's repeated concessions. Since ours is a mutual dialogue, only when the two sides assume a stand of making mutual concessions can they bring about success, and if one side inflexibly insists on a specific proposal, it is difficult to expect any achievements, and meetings will be escalated into repeated arguments.

I think that some issues upon which the two sides have a difference of views can be solved without any difficulty in today's meeting, if your side assumes a little bit of a positive attitude based upon the principle of reciprocity.

I will not cite issues upon which an agreement has been reached. I will only cite issues upon which no agreement has been reached. I think that these issues remain unresolved: which format of dialogue for discussing basic problems will be chosen for a meeting between representatives, and talks between representatives; the agenda-related issue of a nonaggression declaration upon which an agreement was reached in principle; the issue of reasonably formalizing North-South cooperation and exchange; the issue of whether or not the summit talks issue is to be included in the agenda; and several other issues.

I would like to explain our side's stand on the above-mentioned issues upon which no agreement has been reached.

First, over the issue of the format of a North-South parliamentary meeting, we recognized it as reasonable in every aspect to choose a meeting between representatives as the format of dialogue for discussing basic problems. We propose that a meeting between representatives be chosen as a format of dialogue for discussing basic problems not only because this format is in compliance with how a parliament is operated, but also because it is a format that can remove a sense of confrontation and promote national unity. In connection with this, I do not think it an exaggeration that holding a meeting between representatives is [word indistinct] (?good) under circumstances in which an agreement was reached on organizing a joint steering committee, appointing co-chairmen, and organizing an executive body, which are necessary only for a meeting between representatives.

In the 7th meeting, your side insisted that a joint steering committee be organized, that co-chairmen be appointed and that an executive body be organized—which are necessary for a meeting between representatives—to hold talks between representatives, a bilateral talks format. This is very unreasonable, and is contradictory in view of the dialogue format and its proceedings. We cannot but say that your side has the insincere attitude of denying by itself what it previously said. I expect that in today's meeting, your side will willingly accept our proposal of a meeting between representatives as a dialogue format for discussing basic problems.

The second is the agenda issue. I think that among proposed issues for the agenda, the issue of announcing a North-South non-aggression declaration and the issue

of facilitating multifaceted cooperation and exchange between the North and South, the two issues upon which the two sides have differences in views, can be chosen if their expressions are coordinated. Because your side expressed, in the 2d meeting, a will to withdraw the issue of holding North-South summit talks, proposed by your side, and because the two sides' heads of state openly expressed a will to meet each other in reality, if an environment is provided and if the atmosphere is promoted, I think, they can be held naturally. Therefore, even if the parliaments of the North and South do not discuss this issue, it will cause no problem.

As I previously mentioned, if we look at the pending issues upon which no agreement has been reached in our meeting, I think it will not be very difficult to solve them, and if your side shows a little sincerity, an agreement can be reached on them even at this moment.

I believe that because the proposal, which was advanced by us today, respects the opinion which your side expressed, your side will willingly accept our side's proposal. I hope that I will be able to give delightful news to all the co intrymen who are watching this meeting. Thank you. [end recording]

The meeting continues.

**University Reports 'Implanted' Intelligence Agent**  
*SK2711105089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1003 GMT  
27 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 27 (KCNA)—It was disclosed at the Seoul branch of Myongji University on November 23 that the South Korean fascist clique implanted police intelligence agent in the campus, according to a report.

Earlier, it was also made known at Songkyunkwan University in Seoul that the fascist clique infiltrated an intellegence agent into the campus to spy on the activities of students.

This is part of the frantic moves of the No Tae-u fascist clique to suppress and obliterate the students' struggle for independence, democracy and reunification.

Due to such manoeuvres of the fascist clique sacred campus is trampled under the military boots of the Army and police and filled with tear gas and patriotic students are taken to prisons and subjected to white terror.

This fact clearly shows that the No Tae-u group is following in the wake of the dictatorship of the "Fifth Republic" which had turned campus into a theatre of fascist rowdyism.

**South Korean 'Economic Crisis' Reported**

*SK281110189 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1013 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 28 (KCNA)—The South Korean puppets brought forward "comprehensive measures for a business boom," crying that they are "undergoing economic difficulties due to stagnation in export and investment," according to a report.

This means that the puppet clique, unable to conceal any longer the fiction of their much-touted "growth," confessed to the economic crisis of South Korea.

At present, the South Korean economy "records an all-time low" on all indices, undergoing a serious crisis.

Exports dropped 6-7 percent below the like period last year in the second quarter of this year following the dwindle in the first quarter and they are unlikely to show any upward trend in the days ahead.

By contrast, imports moved ahead to record a trade deficit of 5 million dollars in March and 431 million dollars in August, the biggest sum since 1985.

All the more serious are financial difficulties of enterprises.

In the first half of this year more than 820 enterprises, or 2.4 times as many as in the corresponding period last year suspended operation or closed the doors.

Notably, minor enterprises are now in the "worst state of bankruptcy ever since the 1970s" and comprador businesses are also suffering from financial difficulties. The business group whose mainstay is the comprador capital Luckey now faces bankruptcy after issuing convertible cheques.

In the financial domain the puppet clique ordered all banks to curtail loans by two trillion won in February with the result that every enterprise is now crying over the shortage of fund.

According to a survey by the trade association of South Korea, 85 percent of big businesses and 60 percent of minor enterprises are suffering from the shortage of fund.

Prices have jumped this year 10-20 percent in manufactured goods and 22-39 percent in foodstuffs, to add to economic instability.

Agricultural production including rice yield slid down this year.

Thus, all the goals set out by the puppet clique, such as the "goal of GNP growth," the "price ceiling goal" and the "unemployment curb goal" have fallen flat and the economy as a whole is now in a total muddle.

The crisis of the South Korean economy is an inevitable outcome of its fatal vulnerability, being dependent on the United States.

The South Korean economy is a dependent "export-oriented economy" which has been so organized as to be convenient for the U.S. imperialists' colonial plunder.

**Daily on UN Membership 'Worsening Division'**  
**SK2711105889 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1006 GMT**  
**27 Nov 89**

[Text] Pyongyang November 27 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today carries a signed article headlined "puppets' attempt to 'enter United Nations' is factor of worsening division and tension."

Recalling the protestations of the South Korean puppets that the North and the South should "simultaneously enter" the United Nations and, otherwise, South Korea would singly tender a formal "application for UN membership" next year, the author of the article says:

The South Korean puppets are making sustained efforts for "UN membership" with a view to painting South Korea, a colony of the United States, as an "independent state" since those who entered the UN are recognized as independent states in the international arena, and thus legalizing a permanent division of the country and the existence of "two Koreas" and maintaining their power under the patronage of their masters.

Should a homogeneous nation with a long history like Korea be divided into two artificially, it would rather encourage confrontation and distrust between the North and the South than stabilizing the situation there and would rather foster the root cause of constant tensions and war than making peace come to stay.

The South Korean puppets' fuss over "UN membership" is intended neither for peace nor for reunification.

Our stand toward UN membership is one for peace and reunification, whereas that of the South Korean puppets is one for increasing tensions and division.

Their campaign for "UN membership" cannot be justified either in view of our nation's will to achieve reunification or in view of the UN charter and the resolution of the UN General Assembly.

Any act of encouraging or sympathizing with the scheme of the separatists for "UN membership" which would result in a permanent division of Korea will be an interference in the internal affairs of our nation, an act of increasing the tensions on the Korean peninsula and hampering its reunification.

The No Tae-u group must act with discretion, clearly seeing what doom its predecessors met in trying to attain their treacherous aim by depending on outside forces, turning their back on the nation.

**Pyongyang Protests U.S. 'Aerial Espionage'**

**SK2911114389 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1101 GMT**  
**29 Nov 89**

[Text] Pyongyang November 29 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists committed an aerial espionage on the depth and vast areas of the northern half of Korea by letting the high-altitude strategic reconnaissance plane "U-2" make a shuttle flight from the West Sea to the East Sea of our country along the Military Demarcation Line from around 07:00 today, according to military sources.

They carried out such aerial espionage on November 28, too. Its cases numbered 25 in November.

On November 28, they brought "E-3" AWACS into the air above South Korea from Okinawa, their overseas aggressive base, and committed an aerial espionage on the depth of the northern half of Korea by letting it make a shuttle flight for hours from the East to the West in the air above the area near the Military Demarcation Line. Such cases numbered 14 in one month.

They persistently committed aerial espionage by letting reconnaissance planes including the "RV-1" make shuttle flights on several occasions every day from the East to the West. Its cases numbered more than 120 in the same period.

Such acts of aerial espionage which are getting more unscrupulous each day reveal more glaringly the aggressive and belligerent color of the U.S. imperialists.

**Daily Denounces U.S. Sanctions Against PRC**

**SK2611091689 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0811 GMT**  
**26 Nov 89**

[Text] Pyongyang November 26 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN in a signed commentary today notes that both houses of the United States recently adopted "amendment bills on sanctions against China" of the U.S. State Department.

The quelling of the counter-revolutionary riot in Beijing in June this year was a sovereign step taken in accordance with the Constitution and law and a domestic affair of the Chinese people in which nobody is allowed to interfere, says the commentary.

Whatever may happen in China, an independent and sovereign state, across the ocean, it is none of the United States' business, the news analyst says, and goes on:

However, the U.S. imperialists put pressure on it, hurling abuses and slanders at the internal affair of China, and adopted even "amendment bills" on "sanctions." This is a crude infringement on the sovereignty of China and an insult to the Chinese people. It is an insolent hegemonist act of the U.S. imperialists who behave arbitrarily in disregard of international law and usage and the sovereignty of other countries.

The United States' interference in the home affairs of China and malicious smear campaign against it are an offspring of the U.S. imperialists' anti-socialist strategy. They resort to political and economic pressure and military threats and blackmail and intensify ideological and cultural offensive to annihilate socialist countries. They are trying hard to destabilize the situation in socialist countries, disorganize them by every conceivable means and stretch their hand of interference to them if an occasion presented itself.

When the counter-revolutionary riot broke out in China they lost no time in setting in motion mass media intentionally to spread false reports and rumors and encouraged the counter-revolutionary insurgents, and openly put pressure on the Chinese Government, speaking ill of its revolutionary steps.

The "amendment bills" on "sanctions" against China adopted recently in the U.S. Congress are an extension of such anti-China moves and that shows they still pursue the ill-advised scheme to obstruct the socialist construction of the Chinese people.

It is an anachronistic dream for them to act the judge proceeding from their own interests, while meddling with other's business. The days are gone when the imperialists could have everything their way.

The U.S. imperialists' moves against China will end in failure.

### Czech Counterpart Replies to Yon Hyong-muk

SK2811044189 Pyongyang Domestic Service  
in Korean 1300 GMT 26 Nov 89

[Text] Comrade Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the State Administration Council, received a reply message from Comrade Ladislav Adamec, premier of Czechoslovakia, for sending him a congratulatory message on the occasion of the 71st anniversary of the founding of the independent state of Czechoslovakia.

The reply message indicated that he truly thanks him for the sincere congratulations and expressed the firm belief that the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Korea will further develop in the future according to the interest of the peoples of the two countries, and in the advantage of peace and progress of the world. It also hoped that there would be new results in fulfilling the decisions of the Congress of the Sixth Workers' Party of Korea.

### Talks With Romanian Premier Held in Bucharest

SK2711045989 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0450 GMT  
27 Nov 89

[Text] Pyongyang November 27 (KCNA)—Talks were held in Bucharest on November 24 between Yon Hyong-muk, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and Premier

of the Administration Council, and Constantin Dascalescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Prime Minister of the Government.

Discussed at the talks were the questions of further strengthening and developing the friendly and cooperative relations between the two parties, two countries and two peoples in the spirit agreed upon at the talks and meetings between the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and respected Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu.

The talks took place in a friendly atmosphere.

The Prime Minister of the Romanian Government arranged a dinner for the delegation of the Workers' Party of Korea in the evening.

### O Chin-u Meets Soviet Military Academy Delegation

SK2711112089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1015 GMT  
27 Nov 89

[Text] Pyongyang November 27 (KCNA)—O Chin-u, minister of People's Armed Forces, today met and had a friendly talk with a delegation of the V.I. Lenin military-political academy headed by Colonel General M. F. Kizyun, director of the Academy.

Present there were Lieutenant General of the Korean People's Army O Ki-su and Soviet ambassador to Korea Gennadi Bartshevich and the military attache of his embassy.

### Papers Celebrate Mongolian Founding Anniversary

SK2611092089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0806 GMT  
26 Nov 89

[Text] Pyongyang November 26 (KCNA)—Papers here today dedicate articles to the 65th anniversary of the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR].

A signed article of NODONG SINMUN says:

With the proclamation of the MPR the Mongolian people vigorously embarked upon the road of building a new society as genuine masters of the country.

Today they are making strenuous efforts to implement the decisions of the 19th party congress and complete the laying of material and technical foundations of socialism.

All the achievements of the MPR are a brilliant fruition of the correct line of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party on transition from feudal society directly to socialist society and of the creative endeavours of the Mongolian people.

The friendly and cooperative relations between the Korean and Mongolian peoples have constantly consolidated and developed in the course of the common

struggle against imperialism and for the victory of the cause of peace and socialism.

The visit to Mongolia by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song last year and the visit to Korea by respected Comrade Jambyn Batmonh in 1986 were epochal events in the history of the Korea-Mongolia friendship.

The strengthening of friendship and unity between the two countries is greatly conducive to strengthening the socialist forces and defending peace and security in this region.

The Korean people believe that the friendly and cooperative relations between Korea and Mongolia will expand and develop to a new height with every passing day in the spirit of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

A signed article of MINJU CHOSON says the Korean people sincerely wishes the Mongolian people greater success in their endeavours to implement the decisions of the 19th party congress and defend peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region against the imperialist moves toward aggression and war.

#### **Assembly Head Meets Guinean Delegation**

*SK2811113589 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1027 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 28 (KCNA)—Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly [SPA], today met and had a friendly talk with the delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea led by its Secretary General Mohamed Sanfil which paid a courtesy call on him.

#### **Albanian Photo, Film Shows Held in North**

*SK2711215589 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1527 GMT  
27 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 27 (KCNA)—A photo exhibition opened and a film show was held Monday at the Chollima House of Culture on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the liberation and the victory of people's revolution of Albania.

Present there were O Mun-han, vice-chairman of the Korean committee for cultural relations with foreign countries, other officials concerned and working people in the city.

Ismail Djalosh, Albanian ambassador to Korea, and his embassy officials and cultural officials of different embassies here were invited.

Speeches were made at the photo show.

Then the attendants saw photographs showing the achievements made by the Albanian people in the political, economic and cultural fields over the past 45 years after the victory of the revolution and appreciated an Albanian film.

#### **Albanian Film Week Opens in Pyongyang**

*SK2811114689 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1038 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 28 (KCNA)—An Albanian film week began on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the liberation and the victory of the people's revolution in Albania.

An opening ceremony of the week was held today at the Pyongyang International House of Cinema.

Present there were vice-minister of Culture and Art Kim Chang-kuk and other officials concerned and working people in the city.

Albanian Ambassador to Korea Ismail Nezir Djaloshi and his embassy officials were invited.

Speeches were made there.

Then the attendants appreciated an Albanian feature film "in the name of freedom".

Albanian feature films will be screened at cinema houses in Pyongyang.

#### **Worker's Party Official Meets European Figures**

*SK2811052089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0445 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 28 (KCNA)—Director of a department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] Kim Yong-sun, head of the WPK delegation on a visit to France, met with officials of the European Parliament [EP] and various countries.

On the 24th of November the head of the delegation met and had a conversation with former Maltese Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff who came to Paris to attend the enlarged meeting of the Extraordinary Executive Committee of the International Liaison Committee for the Reunification and Peace of Korea.

Dominic Mintoff asked him to convey his wholehearted greetings to respected President Kim Il-song and Comrade Kim Chong-il.

Noting that President Kim Il-song is not only the leader of the Korean people but also the outstanding leader of the world people, he gave his impressions of his Korean visit.

On November 23 the head of the delegation separately met and had a talk with Enrico Vinci, secretary general, and Wilfried Telkamper, vice-president, of the European Parliament, Maria Santos, president of the group of the

Green Party of Portugal, Antonio Iodis, vice-president of the Group of the European Popular Party, Michael Hindley, labour member of the Parliament of Britain, Proinsias de Rossa, workers' member of the Parliament of Ireland, Marie Christine Aulas, Green member of the Parliament of France, and Sean Garland, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Ireland.

The secretary general of the European Parliament wished to see more brisk contact between the EP and Korea, saying that the EP would take a fair stand toward the Korean problem in the future.

The vice-president of the EP noted that he would carry on various work with keen interest in the Korean problem in the future.

He underscored the need to make the EP take a fair stand toward the Korean problem in the days ahead.

### Daily Calls for Strong Party Leadership

SK2611085689 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0824 GMT  
26 Nov 89

[Text] Pyongyang November 26 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comes out with a signed article titled "To Strengthen Party's Leadership is Fundamental Guarantee for Advancing Along the Road of Socialism to the End."

Dear Comrade Kim Chong-il said:

"Without the party's leadership it would be impossible to ensure the unity of the people in ideology and will, display the superiority of collectivism that is inherent in socialism, and beat the untridden path of communism."

Saying that to strengthen party's leadership is, above all, a fundamental guarantee for capturing the ideological fortress of socialism and communism, the article says that it is impossible to carry out the most arduous and complicated work of remoulding man in reliance upon the efforts of an economic working organ, without the party's leadership, the body of political leadership.

It continues:

The working masses accelerate socialist construction by displaying their consciousness befitting the master of revolution and a high degree of creative zeal where the working-class party is powerful and it conducts constant political and ideological education. On the contrary, when this work is neglected and efforts are directed only to the economic technical work, people fall ill, contaminated with wrong ideas, and then it is impossible even to maintain socialist society. This is shown by historical experiences.

The ideological and material fortresses of communism can be scaled only under the party's leadership and socialism without the party's leadership cannot be a true socialism.

To strengthen the party's leadership is also a decisive factor in dynamically propelling the construction of socialism and communism by firmly building up the might of the subject of the revolution.

As our experience shows, when we have a powerful united party and enhance its leading role, we can unite millions of and tens of millions of the entire people into one steel-like integral whole in ideology and purpose. On the contrary, when the party is divided and so are the masses, and party ails ideologically, the masses, too, fall ill, making it impossible to achieve the organisational and ideological unity and, in the long run, the subject of the revolution becomes impotent.

Without the party's leadership, unity and cohesion cannot be achieved, disorder cannot be evaded and socialism which is built in an organized and planned manner is inconceivable.

The party's leadership is also a powerfull means of smashing the anti-socialist moves of class enemies and defending and adhering to socialism.

The party, a militant unit steadfastly safeguarding the interests of the working class, sees to it that the intrinsic collectivist nature of socialism, a society of the working class, is firmly upheld in the political, economic, cultural and all other fields and a resolute fight is waged against the slightest elements going against it. So there is no room for the capitalist elements to make their way in any of the political, economic and cultural fields when the party's leadership is strengthened. Only when the leadership of the working-class party is strictly guaranteed, is it possible to thoroughly defend the socialist political system involving the planned economic system, the socialist ownership of the means of production and the socialist cultural system and give full play to their advantages.

The working-class party is, indeed, not only a guide to socialism and communism but also its staunch defender and champion, declares the article.

### Technical Innovations Seen in Rail Transport

SK2711101289 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0959 GMT  
27 Nov 89

[Text] Pyongyang November 27 (KCNA)—Railway workers and technicians have carried into practice more than 200 inventions and over 56,000 technical innovation proposals during the past ten years through a powerful massive technical innovation drive.

A signal [as received] success has been registered in the work to complete the electrification of railways and a great advance made in replacing transport means and equipment with heavy and high-speed ones, realizing automation and computerization and stepping up the modernisation of railway transport.

Technicians and workers of the June 4 rolling stock complex and the Kim Chong-tae electric locomotive

complex have made technical preparations for the increased production of 100-ton wagons and 8-axle electric locomotives and resolved scientific and technical problems arising in making chucks and equipment and producing electric locomotives, thus making a great contribution to increasing transport capacity.

The Pyongyang and Hamhung marshalling yard stations realised automation, increasing the capacity of marshalling yard 2-3 times. And the automation of many stations and railway sections including the railway command of the Pyongyang-Sinsongchon line has been completed to markedly raise traffic capacity.

Achievements in railway transport are a clear demonstration of the validity and vitality of the technical innovation policy of the Workers' Party of Korea.

### Daily Denounces No's Speech on Human Rights

*SK2811054689 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0506 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[“Shameless False Propaganda of Fascist Tyrant”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang November 28 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u blared before West German businessmen some time ago that “all the political prisoners were released” and “all manner of violation of human rights has disappeared” in South Korea with “a progress in democratisation and liberalisation”.

Commenting on this, NODONG SINMUN today brands this as a prattle to evade the denunciation and condemnation by public opinion at home and abroad by covering up his crimes in turning South Korea into the worst zone of human rights violation in the world, into a zone of fascist rowdyism.

The news analyst says:

Arrest without a warrant, torture-killing, trial and punishment under fascist laws are not uncommon in South Korea.

When the traitor No asserted in West Germany that there was no violation of human rights in South Korea, “Radio Christian” of South Korea revealed that the number of those taken into custody by the puppets on the charge of the violation of the “National Security Law” increased 2.6 times and the number of those arrested on the charge of the violation of the labour law jumped 4.6 times in the first ten months of this year as compared with the same period last year. The “offenders of political coloring” arrested by the No Tae-u “regime” number 2,094, twice as many as in the period of the “Fifth Republic”. This was disclosed by none other than the puppet home minister.

To wrap up in silk the reality of South Korea, a barren land of human rights as the whole world admits, and to hypocritically beat the drum of “human rights” is a

ridiculous act which can be done only by such shameless fascist tyrant and hooligan as No Tae-u.

The traitor No is making preposterous, false propaganda to conceal from the world his true color as a colonial military dictator and the fascist scene of the South Korean society by all means and thus escape from his political and economic crisis and his isolation within and without. But nobody would lend an ear to him.

As long as South Korea remains under the colonial military dictatorial rule of the U.S. imperialists and the No Tae-u group, the democratic development of the South Korean society and guarantee of human rights cannot be expected.

If the No group has the slightest intention to democratize the South Korean society, it should abolish the military dictatorial system and step down from “power”.

### Communist Indoctrination Work Stressed

*SK2811090089 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2100 GMT 24 Nov 89*

[NODONG SINMUN 25 November editorial: “Let Us Further Intensify Communist Indoctrination Among Party Members and the Working People”]

[Text] Today, we are faced with the heavy but honorable task of vigorously accelerating the grand march of socialism, and of further enhancing the superiority of the socialist system of our country by continuously maintaining the surging revolutionary spirit. What is important in carrying out this task is to further strengthen communist indoctrination work among party members and the working people.

Our party, proceeding from the practical demands of our constantly deepening and developing revolution, has stressed the need to further strengthen communist indoctrination work without letup. Thoroughly implementing this intent of the party is precisely an important task on which party organizations of all levels should concentrate great efforts.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and secretary of the party Central Committee, has indicated: To turn party members and the working people into genuine communists who have been firmly armed with the class consciousness of the working class, it is imperative to strengthen revolutionary indoctrination, communist indoctrination, among them.

Communist indoctrination is part of the indoctrination in the chuche idea and is an important ideological indoctrination work that our party has consistently carried out. To successfully carry out socialist and communist construction, it is more important than anything else to indoctrinate and encourage people to become genuine communist human beings and to occupy the ideological fortress of communism. Genuine communist human beings, that is to say, communist revolutionaries of the

chuche type, are precisely those who define loyalty to the party and the leader as their first life and who have the noblest communist features and temperament. Such ideological and mental features are cultivated through communist indoctrination, together with indoctrination in loyalty, indoctrination in the revolutionary tradition, and indoctrination in the party's policy.

Only by constantly strengthening communist indoctrination can we encourage people to become communist revolutionaries who resolutely struggle for the party, the revolution, the fatherland, and the people, with high class consciousness, collectivist spirit, and noble socialist and patriotic spirit. Therefore, communist indoctrination occupies an important position in the ideological indoctrination work by the party of the working class which is building socialism. The wisdom of the party of the working class which properly carries out political and ideological indoctrination work among the people and socialist construction finds expression emphatically in firmly grasping and properly carrying out this indoctrination work.

Properly carrying out communist indoctrination work among party members and the working people is of great significance in extensively enhancing the extraordinary superiority of the socialist system. As elucidated by dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, the problem of enhancing the superiority of the socialist system is closely related to the social, cultural, and political level of the popular masses who are the masters of this social system. Although the socialist system has boundless potential, all members of society cannot enhance the superiority of the new social system, if they fail to have the communist ideological and mental features suitable to this new social system. Therefore, the ways of carrying out the difficult and vast tasks which arise in socialist and communist construction should be sought precisely in strengthening communist indoctrination among people and, thus, constantly enhancing their political and ideological level. This is the genuine path which adheres to the principle of socialism and which glorifies its dignity.

Historic experience shows that if the indoctrination work to enhance communist ideological consciousness among the popular masses is not strengthened, this increases the influence of bourgeois ideologies, paralyzes the popular masses' revolutionary consciousness, makes it impossible to further consolidate and develop the socialist system, and thus drives the already attained revolutionary gains into danger.

Since an early date, our party has deeply discerned the great significance and importance of communist indoctrination and has concentrated great efforts on this.

In particular, in November 1958, right after the socialist system was established for the first time in our country, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song published the historic classical work: On Communist Indoctrination, extensively elucidated all theoretical and practical problems which arise in communist indoctrination work, and

thus, saw to it that an epochal change was effected in ideological reform work. Thanks to the communist indoctrination policy set forth by the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song and the wise leadership of the leader, the work of occupying the ideological and political fortresses of socialist and communist construction has been constantly strengthened and developed in our country. Our party's ideological indoctrination work has been vigorously pushed ahead to a new high stage in the period of modeling the whole society after the chuche idea.

The dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, while continuously glorifying the immortal achievements of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, has made decisive progress in communist indoctrination work among party members and the working people in conformity with the demands of the developing reality. The practical experience of our party which has thoroughly embodied its communist indoctrination policy has proved the valuable truth that, to build socialism, the problem of indoctrinating the people the communist way should be firmly grasped above all, and this principle should always be adhered to.

Thanks to the correct ideological indoctrination policy and the leadership of the party and the leader, our society today has been changed into a sound socialist society in which communist ideological and mental features overflow. Our party members and working people enthusiastically love their system and have firmly defend it with lofty class consciousness. They are working and struggling faithfully under the communist slogan: One for all, all for one. They are working hard, devoting their all, not for the sake of their individual honor or some bits of money, but only in the interests of the party, the revolution, society, and the people. As the people who are carrying out the revolution, they are continually moving forward and continually introducing innovation with firm faith in the victory of the revolution—and with overflowing revolutionary zeal. This is precisely the ideological and mental features that our people have today.

Today, the banner of socialism and communism flies high over the fatherland, the sound of the drum of the revolution reverberates dynamically, and the whole of society overflows with noble communist features. This is clear proof of the correctness and vitality of our party's chuche-oriented ideological indoctrination policy. The might of unity and cohesion that our people vigorously demonstrated again in the recent elections of deputies to local organs of power cannot be thought of apart from the leadership of our party.

We should continuously strengthen and develop communist indoctrination work among party members and the working people based on the success and experience attained in the past. Strengthening communist indoctrination during the present period is an indispensable requirement for effecting a revolutionary upsurge in all fields by giving new impetus to the grand march of

**socialism and for more firmly building the party and the ranks of the revolution in conformity with the demands of the prevailing situation.**

The duty assigned to us in socialist construction is very weighty and vast. We should complete the Third 7-Year Plan ahead of schedule by accelerating the revolution and construction under the banner of the three revolutions—ideological, technological, and cultural. Thus, we should completely solve the rural problem of socialism and achieve the complete victory of socialism. We should carry out this vast task in the peculiar socialist way, that is to say, by reforming the ideology of the working people and enhancing their revolutionary zeal and initiative.

Communist indoctrination is the mighty indoctrination work which implants in people communist faith, firm faith in the invincibility of the socialist cause, which cultivates among them a clean and pure spirit with which they can struggle for the party and the revolution, jumping into fire and water, and which inculcates a lofty communist attitude toward labor among them. Only when all party members and the working people are thoroughly armed precisely with such a spirit can they highly display mass heroism everywhere and create amazing miracles and innovations in the implementation of revolutionary tasks assigned by the party.

The way to make great strides in the revolution and construction today again, as all the people scored a breakthrough in the most difficult situation in our revolution—upholding the call of the party and the leader during the period of the Great Chollima Upswing—is to push ahead steadfastly the work of indoctrinating the party members and working people in a communist way.

We are now accelerating socialist construction at a time when the imperialists are stepping up antisocialist maneuvers more than ever before. The brunt of the attack of the imperialists' maneuvers to block the advance of socialism is aimed at infiltrating the bourgeois ideology and culture and corrupt way of living into the popular masses and ridding them of their faith in socialism. The struggle to crush these vicious maneuvers of the enemy of the revolution is a serious class struggle in the ideological domain.

The important way to crush the imperialists' ideological and cultural infiltration and strengthen the political and ideological unity and cohesion of the revolutionary ranks is to continuously intensify revolutionary indoctrination and communist indoctrination with the party members and working people. If all the party members and working people maintain high class consciousness, despise imperialism and its ideology and culture, are firmly convinced of the absolute superiority of socialism, and live and struggle militantly, we will have nothing to be afraid of, no matter what wind may blow.

When all the people maintain this spirit and mettle, our revolutionary ranks will be further solidified to become invincible, and their might will be highly demonstrated.

Truly, communist indoctrination work is a mighty weapon to crush the enemy's reactionary ideological offensive with the revolutionary offensive, and it is an important work to add luster to the might and dignity of the chuche fatherland which is successfully building socialism. All the party organizations and functionaries should strongly bear in mind the fact that the future of our socialist system and the success of the revolution and construction depend on intensifying communist indoctrination with the party members and working people, and make great efforts for this work.

An important problem in intensifying communist indoctrination at present is to vigorously conduct the class indoctrination work to firmly arm the party members and working people with the class consciousness of the working class. Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and secretary of the party Central Committee, has noted: We should intensify the class indoctrination with the party members and working people so that they can distinguish enemy from friends and resolutely adhere to the revolutionary position of the working class in the revolution and construction. Moreover, since we are engaged in the revolution while face to face with the class enemy—including the U.S. imperialists occupying South Korea and their stooges—we must place major emphasis on class indoctrination.

A fundamental part of communist indoctrination is class indoctrination. The class consciousness of the working class is the essence of communist ideology, and class indoctrination is an essential requirement in bringing up a communist man. Under the historical condition where the revolution is continually being developed and the change of generations is constantly under way, intensifying class indoctrination is essential to the firm passage of the revolution from generation to generation and to the successful solving of the problem of bringing up communist people.

The process of socialist and communist construction is a process of remaking nature, society, and man as demanded by the working class in order to working-classify the entire society, and this process involves serious class struggle. The more socialist construction progresses, the more we should intensify class indoctrination to awaken the party members and working people vis-a-vis classes and to make them wage a vigorous struggle for the victory of the cause of the working class in the face of any difficulties and trials. In particular, under the condition where the imperialists are engaged in vicious maneuvers to demolish the revolutionary forces from within, class indoctrination is more important than ever.

We should see to it that, looking straight at the reactionary essence of the corrupt and diseased capitalist society from a working class viewpoint, party members and the working people absolutely hate imperialism and the exploitative system and resolutely struggle against them. Party organizations at all levels should inculcate in

party members and the working people not only the deep realization of the true colors of the imperialists—who indulge in bravado and bluster on the eve of their ruin—the inevitability of their ruin, and the inevitability of the victory of socialism, but should also teach them to cherish in their hearts high dignity and honor as the people who are building socialism. Along with this, party organizations of all levels should not only indoctrinate party members and the working people not to forget the U.S. and Japanese imperialists' atrocities committed in Korea, and the past period when they were exploited and oppressed, but also inculcate in them the spirit of infinite hatred of the antipopular fascist ruling system in South Korea.

In particular, party organizations of all levels should further strengthen class indoctrination among youngsters who have never undergone exploitation and oppression in the past and who have never experienced the trials of the arduous revolutionary struggle. Thus, party organizations of all levels should see to it that the new generations clearly know how the new life of socialism that they are enjoying today was provided, that they enthusiastically love their socialist system and resolutely defend it, and that they continue to carry out the revolution to the end, generation after generation.

Collectivist indoctrination occupies an important position in communist indoctrination. Collectivism is the basis of life in socialist and communist society and is the peculiar way of activity of communists. Only by strengthening collectivist indoctrination can we do away with individualism and egoism and foster people to become those genuine communist human beings who devote their all for society and groups. Strengthening collectivism is an important task to extensively enhance the superiority of the socialist system of our country.

Collectivism is the life of socialism. The essential superiority of the socialist system finds expression in the fact that all the people are firmly united as one on the basis of revolutionary duty and comradely love and help each other under the principle of: One for all, all for one. Collectivist indoctrination should be strengthened among party members and the working people. Thus, we should see to it that the foundation of our socialist system is further consolidated and that the united might of our people is more vigorously demonstrated in socialist construction.

Party organizations should indoctrinate party members and the working people to see to it that they are armed with the collectivist spirit of opposing individualism and egoism, treasuring the interests of groups and society, and struggling, devoting their all. Along with this, by seeing to it that all party members and the working people thoroughly implement the party's slogan: Let all of us live and struggle heroically, party organizations should lead them to highly display the collectivist spirit in their practical struggle for socialist construction.

It is also important to constantly strengthen indoctrination in socialist patriotism among party members and the working people. Socialist patriotism is patriotism of the working class and the working popular masses who are advancing toward socialism and communism. It is the spirit of loving the socialist fatherland where the party of the working class, the people's government, and the socialist system exist. Only when party members and the working people are armed with this spirit can they be firmly prepared to become not only genuine patriots who are struggling to build a communist paradise in their country, but also thorough communist revolutionaries of the chuche type.

Our socialist fatherland today radiates brilliance as the people's paradise and as a model country of socialism where the genuine life and happiness of the working people are flowering. All party members and the working people should have the high national dignity and honor of living under the most superior socialist system and should have the firm ideological determination to carry out the revolution and construction under the party's leadership, in conformity with our people's aspiration and the specific situation of our country, and in our own style. All party organizations should deeply inculcate among the people the extraordinary superiority of our country's socialist system and teach how our superior socialist system has been provided in our country today, so that they firmly defend this system and further glorify it.

Party organizations should implant the spirit of loving labor in the working people so they become fond of working and struggling, and consequently the whole country will seethe with creation and innovation. It is important, in strengthening communist indoctrination among party members and working people, to lead them to infinitely love the future of communism and to struggle for it with optimism and a firm faith in victory.

Communism is the brilliant future of mankind, and it is the inviolable iron rule in the development of history that imperialism perishes and communism is victorious. Revolutionaries can only continue to carry out the revolution to the end under all circumstances, adhering to class stand and revolutionary principles, when they infinitely love the future and have faith in certain victory.

All party organizations should inculcate party members and the working people with the experiences of our revolution which has been victorious while breaking through the arduous road of the revolution and should, thus, see to it that they staunchly fight toward the brilliant future of communism with a firm faith, that only when they advance along the most correct revolutionary line under the leadership of the party and the leader, can they always be victorious.

In carrying out communist indoctrination work among party members and the working people, various forms and methods should be used in a substantial manner. Carrying out communist indoctrination in combination

with the basic principle of the chuche idea is very important. The chuche idea elucidates the basic principle of the revolutionary movement and all ideological and mental features that communist revolutionaries should have. Therefore, communist indoctrination can attain its desired success only when it is carried out based on the chuche idea.

Party organizations, by carrying out communist indoctrination work in close combination with the principle of the chuche idea, should see to it that party members and the working people have the deep awareness of being the master of the revolution and that they vigorously struggle for the victory of the revolutionary cause of realizing the popular masses' independence. Thus, party organizations should see to it that party members and the working people actively contribute to further strengthening the main force of our revolution.

Party organizations, by carrying out communist indoctrination in close combination with indoctrination in loyalty, indoctrination in the revolutionary tradition, and indoctrination in the party's policies, should see to it that party members and the working people prepare themselves to become resolute revolutionaries, who struggle to the end for the victory of the socialist and communist cause.

The basic textbooks in strengthening communist indoctrination are the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song's classical works and the party's documents. The respected and beloved leader's classical works, including "On Communist Indoctrination," "Our People's Army Is the Army of the Working Class and the Revolution," and "Class Political Indoctrination Should Be Strengthened Continuously," and the dear Comrade Kim Chong-il's documents, including "On Some Problems of Education in the Chuche Idea" and "On Firmly Establishing the Chuche View of the Revolution" not only have extensively synthesized all theoretical and practical problems to strengthen communist indoctrination and class indoctrination, but have also clearly elucidated concrete tasks and ways.

Party organizations of all levels should carry out in depth the work of strengthening communist indoctrination among party members and the working people, using the original copies of the classical works. All fields and units should strengthen study on classical works related to communist indoctrination, and in particular, the study of classical works should be conducted through the method of discussion meetings. Thus, party organizations in all fields and units should see to it that all party members and the working people deeply realize the ideologies and theories of the party and the leader, and think and act according to these ideologies and theories of the party.

What is important in carrying out communist indoctrination in a substantial manner is to carry it out in combination with practical struggle. One of the important purposes of communist indoctrination is to see to it

that party members and the working people struggle, devoting their all for society, groups, the party, and the revolution, not for their individual interest and remuneration.

What is important in communist indoctrination in the present period is to actively contribute to seeing that all functionaries and the working people devotedly struggle to implement the intent of the party and the leader, not seeking credit or remuneration like unheralded heroes and regardless of whether someone sees or not. Party organizations of all levels should see to it that all functionaries and the working people have a high sense of responsibility for their revolutionary duties, and devote all their energies and wisdom to faithfully implementing the struggle tasks assigned by the party. In particular, party organizations should see to it that all the working people unanimously launch into the movement to cultivate their villages and streets, and the movement to cultivate their farm fields with the attitude of befitting the master of the country's economy.

The method of indoctrination to influence people by positive examples is a major method that our party has consistently adhered to in communist indoctrination. Party organizations should find out positive models which are being created in the course of waging the movement to win the red flag of the three revolutions, and the movement to emulate the examples set by unheralded heroes should give encouragement to them. At the same time, they should actively support and encourage the fine communistic customs and manners which are being enhanced among the masses, and should generalize these fine communistic customs and manners. Thus, they should see to it that the whole society further seethes with the fine communist custom of helping and leading each other and struggling together under the slogan, "One For All, All For One."

Thanks to the party's correct ideological indoctrination policy and its leadership, all party members and the working people have been firmly prepared to become chuche-type communist revolutionaries and the noble communist features are being enhanced in all of society. This is our great pride.

By deeply realizing the intent of the party to strengthen communist indoctrination work and by constantly strengthening and developing the work, all party organizations and functionaries should vigorously accelerate the socialist and communist cause under the banner of chuche. sent 28 nov

#### \* Missile Development in DPRK Continues

902C0022A Seoul KUGBANGGWA KISUL in Korean  
No 127, Sep 89 pp 6-15

[Article by Major Yi Tae-ho: "Trends and Prospects in North Korea's Guided Missile Development"]

[Text] "North Korean ground forces are producing and deploying the improved-performance SCUD-B missiles

and the land-based antiship Samlet and Silkworm missiles with a range of 85 kilometers on the east and west coasts and are increasing their tactical missile threat by subjecting the outer harbor of Inchon on the west coast and Sokcho on the east coast to the threat of attack. In 1969-70, North Korea introduced for the first time the FROG-5 (the Soviet Luna-2) and the FROG 7-A (the Soviet R-65, Luna-M), and by the mid-1970's had embarked on a plan to produce a reverse-engineered version of the FROG 7-A by itself. An important underlying motive was Kim Il-song's chuche thought and the weakening of North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union."

In the wake of the 8-year-long war of attrition between Iran and Iraq, what people have focused on primarily is the utilization, development, and rapid increased deployment of tactical missiles in the Third World manifested in the surface-to-surface tactical missiles used in the attacks of both sides against cities and the use of the Silkworm missile in the area of the Persian Gulf.

What has been most unexpected and least discussed is the supply of North Korean-made missiles and the transfer of missile technology to Iran.

In particular, as seen in the "White Paper on National Defense"—which was published in 1988, for the first time since the founding of the ROK Army—the North Korean ground forces are producing and deploying improved-performance SCUD-B missiles and the land-based antiship Samlet and Silkworm missiles with a range of 85 kilometers on the east and west coasts and are increasing their tactical missile threat by subjecting the outer harbor of Inchon on the west coast and Sokcho on the east coast to the threat of attack.

In 1969-70, North Korea introduced for the first time the FROG-5 (the Soviet Luna-2) and the FROG 7-A (the Soviet R-65, Luna-M) and by the mid-1970's had embarked on a plan to produce by itself a reverse-engineered version of the FROG 7-A. Important underlying motives were Kim Il-song's chuche thought and the weakening of North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union.

When the Soviets furnished the North with rockets, they also provided high-explosive shell warheads, but North Korea broke away from external constraints and developed chemical projectile warheads for the FROG-5 and FROG 7-A.

#### SCUD-B Missile Program

In return for North Korea's assistance at the time of the Middle East war in 1973, Egypt turned over to North Korea several SS-1C "SCUD-B" missiles (the Soviet R-17E) that had been provided by the Soviet Union, and promised cooperation in the missile development field.

Following the acquisition of the missiles and Egypt's decision to provide cooperation, North Korea embarked on a revamping of its missile development program. Its

thrust was to discard the FROG 7-A program and replace it with a program of research and development on a new missile that was a reverse-engineered version of the SCUD-B. This also could be an improved version of the SCUD-B (SCUD-PIP [Product Improvement Program]).

In these efforts, North Korea not only received assistance from Egypt, but also requested and received technical assistance from China in the fields of rocket engine design and production, metallurgy, and air frame technology.

Despite the launching of the ambitious SCUD-B program, because of technical difficulties and the severe economic crisis of the late 1970's, progress was very slow. This situation continued until the middle of the 1980s with no basic change.

For a variety of reasons the Iranian Government approached China and North Korea for tactical guided missiles and missile technology.

These factors included the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's use of the FROG 7-A and SCUD-B missiles and that Iran had been unable to acquire any comparable weapons system anywhere (except for a very small number obtained from Libya).

In the agreement believed to have been reached in mid-1985, it was agreed that in return for financial support of North Korea's SCUD-B missile program, Iran would have the option of purchasing missile-related technology and the SCUD-B missiles that North Korea would produce.

Even before receiving Iran's assistance, North Korea had devoted extensive efforts to obtaining foreign technology aimed at supporting its own SCUD-B missile and other missile programs.

During the period 1982-87, North Korea had secretly acquired frequency-measurement devices and integrated circuitry technology from NATO countries and Japan. Its integrated circuit factory (the Pyongyang Semiconductor Production Plant) was assigned this mission. It was completed in April 1987 with the assistance of the UN Development Program (UNDP).

In October 1984 Iranian businessman (Babek Seroush) and Soviet immigrant Yuri Geifman were charged and indicted in New York in connection with a plot to divert to North Korea precision parts to be used in missile guidance devices and night-vision equipment.

In December 1987 a North Korean businessman based in Osaka, Japan and some Japanese were charged with suspicion of illegally importing to North Korea COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls]-restricted items including 6 synchrosopes, 2 micro-frequency counters, and 263 integrated circuits.

Also in March 1988 North Korean personnel tried but failed to clandestinely acquire Japanese-made computers by first exporting them to Singapore, and then to Indonesia.

This series of incidents spurred Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to adopt in October 1988 a measure prohibiting the foreign export of missile-related components. Before this ban, Japan had prohibited only the export of missile-auxiliary systems but permitted the export of parts.

At present it is not clear how much technology has been acquired from foreign technology and is reflected in North Korea's missile program, but this series of cases provides some clear evidence. At a minimum North Korea is developing the infrastructure required to produce by itself the missile-related parts and electronic components to further its missile program.

In January 1987, the ROK defense minister, knowing very little about the SCUD-B missile, announced that North Korea had recently carried out a missile test-firing in the area north of Wonsan, South Hamgyong Province. This is believed to have been perhaps the first successful firing of a SCUD-B missile assembled and manufactured in North Korea.

This announcement showed that North Korea's test facilities and presumed production facilities were located in the area north of Wonsan. Four months later, in June 1987, the Iranian Government concluded a \$5 million weapons purchase package with North Korea, including the purchase of 90 to 100 SCUD-B missiles. The delivery of the missiles is believed to have begun immediately after the conclusion of the contract and completed by the beginning of 1988.

In order to satisfy this supply agreement, the SCUD-B missile production capacity had to be around 8 to 10 missiles a month—a considerable number. One of the interesting facts in the SCUD-B missile program is that North Korea did not field-deploy the missiles that could be thrown into actual combat, but instead supplied them to Iran on a preferential basis.

It is believed that not only was this what the agreement with Iran called for, but also that North Korea gave preferential consideration to the fact that Iran had provided Pyongyang with economic assistance across the board, particularly financial support of the SCUD-B missile program. U.S. Defense Department sources verified in October 1988 that North Korea had imported SCUD-B missile components and assembled them.

It is still not known from where and what kind of parts were imported, but the import and assembly of components points to imports of rocket engines and guidance components from China, and other things are of a similar nature. So far there is no indication that the Soviet Union has supplied the North with components, but the possibility cannot be discounted.

The logical results of the SCUD-B missile program suggest that based on numerous factors, North Korea is aiming for production of a SCUD-PIP with improved accuracy and improved range (for example, to increase the range from 450 km to 600 km).

- The standard SCUD-B missile's 180-300-kilometer range cannot hit ROK strategic military rear area targets in the southern part of the peninsula and this is a fundamental of North Korean military strategy.
- Over a long period of time North Korea participated in Egypt's improved SCUD-B missile production program, and this included improvements in range and accuracy.
- The technologies required for improvement of the SCUD-B missile are virtually all available and such technologies are said to be located at the low end of the technology curve, as evidenced in Iraq's "Al-Husayn Program."
- Tactical-warhead missiles at present are one of the most important elements in Third World military planning.

The precision technology involved in the SCUD-B missile program and the results it has achieved are not known, but it is interesting to note that the development period on the whole follows exactly the experience of the Soviets, who carried out the original SCUD missile systems development.

The research and engineering of the North Korean SCUD-B missile is believed to have begun in the latter half of the 1970's, with first production in 1986, and development testing in the 1986-87 timeframe. The first North Korean-produced missiles were combat deployed in Iran in late 1987 and field deployed to the North Korean ground forces in late 1988.

According to this timetable, research and engineering on the SCUD-PIP began during 1986-87 and development tests were conducted in 1988-89. Field deployment is anticipated in late 1989. Chemical and bacteriological missile warhead development is also being pursued in the SCUD-B missile program.

#### **HY-2 Silkworm Missile Program**

##### **SSN2 Styx and SSC2B Samlet Acquisition: 1960-69**

North Korea first acquired anti-ship missiles in the 1960's when the Soviets agreed to supply North Korea with the SS-N-2 Styx (the Soviet P-15) and the SS-C-2B Samlet (Soviet S-2 SOPKA).

The first delivery of SS-N-2 Styx missiles to North Korea took place in the 1967-68 timeframe with the delivery of 4 Komar class speed attack boats. According to intelligence documents that have been released, the first SS-C-2B Samlet cruise missiles were delivered in mid-1972. There is a good possibility, however, that they were actually delivered between 1968 and 1969.

The initially delivered SS-C-2B Samlets consisted of 5 launchers, which were first deployed in the vicinity of major ports and naval bases on the east coast of North Korea (for example, Hamhung, Wonsan, and Najin). They replaced the existing heavy caliber artillery that had performed this coastal defense function. As deliveries continued, they were deployed additionally along

and the land-based antiship Samlet and Silkworm missiles with a range of 85 kilometers on the east and west coasts and are increasing their tactical missile threat by subjecting the outer harbor of Inchon on the west coast and Sokcho on the east coast to the threat of attack. In 1969-70, North Korea introduced for the first time the FROG-5 (the Soviet Luna-2) and the FROG 7-A (the Soviet R-65, Luna-M), and by the mid-1970's had embarked on a plan to produce a reverse-engineered version of the FROG 7-A by itself. An important underlying motive was Kim Il-song's chuche thought and the weakening of North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union."

In the wake of the 8-year-long war of attrition between Iran and Iraq, what people have focused on primarily is the utilization, development, and rapid increased deployment of tactical missiles in the Third World manifested in the surface-to-surface tactical missiles used in the attacks of both sides against cities and the use of the Silkworm missile in the area of the Persian Gulf.

What has been most unexpected and least discussed is the supply of North Korean-made missiles and the transfer of missile technology to Iran.

In particular, as seen in the "White Paper on National Defense"—which was published in 1988, for the first time since the founding of the ROK Army—the North Korean ground forces are producing and deploying improved-performance SCUD-B missiles and the land-based antiship Samlet and Silkworm missiles with a range of 85 kilometers on the east and west coasts and are increasing their tactical missile threat by subjecting the outer harbor of Inchon on the west coast and Sokcho on the east coast to the threat of attack.

In 1969-70, North Korea introduced for the first time the FROG-5 (the Soviet Luna-2) and the FROG 7-A (the Soviet R-65, Luna-M) and by the mid-1970's had embarked on a plan to produce by itself a reverse-engineered version of the FROG 7-A. Important underlying motives were Kim Il-song's chuche thought and the weakening of North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union.

When the Soviets furnished the North with rockets, they also provided high-explosive shell warheads, but North Korea broke away from external constraints and developed chemical projectile warheads for the FROG-5 and FROG 7-A.

#### SCUD-B Missile Program

In return for North Korea's assistance at the time of the Middle East war in 1973, Egypt turned over to North Korea several SS-1C "SCUD-B" missiles (the Soviet R-17E) that had been provided by the Soviet Union, and promised cooperation in the missile development field.

Following the acquisition of the missiles and Egypt's decision to provide cooperation, North Korea embarked on a revamping of its missile development program. Its

thrust was to discard the FROG 7-A program and replace it with a program of research and development on a new missile that was a reverse-engineered version of the SCUD-B. This also could be an improved version of the SCUD-B (SCUD-PIP [Product Improvement Program]).

In these efforts, North Korea not only received assistance from Egypt, but also requested and received technical assistance from China in the fields of rocket engine design and production, metallurgy, and air frame technology.

Despite the launching of the ambitious SCUD-B program, because of technical difficulties and the severe economic crisis of the late 1970's, progress was very slow. This situation continued until the middle of the 1980s with no basic change.

For a variety of reasons the Iranian Government approached China and North Korea for tactical guided missiles and missile technology.

These factors included the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's use of the FROG 7-A and SCUD-B missiles and that Iran had been unable to acquire any comparable weapons system anywhere (except for a very small number obtained from Libya).

In the agreement believed to have been reached in mid-1985, it was agreed that in return for financial support of North Korea's SCUD-B missile program, Iran would have the option of purchasing missile-related technology and the SCUD-B missiles that North Korea would produce.

Even before receiving Iran's assistance, North Korea had devoted extensive efforts to obtaining foreign technology aimed at supporting its own SCUD-B missile and other missile programs.

During the period 1982-87, North Korea had secretly acquired frequency-measurement devices and integrated circuitry technology from NATO countries and Japan. Its integrated circuit factory (the Pyongyang Semiconductor Production Plant) was assigned this mission. It was completed in April 1987 with the assistance of the UN Development Program (UNDP).

In October 1984 Iranian businessman (Babek Seroush) and Soviet immigrant Yuri Geifman were charged and indicted in New York in connection with a plot to divert to North Korea precision parts to be used in missile guidance devices and night-vision equipment.

In December 1987 a North Korean businessman based in Osaka, Japan and some Japanese were charged with suspicion of illegally importing to North Korea COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls]-restricted items including 6 synchroscopes, 2 micro-frequency counters, and 263 integrated circuits.

Also in March 1988 North Korean personnel tried but failed to clandestinely acquire Japanese-made computers by first exporting them to Singapore, and then to Indonesia.

This series of incidents spurred Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to adopt in October 1988 a measure prohibiting the foreign export of missile-related components. Before this ban, Japan had prohibited only the export of missile-auxiliary systems but permitted the export of parts.

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#### HY-2 Silkworm Missile Program

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the eastern and western coastal areas and these deliveries are believed to have continued until the early 1970's.

With the delivery of these two missile systems, not only was it possible to conduct training and support for these systems but also to conduct bench tests on these missiles and to dismantle and assemble them.

#### Revision of the Program and Chinese Assistance: 1969-74

Soviet-North Korean relations in the late 1960's worsened abruptly and following this the Soviet Union refused to supply Pyongyang with additional modern missile systems and was reluctant to modernize those missile systems it had already delivered. This step spurred North Korea to seek to raise the level of basic equipment and the capability to assemble it by itself.

In hopes of improving this capability and filling the gap stemming from the Soviet measures, North Korea approached the Chinese and succeeded in receiving cooperation in fields relating to the acquisition, production, and development of modern weapons. The important element in this joint effort was the transfer of China's reverse-engineered missile systems and missile R&D technology.

The first visible result of this cooperation was the reorganizing of the maintenance and assembly-production program established by the Soviets for the SA-2, FROG-5 (maintenance portion) and the SS-C-2B Samlet. Immediately after these measures, North Korea acquired China's reverse-engineered SA-2 missile and the SS-N-2 Styx, that is, the CSA-1 (in Chinese, Hong Qian—Red Leader—HQ-2) and the CSS-N-2 (in Chinese, Hai Ying—Sea Eagle—HY-1).

These missiles were all produced patterned after the Soviet-made missiles and in fact there were no modifications by the Chinese. (An interesting fact is that China did not produce the SS-C-2B Samlet and deployed only a small, limited number of them. With its limited performance it is deemed an obsolete weapon system.)

At that time China assisted North Korea and with the expansion, assembly production, and modernization of Pyongyang's missile program, it readjusted the program so that North Korea was ultimately able to produce the CSA-1/HQ-2 and the CSS-N-2/HY-1. Thus, the expanded program from the very first was carried out under the guidance of China, which provided technical support.

The North Koreans obtained the CSS-N-2/HY-1 missile and the completed CSA-1/HQ-2 missile from the Chinese navy and the plan developed as a dismantle-and-reassemble missile system, and with the development of the plan it was transformed into an auxiliary system.

North Korea in the early 1970's—perhaps in 1972—was absolutely dependent on Chinese parts, but achieved a self-production capability for the CSS-N-2/HY. It is believed to have introduced during this period the anti-ship SS-N-2 Styx/CSS-N-1/HY-1 batteries to beef up its SS-C-2B units.

While this development was taking place, the Soviet Union delivered to North Korea on an irregular basis SS-N-2 Styx and SS-C-2B Samlet missiles in a completed or a dismantled form.

#### HY-2 Silkworm Program: 1974-Present

In the mid-1970's—perhaps in 1974—the CSS-NM-2/HY-1 program was replaced by the Chinese HY-2 Silkworm missile (the Hai Ying—Sea Eagle—an improved version of the HY-1) production plan.

The HY-2 Silkworm program's initial process, as in the case of the CSS-N-2/HY-1, was limited to assembly production of major components. North Korea is thought to have achieved HY-2 Silkworm production capability in 1976. In addition, the production of the CSS-N-1/HY-1 was either suspended or replaced by the HY-2 Silkworm. The operational CSS-N-2/HY-1 is judged to have been continuously field deployed until perhaps 1980, when the improvements were achieved on the standard version HY-2 Silkworm.

The Soviet-supplied SS-N-2 Styx seems to have followed the exact same process. Until the early 1980's North Korea is believed to have produced itself or assembled all auxiliary systems with the exception of the sustainer motor and the guidance system component, which were provided by China.

Even though the production of the HY-2 Silkworm is still continuing, it may be replaced by the Chinese HY-3 or HY-4. Moreover, it is believed that if North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union continue to improve, the Soviets might supply the North with SS-C-3 Styx (the Soviet P-20, -21) or the even higher-performance SS-C-1b Sepal (Soviet S-35).

#### Relations With the Middle Eastern States

##### Egypt

North Korean-Egyptian relations go back to the late 1950's but until 1973 they were at a low level and were mainly political and economic in nature, with only limited weapons sales.

In mid-March 1973 North Korea provided Egypt with pilots for its MiG-21 aircraft, who took part in the October 1973 war. This was more symbolic than substantive, but Egypt was grateful for it and in mid-1976 supplied Pyongyang with a small number of SCUD-B missiles it had received from the Soviet Union. This gave a decisive impetus to the missile development program between North Korea and Egypt and the maintenance of the relationship.

The level of bilateral cooperation was low but it made possible interrelated efforts and technological transfers. The extent of North Korean cooperation in the Egyptian SCUD-B missile program is not clear, but the cooperation was extremely important and there is no doubt both sides benefited.

According to one report, North Korea was deeply involved in setting up the facilities to produce Egypt's first SCUD-B missile and even the SCUD-PIP missile.

In mid-September 1983, Egyptian Defense Minister Marshal Abu Ghazala led a high-ranking military delegation on a visit to China and North Korea. Shortly thereafter, in 1984, both countries signed agreements in which North Korea gave technological support to the production of Egypt's Morning Bird, a modification of the SA-2.

During 1987 the Arab Industrial Union announced that test firings of the Sakr-80, which was to replace the FROG 7-A, had begun at the Sakr Ammunition Factory. To date there is no indication of North Korean involvement in the Egypt-Argentina-Iraq Bdar-2000/Condor II medium range guided missile program.

#### **Iran**

Relations between North Korea and Iran improved rapidly after the fall of the shah stemming from Khomeini's Islamic revolution. After 1980 North Korea performed not only the role of Iran's principal weapons' supplier but also that of its adviser.

In the mid-1980's, when the Iran-Iraq war was at its height, after Iraq used warhead missiles to attack Iranian cities, Iran approached North Korea for additional military aid. In this North Korean military aid the focus was placed on tactical missile systems, anti-ship missile systems, and technology transfer.

After the 1985 agreement, Iran provided financial aid and North Korea furnished SCUD-B missile systems and tech transfer. Ninety to 100 North Korean-made SCUD-B missiles and an unknown number of HY-2 Silkworms were included in the \$5 million sales contract of June 1987.

Iran received the first deliveries of Silkworm anti-ship missiles from China in the summer of 1986 and after successful test-firings in late February 1987 deployed them only along the Straits of Hormuz and the northern part of the Fao Peninsula.

As international pressure spearheaded by the United States against Iran's attacks against oil tankers mounted, China agreed not to supply HY-2 Silkworms to Iran. Nonetheless, Iran continued to receive this kind of missile.

Iran does not appear to have received FROG 7-A or SCUD-B missiles from the Soviet Union or China, but in the attacks on cities of 1988, about 77 SCUD-B missiles—which played a decisive role—were fired.

In connection with the supply of missiles to Iran, because the media did not properly report the North Korea-Iran relationship, an unexpected situation took place. No serious attention was paid to the fact that North Korea had supplied its own SCUD-B missiles and HY-2 Silkworms to

Iran. North Korea's missile transfers began in the middle of 1987 and continued sporadically until 1988.

The method by which North Korea supplied SCUD-B and Silkworm missiles to Iran is not clear, but available evidence suggests two methods were used.

The first method was sea routes. Initially, North Korean missiles were loaded onto merchant ships in North Korea and sent to Singapore, where they were transferred to Iranian businessmen. The missiles were then loaded onto Iranian vessels, which sailed directly to the port of Bandar 'Abbas, where the missiles were unloaded. They were then sent by overland routes and deployed to operational units.

In April 1988 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz claimed that the Iranian merchant vessel Teyfouri had transported North Korean-made missiles to Iran. He said that this vessel had arrived in late February 1988 at Bandar 'Abbas and unloaded 80 HY-2 Silkworm and 40 SCUD-B missiles.

The second method was aircraft. After the opening of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, Iran placed high priority on the shipment of missiles by aircraft from North Korea and China. The aircraft used were Boeing 747 cargo planes that Iran had purchased from the United States before the Islamic Revolution.

The airplanes departed from Pyongyang, went through Urumchi in northwest China, where they refueled, then continued through either the Soviet Union or Afghanistan, and flew directly to Teheran.

It is also possible that North Korea first sold the missiles to Libya, which either resold them, or simply transported them by air to Iran as a broker.

The poor media reporting of these North Korea-Iran missile transactions made it possible for both North Korea and China to publicly announce that they were not involved in exporting or reexporting Chinese-made HY-2 Silkworms and SCUD-B missiles to Iran.

Despite the Iran-Iraq truce, cooperation and technology transfer in the field of Iran-North Korea missile sales is likely to continue as long as hostility exists between Iran and Iraq.

#### **Organization of North Korea's Missile Units**

North Korea's tactical missile units consist of a FROG-5 missile regiment (9 TELS [Transporter-Erector-Launcher]), 1 FROG-7A missile regiment (18 TELS), and 1 SCUD-B missile regiment (approximately 12 TELS).

If our judgment about the SCUD-PIP missile is correct, the first SCUD-PIP missile could be deployed to the field by the latter half of 1989. The creation and development of new SCUD-B or SCUD-PIP missile units would be additional deployments rather than replacements for the FROG-5/7A units. The SCUD-B missile is deployed in fortified bunkers or in underground fortified positions in the mountains.

During combat operations, the SCUD-B missile regiment would be operated 20-30 km behind the FEBA (forward edge of battle area), the SCUD-PIP missile units 30-50 km, and the FROG-5/7A 10-15 kilometers behind FEBA. The serious threat to the Republic of Korea by such North Korean long-range missile units is that a considerable number of airfields and bases in the South fall within their range.

North Korea's coastal defense units have field-deployed 12-15 SS-C-2b Samlet cruise missiles and land-based HY-2 Silkworm missiles. Sixty percent of these batteries are deployed on the east coast and 40 percent on the west coast, providing a layered defense not only for major military bases, but also for the entire coastline.

The HY-2 Silkworm battery units are located between Hamhung and Wonsan and 4 launchers are set up at 51 km-intervals along the coast. Each battery is estimated to be composed of a headquarters, fire-control center, and 2-3 launcher platoons. Its strength is believed to be about 85 men.

Even though concrete verification of this organizational structure is still lacking, North Korea is believed to have organized one-five of these batteries for each battalion, following the practice of the Soviet Army. If this is the case, it can be judged that North Korea has six coastal defense missile battalions—one battalion for each corps that has responsibility for coastal defense.

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### South Korea

#### Inter-Korean Parliamentary Talks Begin 29 Nov

SK2811082489 Seoul YONHAP in English 0718 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—South and North Korean legislators will meet at the truce village of Panmunjom to discuss arrangements for a full-fledged inter-Korean parliamentary conference Wednesday morning.

Five-member delegations from each side will discuss the methods and agenda of the conference during the ninth contact, which comes after a break of more than one month.

At talks on Oct. 25, both sides exchanged verbal attacks over a series of South Korean figures' defiant visits to the North but made no progress on terms for the parliamentary conference.

Wednesday's meeting will test the prospects for a variety of other inter-Korean contacts since it follows the collapse Monday of Red Cross talks to prepare for the reunion of separated families.

During past contacts, both sides agreed to hold opening and closing assemblies and to host the main conferences alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang with 50 parliamentarians from each side attending.

However, they differ over the form of the main conference, with Seoul hoping for a tete-a-tete between both sides and Pyongyang insisting on a round-table meeting attended by representatives from all political parties.

The North also disagrees with Seoul's proposal to include an inter-Korean summit on the agenda, although the two sides have narrowed differences on other topics, including a declaration of non-aggression and multi-faceted exchanges.

### No Agreement Reached in Meeting

SK2911075489 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean  
0500 GMT 29 Nov 89

[Excerpt] [Anchorman Mun Kyu-ho] The ninth contact for North-South parliamentary talks was held today at Tongilgak, an area on the North Korean side in Panmunjom. They failed to narrow their differences regarding the format of full-dress talks and agenda items for the talks, and ended without any agreement. The North and South agreed to hold the 10th preparatory contacts for 24 January, next year. We will hear from reporter Ko Tae-won from the North-South Dialogue Office. Would you elaborate on what the two sides proposed?

[Ko Tae-won] Each side's delegations delivered a keynote speech for about 15 minutes, approximately half the duration of their speeches in previous meetings. They began discussing practical matters. However, no progress was made. Regarding the talks format, an issue in point, our side again stressed that talks between representatives, a bilateral talks' format, must be chosen as a format for discussing the agenda. Meanwhile, the North Korean side insisted on the format of a meeting between representatives—a joint meeting format. This way, they failed to narrow their differences.

Over the issue of the agenda for the full-dress talks, our side demanded that in addition to the issue of exchange and cooperation and the issue of a North-South nonaggression declaration, the two items upon which an agreement was reached, the issue of holding North-South

summit talks be included in the agenda. However, the North Korean side maintained its previous stand of adopting only the two items as the agenda items.

In particular, referring to the facts that in the letter of Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the [Standing Committee] of the Supreme People's Assembly, dated on 9 April 1985, the North Korean side proposed holding parliamentary talks in the format of talks between representatives, and that the North and South agreed in the first preliminary contacts on 23 July, the same year, that talks would be held in the format of talks between representatives and that talks would be attended by 11 representatives from each side, our side pointed out that today's proposal by the North Korean side is unjust.

[Mun] How did the North Korean side respond to our side's calls for reforms and opening of doors in today's contacts?

[Ko] In today's contacts, our side said that the opening up in East Europe has become a world-wide trend and that such a change is important for the North and South to recover homogeneity between them and would be a fast way to achieve this. In his keynote speech, Chae Mun-sik, senior delegate, said that the world is changing in a direction that no one could forecast just a month ago and that a major change that is removing the rusted barbed wire of the cold war is taking place in East Europe. In this round-about way, he urged the North Korean side to change its attitude.

In response to this, Chon Kum-chol, head of the North Korean side's delegation, asked what we meant by reforms and open doors; said that he cannot accept the logic with which the North, too, must implement the East European-style open doors and reforms; and stressed that the world-wide trend is a road toward independence.

[Mun] The next contact is scheduled for 24 January next year. What are prospects for the talks, and how did the two side's delegations assess today's talks?

[Ko] The North and South agreed that they will hold the 10th contact on 24 January next year at the House of Peace in Panmunjom to continuously discuss the agenda, the format of talks, and other issues. However, in a press conference given after today's talks, the North Korean side pointed out that the next contact would be held at a time when the "Team Spirit" exercise is starting and stressed that North Korea's stand on the "Team Spirit" exercise is firm. This indicates that the next contact will not go smoothly.

In his news conference, Chae Mun-sik, senior delegate, said that the issue of which of the two talks' formats will be chosen, talks between representatives or a joint meeting, and the issue of whether the North-South summit talks will be included in the agenda, will be two major controversial issues. Senior delegate Chae said that all forms of North-South dialogue are being held on a bilateral format and that the North side's 1985 letter

proposed bilateral talks. This way, he expressed his opinion that he will insist on talks between representatives as the talks format. [passage omitted]

### Red Cross Talks Failure Casts 'Black Shadow'

SK2811082289 Seoul YONHAP in English 0559 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[News analysis by Pak Chung-chan]

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—The utter lack of movement in inter-Korean Red Cross talks on Monday cast a black shadow over the future of all forms of dialogue between the two Koreas.

Parting smiles belied the deep gulf separating the two sides, which for the first time since they got together in September to discuss the reunion of long-divided family members and relatives were unable to even set a date to meet again.

South and North made believe they would meet again if there were any change in position on the terms for the exchanges, but it was an empty gesture to avoid taking responsibility for calling it the end of the talks.

Discord at the seventh contact at Panmunjom, a village of austere military barracks that is as powerful a symbol of the cold war for Koreans as is the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, left almost no hope for a reunion this year.

Red Cross officials agreed in the third contact to exchange relatives and art troupes on Dec. 8, vowing to see tearful hugs between wrinkled mothers from the South and their long lost sons in the North as they did for the first time in September 1985.

It is increasingly likely the only tears being shed next week will be tears of sorrow as yet another year comes toward a close with families still torn in two by the separation of the two Koreas in 1945 and it is uncertain when both sides can meet again given that the pendulum of detente on the peninsula seems to be swinging again toward the dark side.

The failure of the Red Cross talks will affect other channels of dialogue between the two Koreas for the time being.

During Monday's talks, the North rejected the South's proposal to go ahead with full-fledged Red Cross talks in Pyongyang on Dec. 15 as previously agreed.

It is not difficult to guess that other dialogue between the two Koreas will make no progress in the near future.

Currently, the two sides are engaged in preliminary meetings on parliamentary talks, a prime ministers' conference and forming a single team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games in addition to the Red Cross meeting.

South Korean newspapers expressed their dismay at Monday's fiasco with the acid observation, "a flower girl

has blocked the reunion of divided families." The flower girl refers to an ideological North Korean opera banned in the South.

The papers also questioned whether the reunion had been deliberately torpedoed.

At the previous contact, Pyongyang suggested revolutionary operas such as "a flower girl" and "a sea of blood" be staged in Seoul during the exchange of relatives.

The banned operas blatantly propagate the revolutionary ideologies and teachings of North Korean ruler Kim Il-song and so Seoul was trapped into turning down the suggestion on the ground that it was against the Red Cross principle to include events of a political character.

With the demand, North Korea seemed determined to either stage the operas, thus filling South Korean television screens with Kim Il-song's political dogma, or driving the talks to the wall. It had already been agreed that as part of the reunion each side would broadcast live performances by visiting troupes from the other side.

Pyongyang was well aware of the dilemma into which its proposal plunged the Seoul government, which if it were to allow the performance of North Korean operas once would thereafter find it difficult to enforce its ban on them.

Still, there was a possibility Seoul would accept Pyongyang's proposal to perform the operas despite expected adverse effects.

A minority opinion in the Seoul government was to accept the North's proposal since the North would then probably erect a new hurdle, thereby revealing its true intent, according to analysts here.

There was also a consensus in the South that the North Korean operas would be a flop, failing to meet the North's objectives because audiences in the South would easily see through the crude dogma.

There is fierce competition among Koreans in the South who fled from the North before or during the Korean war to join in the reunions, and emotions have soared with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in Germany as South Koreans conjure up the image of two Koreas becoming one again.

This mood was reflected in Seoul's unprecedentedly positive attitude at the Red Cross conference table in recent weeks.

However, South Korea seems determined to see the inter-Korean dialogue from a wide perspective and to take into account the situation in North Korea as well as problems in inter-Korean talks arising from one-sided concessions.

Analysts say the South Korean Government has been desperate to avoid driving North Korea's leaders into a

corner, fearing it would result in the shutdown of all inter-Korean windows of contact for a considerable time.

North Korea is in a very awkward situation in connection with developments in Eastern Europe and has not decided firmly what road it should take.

Kim Il-song's recent visit to Beijing suggests neither country will open its doors to democratic reforms, at least for the time being.

Moreover, North Korea is in a state of transition as Kim tries to establish the world's first communist dynasty by bequeathing his power to his son, Kim Chong-il. Evidence of the handover should be visible by spring, according to some analysts.

Such realities make Pyongyang's leaders hesitate in exchanges with the South as hasty opening of doors to Seoul would bring difficulty at an unstable period, the analysts said.

Therefore, an inter-Korean encounter would fail to make progress even if it could be arranged and the aborted reunion of separated families will not be raised again until next year.

Discussion itself seems impossible until South Korea and the United States halt their annual joint military exercise, called "Team Spirit," which is a perennial pretext for North Korea to refuse dialogue with the South.

#### Pyongyang Fears Ideological 'Contamination'

SK2911012689 Seoul *THE KOREA HERALD* in English  
28 Nov 89 pp 2, 3

[News analysis by staff reporter Kim Hye-won: "'Revolutionary' Operas Dim Outlook for Red Cross Talks"]

[Text] Inter-Korean Red Cross contacts trying to pave the way for the reunion of dispersed family members finally ended in deadlock Monday.

The stalemate, at least on the surface, resulted from the dispute over whether the North Korean artists that would accompany the home visitors should be allowed to stage Communist operas in Seoul.

But the deadlock only revealed the limits of any inter-Korean negotiation without a political concession from one or both sides.

Although both sides still held open the possibility of further contacts by saying that they would telephone each other when necessary, it appears highly unlikely they will overcome the impasse in the near future.

It is not clear, either, whether the two sides will work together again next year in light of the clashes over the North Korean dramas during Monday's contact.

But the north's demand that Seoul approve the performance of the revolutionary dramas in the south was not unexpected—even though northern officials brought it up suddenly during the sixth contact last week.

Throughout the previous contacts, the north insisted, without explanation, that its troupe needed at least three hours to perform. It finally confessed the truth last week. Its ideological dramas like "A Flower Girl" and "Blood Sea" need at least three hours of show time.

The South's chief delegate, Song Yong-tae, told reporters after the meeting that he had long expected the north to bring the dramas up as an issue some day.

He said the north's insistence on bigger art troupes and the telecast of the performances were both motivated by its scheme to stage the dramas in Seoul.

Some Red Cross officials in the south even claimed that the north initiated the program of home visitor and artist exchanges for the only purpose of staging the operas in Seoul, which, Pyongyang claims, were written by Kim Il-song. The fact that the two sides spent most of their time discussing the art troupes after the third contact supports this theory.

High hopes for the talks, which stemmed from an easy agreement on the schedules of the home visitors exchange and the 11th plenary session of the South-North Red Cross Talks during the third contact, disappeared as soon as the two sides began discussing the art troupe exchange in detail.

Until this impasse occurred, almost all the agreements made between the two sides had been made possible by concessions on the Seoul side. The only compromise from Pyongyang was its agreement to reduce the number of art troupe members from 300, which it originally suggested, to 200.

The reconciliatory attitude of the south, in part, stemmed from its need to accommodate changes happening in and outside the country.

The Seoul government, pressured by its people to take the initiative in inter-Korean dialogue in the wake of developments in East and West Germany, should continue to take the initiative with the north in one way or another.

In addition to the humanitarian motivation of helping separated family members relieve their pain through reunion, the south might want to use the exchanges to push the broom of detente that is now sweeping the world into North Korean society.

Moreover, the cross-border exchange of home visitors could have helped alleviate pressure on government to settle the issue of liquidation of the Fifth Republic legacies by year-end.

The Pyongyang government, however, seems to lack such motivations.

North Korea watchers say its reason for pursuing the exchange visits last summer must have been to show South Koreans a Pyongyang that underwent a lot of development to host the world youth festival in July.

But the rapid changes in international politics since then, and ever-worsening economic difficulties in the country, have made Pyongyang more passive, they say.

Analysts say that Pyongyang may fear the ideological contamination some 600 South Koreans visiting Pyongyang could cause during the home visitors exchange program, especially after the popular movement in East Germany, which it calls the result of ideological contamination.

Considering that all past inter-Korean exchanges were made for political reasons, it is difficult to expect that North Korea will return to the dialogue table in the near future without an ulterior motive.

#### **Inter-Korean Fund Considered for Aid to North**

*SK2911025389 Seoul YONHAP in English 0208 GMT  
29 Nov 89*

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 29 (YONHAP)—Korea's wealthy southern half is considering creating a fund to give economic aid to its poor communist neighbor in the North, National Unification Minister Yi Hong-ku said Tuesday.

"The government is considering establishing an inter-Korean economic cooperation fund as one way to facilitate economic cooperation with the North," Yi told the National Assembly during a question-and-answer session.

"I think the government will request the National Assembly to approve the budget for the fund if consideration is finalized," Yi said.

He also suggested Seoul might donate surplus rice to Pyongyang, an idea discussed unofficially in academic and journalism circles in the South.

"Although it is a good proposal, there is concern that such an idea would not bear fruit if it were pursued hastily. So we are considering it prudently," Yi said.

Some experts have suggested bartering the South's surplus rice for mineral ore, which is abundant in the North.

In a separate hearing before the Budget Committee, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said the government is still debating which American fighter to purchase for the Air Force.

"Both the F-16 and FA-18 fighters now under consideration are excellent and a match for North Korea's most sophisticated MIG-29 fighters, but the final decision has yet to be made and all relevant government agencies are participating in making the decision," Yi said.

**Religious Groups Seek Exchanges With North**  
*SK2911011689 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English*  
*29 Nov 89 p 9*

[Text] Despite North Korea's inelastic attitude toward overtures for exchanges with the south, the religious communities in the south will continue to remain loose in their ways to seek swaps with their northern counterparts.

The religious circles have learned a hard lesson through the repeated rejection by North Korea of their invitations, but they will stay unfazed in their efforts to open up some channels for mutual exchanges by continuing to knock on its doors.

The daring moves are not limited to the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, but have included lately Chondogyo [chondoist religious sect].

The Chondogyo Central Headquarters has recently applied for government permission to invite some 20 Chondogyo officials in the north to the 131st April 5 Chondogyo proclamation anniversary in Seoul next year.

The request has been approved and the indigenous religious church has extended the invitation to the North Korean Chondogyo Central Headquarters in Pyongyang.

In addition, the National Unification Board, the official window for exchanges with the north, has several applications on hand including one from the Christian Council for South-North Exchanges to invite North Korean Christians over Christmas to the south.

The Korean National Council of Churches is reportedly moving to put in a request to bring to Seoul some key officials of the North Korean Christian Federation. In a separate action, a group of Protestant churches plans to send representatives to the dedication of the Chilgol Church in Pyongyang. The Chilgol Church has been completed recently after the much-publicized Pongsu Church also in Pyongyang, where several Korean church officials in the Korean community in the United States visited in recent years.

The religious organizations are not alone in this. Several church-related establishments are joining in the movement to bring North Korea out in to the open.

The World Conference of Christian Medical Doctors is said to be intensifying its move to extend an invitation to North Korea for its Seoul meeting next May.

North Korea again will be encouraged to send medical students to a Seoul meeting of world Christian medical students slated for Seoul next year.

Despite the hopeful effort of the religious sectors in the country, they are well aware that their efforts will not bear fruit very soon. They know that the North Korean leadership has a tight hold over the North Korean populace, and that they don't want to do anything that might weaken the tight grip. The exchange of people and

information is one problem they can do without as can be seen in the recent Red Cross talks on home visits for dispersed families.

The talks may be aborted due to the deadlock over the North Korean demand to stage North Korean operas full of Communist propaganda in the south during home visits.

Reports say North Korea is trying to find a way out of the Red Cross talks for fear of the democratic change sweeping East bloc nations.

**USSR, South To Establish Consular Relations**

*SK2911100589 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean*  
*29 Nov 89 p 1*

[Text] It was recently learned that Korea and the Soviet Union agreed to establish consular relations.

On 29 November, a government source confirmed this and said that, "Both Korea and the Soviet Union recently signed an agreement authorizing consular functions to each other's trade missions in contacts through a third nation, finally resolving this issue. All that is left for them to do is wait for the date to announce this fact."

Therefore, it seems that both sides will be authorizing consular functions to the trade missions in Seoul and Moscow. This means that the relationship between Korea and the Soviet Union has finally reached the level of establishing political relations.

Since Korea and the Soviet Union each established their trade missions in Moscow and Seoul respectively last April, there have been continued negotiations on the issue of raising the status in the relationship of the two countries to an official consular one.

It was learned that the Soviet Union insisted on a sort of opportunism, which is to allow the Seoul trade mission to carry out consular functions as well, while our side claimed that both sides should formally exchange consuls and establish consular relations. However, for the time being, our side accepted the position of the Soviet Union.

Burlatskiy, one of the leading deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in an interview with the CENTRAL ECONOMY newspaper said that, "Considering the relationship with North Korea, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Korea cannot be achieved right now but a policy on providing an important opportunity to develop bilateral relations will be announced in the near future."

Also, Lev Aleksandrovich Voznesenskiy, spokesman of the USSR Cabinet meeting said that, "The interest in trade and diplomacy between the two countries must always be on the same course." He also revealed the official position of the Soviet Government saying, "As

the economic cooperation is developing gradually, the establishment of consular relations will naturally be demanded."

### Foreign Ministry Denies Report on Consular Ties

SK2911083489 Seoul YONHAP in English 0657 GMT  
29 Nov 89

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 29 (YONHAP)—A Foreign Ministry spokesman denied a report by a leading Seoul newspaper that South Korea and the Soviet Union recently agreed to set up consular relations.

"The reports are untrue," the ministry spokesman said. "It is true that we have made efforts to upgrade our relations with the Soviet Union to a diplomatic level but there have been no agreements regarding improved relations."

TONG-A ILBO, an influential vernacular daily, quoted a reliable government source as saying, "the two countries have signed an agreement at a meeting in a third country on the establishment of consular relations by granting consular functions to each other's trade office in Moscow and Seoul."

This means Korea and the Soviet Union may be on the verge of setting up a political relationship, the newspaper said.

The daily said Seoul has been in contact with Moscow on setting up consular relations since the two countries exchanged trade offices in April.

The Soviets want consular relations to be established by granting consular functions to the trade offices while Korea insists relations be upgraded by formally exchanging consular missions.

TONG-A said the agreement came as Seoul accepted Moscow's proposal to grant consular functions to the trade offices. The daily did not elaborate.

South Korea established full diplomatic relations with Hungary in February and with Poland early this month and has been seeking to set up relations with other communist countries, including the Soviet Union and China, under President No Tae-u's "northern policy" of improving ties with east-bloc countries.

### Soviet Figures Comment on Relations With ROK

SK2911023389 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
24 Nov 89 p 9

[Dialogue between Vladimir Martynov, director of the Soviet Institute for World Economy and International Relations at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Vitaliy Ignatenko, publisher and chief editor of the Soviet weekly "NEW TIMES," on relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union]

[Text] (Editor's note: The Soviet weekly magazine "NEW TIMES," which has ties with CHOSON ILBO, in

its issue dated 24 November, carried a dialogue article entitled "The History of Great Discovery." The article extensively deals with the issue of establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union and the issue on South Korea's sole entry into the United Nations. The 15-page article covering the dialogue between Dr Vladimir Martynov, director of the Soviet Institute for World Economy and International Relations at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Vitaliy Ignatenko, publisher and chief editor of the Soviet weekly "NEW TIMES," carries the two Soviet figures' frank and progressive views on Korean-Soviet relations on which the Soviet Union has been thus far reluctant to clarify externally because of its international relations. The Soviet Institute for World Economy and International Relations is one of the major think tanks in the Soviet Government. The weekly "NEW TIMES" was founded in 1945 and is an influential, leading magazine in the Soviet Union. The magazine is published in 10 different foreign languages. CHOSON ILBO obtained this dialogue article in advance.)

(Ignatenko) Our newspapers and magazines published recently give us the impression that South Korea is a land which has been recently discovered. Frankly speaking, for South Korea, we have so far seldom used such words as "country" and "capital," which are generally used when we refer to a sovereign country. This was also the same in my case. When I visited Seoul last year for the first time and sent news articles to Moscow I used the word "capital." But I used the word "capital where the Olympics are being held." The difficulties caused by our attitudes, in which even while dealing with Korea as an entity we try not to see it as an entity in reality, are more conspicuous this year than ever before.

Since General Secretary Gorbachev's speech delivered in Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, South Korea has suddenly come into our view. The mutual visits of businessmen and scientists between both sides have become almost an everyday occurrence, and cultural exchange between them is also being gradually expanded. The visit to the Soviet Union of Kim Yong-sam, leader of a South Korean opposition party, was an important event from the viewpoint of relations between the two countries.

However, there is no need for the average Soviet citizen to find out the meaning of the word "Samsung" on the advertisement tower erected in front of the building of the Sheremetovo International Airport. Fans of the Spartak soccer team in Moscow do not know the meaning of the advertisement letters "Jindo" written on the T-shirts of the players of the Spartak soccer team in Moscow. Despite the fact that South Korean advertisements are seen on the media everywhere, only an uncertain and dubious situation has still continued, and this is because of an extremely prudent political attitude.

(Martynov) It seems that, as a matter of fact, we have entered an era of great discovery here on the threshold of the beginning of the 21st century, though this sounds very ironic. This discovery is not a geographical one but

a political one. This discovery is also closely related to our "new thinking" which seeks to recognize objective reality.

From this point of view, the "discovery" of South Korea is not an exception. Rather, the discovery of "South Korea" is one of the concrete examples of "new thinking." Therefore, I see our first step as being prudent but optimistic.

Whether or not South Korea can be regarded as a state is not a simple problem. Herein lie three aspects which contradict each other. The first aspect is the problem of real existence in the present world. Even children can find South Korea on the world political maps published in the Soviet Union. They can also find the official name of the Republic of Korea on world maps published in foreign countries.

Accordingly, for the people of other countries, the position of South Korea cannot become an issue of argument. The remaining two aspects also are, abstractly speaking, a legal problem and, concretely speaking, a political problem. However, they are not clear. From the standpoint of international law, South Korea is a completely sovereign state. In other words, South Korea is a sovereign state which has its territory, an economic system, and legislative and administrative organs. South Korea is an independent and objective entity regardless of whether we like its ideals and policies or not.

#### **North and South of Korea Should Respect Each Other:**

(Ignatenko) The two Koreas—North and South—have not entered the United Nations. The reason for this is an assertion that if one side enters, the Korean peninsula may be divided permanently. This assertion has always been put forward by socialist countries and nonaligned countries. As a result, South Korea's UN entry has always been thwarted. However, the situation recently began to change. Neither North nor South Korea can now advocate that they are the "sole representative" of the Korean peninsula. North Korea has established diplomatic relations with 108 nations, while more than 130 countries have recognized South Korea.

In view of the current favorable international situation, the simultaneous UN entry of North and South Korea will serve as a basis for more practically dealing with the dialogue for the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula rather than perpetuating its division.

According to the South Korean Foreign Ministry, a total of 104 nations—including Australia and Hungary—made remarks about the Korean issue during the 44th UN General Assembly. Of these nations, 44 countries supported South Korea's UN entry. Particularly, it is noteworthy that India and Nigeria, that have played a key role in the Nonaligned Movement, wanted South Korea's UN membership. What are the positions of the Soviet Union and China?

(Martynov) I think that if both North and South Korea do not respect each other's sovereignty, dialogue for reunification cannot be successful. In other words, the sovereignty of the DPRK in the north of the Korean peninsula and that of the ROK (I would like to use the official title of the ROK) in the South should be respected as well. I would like to stress again that effective dialogue between North and South Korea can be possible only on the basis of an equal footing.

Now, let us discuss about the issue of UN entry of the two Koreas. The UN membership is the right of a sovereign state which cannot be given away to any other nation. The ROK and DPRK are very such nations. Therefore, the issue of their UN entry should be decided in accordance with the UN Charter.

(Ignatenko) Your remarks appear to support the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea into the United Nations, which was put forward by the ROK Government. The North Korean authorities are clearly opposed to simultaneous entry of North and South Korea into the United Nations, which you support. I think that your view has a number of logical and political stumbling blocks [kollimadol].

(Martynov) The ideas including the entry of two Koreas into the United Nations and the plan of so-called "cross recognition" proposed by Henry Kissinger which calls for recognition of South Korea by the Soviet Union and China and that of North Korea by the United States and Japan were already put forward in the 1970's.

Under the political circumstances in which the U.S.-USSR confrontation are being relaxed to the greater extent than ever before and confrontation between the North and South of Korea has also been eased, a basic change is taking place in South Korea's politics. In other words, political democratization has begun.

This being the case, I believe it will not be difficult for all sovereign states to enter the United Nations according to their free will.

We cannot block the entry of any country into the United Nations.

The conclusion is clear. I think that both North and South Korea have the right to request an independent UN entry.

#### **The Stationing of U.S. Troops Is Hard to Understand**

(Martynov continues) Is it too early for us to leave the issue of the Korean peninsula to the hands of those who are directly concerned? We have already discarded the policy of "powerful sphere" [seryokwon chongchaek] and are striving to break the old practice of linking the world situation to ideology and military power.

I believe that the formula of "one people with two systems" is most suitable for China.

Following such a model, North and South Korea can maintain the present political and economic system.

The United States continues to maintain 43,000 military personnel in South Korea. Should the U.S. troops stay in South Korea forever? The U.S. forces came to South Korea in the Cold War period when the United States maintained military strategies and military priority and when the "balance of power" in the world and the Far East was entirely different from those of today. They are still staying in South Korea today.

The purpose of the U.S. forces' presence in South Korea was not to "defend the South from a possible new provocation from the North. It was to "block the Soviet Union and China from expanding into the Asian region."

The United States, too, is well aware that such a Cold War era has gone and will not appear again. In a nutshell, the stationing of U.S. forces in South Korea has lost its justification.

I would like to express above all deep sympathy and solidarity with the South Korean people who ardently seek reunification. However, the ultimate policy for reunification rests precisely with the South Korean people themselves. No one can and should hinder the South Korean people's efforts to achieve reunification.

What we are most concerned about is the fact that U.S. forces have been deployed on the Korean peninsula, which is located close to the Soviet Union, and that they are armed with nuclear weapons.

However, a promising situation is that the United States and the Soviet Union are now negotiating on the issue of overall disarmament, including the issue of reducing nuclear weapons, and that the possibility seems high for the issue of withdrawing nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea—which has posed a threat to the security of the Soviet Union—to be negotiated. However, I would like to emphasize that what is important is that withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea does not constitute a prerequisite for concluding an agreement between South Korea and the Soviet Union.

(Ignatenko) Following its recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary, South Korea has also officially established diplomatic relations with Poland. Along with this, South Korea and these two countries have concluded agreements on trade and investment, and Warsaw and Seoul have agreed to exchange trade missions between them every spring. The South Korean Government has decided to provide a total of \$450 million in loans to Poland in the next 5 years. This fact can be interpreted as the South Korean Government's attempt to promote trade and economic cooperative relations with socialist countries. On the other hand, some observers indicate, however, that the South Korean Government has tried to promote political and diplomatic relations with socialist countries through its economic cooperation with them.

(Martynov) Judging from these facts I think that the time has come for South Korea and the Soviet Union to establish official relations between them. In fact, we are now faced with a delicate situation.

I really wish to see South Korea and the Soviet Union entering a stage of mutual reconciliation. As you remember, as he declared in his speech in Krasnoyarsk, our leader Comrade Gorbachev no longer opposes the establishment of relations with South Korea. As an economist, I would like to emphasize the need to deeply study the course of development of the South Korean economy with an unbiased view.

#### **Establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries rests with the Soviet Union**

(Martynov continues) I think that the future of large-scale trade and economic cooperative relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union is very bright. Of course, the South Korean and Soviet Governments have not had sufficient negotiations on the scale and form of their cooperation in trade. However, a friendly atmosphere has already matured between the two countries. In a nutshell, what is left is practical and actual cooperation. Of course, such a cooperation should be supported by specific legal measures. For example, this includes an agreement on ensuring the guarantee for investments and an agreement on preventing double taxation. However, under today's situation in which official relations have not been established between the two countries, how can such agreements be concluded between them?

(Ignatenko) You and I were both invited by the South Korean prime minister and foreign minister. The invitation extended to us was from the highest organization among the South Korean Government organizations at all levels that have invited Soviet people to visit South Korea.

The then prime minister and foreign minister expressed their interest in our policy of perestroika. We were under the impression that their ultimate interest was in whether or not the Soviet Union has the intention to recognize South Korea. Now the ball has been thrown over to the Soviet side and it is our turn to resolve the issue.

(Martynov) I believe that the Soviet Union has come to a point that is close to recognizing South Korea. The position of the Soviet Union is that it is not completely prepared to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. However, I think that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries rests entirely on a Soviet decision. Before dealing with this issue, one should assume a broader view. The Soviet Union and South Korea are interested in establishing a broad range of relations in all domains. Such relations can hardly be formed merely through signatures. These relations require persistent advance preparations as a precondition, like the act of laying bricks one by one.

Therefore, I do not agree with the assertion that official diplomatic relations should be the precondition for cooperation in the economic and trade domains. We can push ahead with economic and trade relations in such a way that they exercise influence upon diplomatic relations. It is true that there will be difficulties caused by the absence of official relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union. We should strive to work out measures to overcome such difficulty through frank joint efforts. At the same time, we should bear in mind that South Korea-Soviet Union relations should not infringe upon the interest of any third nation in any form.

It may be true that we do not thoroughly understand the South Korean side's position. The South Korean side is apt to interpret what we accept as "firm conviction" as "remarks made with a hidden agenda."

At any rate, South Korea-Soviet Union relations require a considerable period of time for mutual adaptability. Based on this, such relations should develop in a step by step manner. The overall prospect for the development of relations between the two countries is optimistic.

**Soviet Scholar on South's UN Entry Application**  
*SK2811093789 Seoul YONHAP in English 0910 GMT  
28 Nov 89*

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—A top Soviet scholar has said that South Korea deserves to apply for United Nations membership, it was reported here Tuesday.

Vladen Martynov, director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), said in Moscow recently that the matter of South Korea's joining the world body should be dealt with in accordance with the U.N. Charter, said the Naewae Press, which specializes in socialist affairs, quoting Radio Moscow.

Martynov visited Seoul last month at the head of an IMEMO delegation as the guest of Kim Yong-sam, president of the opposition Reunification Democratic Party.

Meeting Soviet reporters, Martynov said it is an objective fact that South Korea is an independent nation in every sense of the phrase and has the right to raise the issue of its entry into the U.N. because it is a sovereign state.

The IMEMO director said there is much room for the Soviet Union and Korea to explore economic cooperation and promotion of bilateral trade is a reasonable way to improve Seoul-Moscow relations. The two countries do not have diplomatic relations.

Martynov's remarks suggest that the Soviet Union does not intend to oppose South Korea's application for U.N. entry, which will reportedly be submitted next year, according to Naewae.

It also said the Radio Moscow report is significant because it came just after North Korea's NODONG SHINMUN (WORKERS NEWSPAPER) carried an article that said supporting South Korea's entry into the U.N. is the same as interfering in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

North Korea opposes South Korea's entry into the world body, saying it would perpetuate the division of Korea.

**Official on New Shipping Line With USSR**

*SK2511022689 Seoul YONHAP in English 0215 GMT  
25 Nov 89*

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 25 (YONHAP)—A direct shipping line linking South Korea's Pusan and the Soviet Union's Nakhodka or Vostochnyy is likely to open in April 1990, the Korea Maritime and Port Administration (KMPA) said Saturday.

A KMPA official said the Korea Maritime Consultive Committee (KMCC) designated three Korean shipping companies Thursday to serve on the shipping route in a consortium with the Soviet's Far East Shipping Co. (FESCO).

KMCC, an affiliate of the Korea Shipowners' Association, plans to have talks with the FESCO in Seoul next February or March to arrange details for the service.

The official said KMPC is about to endorse the three designated firms—Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Chunkyung Shipping Co., and the Pusan Shipping Co.—as eligible shipping agents.

The Korean and Soviet sides will provide one vessel each for the service that will operate twice a week, the official said.

He expected that general cargoes will be shipped between Pusan and Vostochnyy while containerized freight will rely on the Pusan-Nakhodka route.

Pusan is South Korea's largest port while Nakhodka is one of the Soviet Far Eastern ports some 60 kilometers from Vladivostok, which is situated near Vostochnyy.

Trade between Seoul and Moscow totaled 432 million U.S. Dollars in value in the January-October period of the year, up about 2.5 times from 172 million dollars a year earlier.

Direct containerized trade was tallied at 5,467 twenty-foot equivalent unit (teu) except for cargoes transported to Europe on a trans-Siberia railroad in the first 10 months, about three times the 5,467 teu a year ago.

**Soviets, South Sign Agreement on Ship Inspection**

SK2911004389 Seoul *HANGUK ILBO* in Korean  
27 Nov 89 p 6

[Text] A mutual business proxy agreement on the inspection of ships between Korea and the Soviet Union has been concluded.

On 26 November, the Korean Shipping Registry (chairman: Choe Pyong-su) signed a mutual business proxy agreement on the registration of shipping and on the inspection of ships from Korea and the Soviet Union. This officially opened the way for exchanges in the registration of shipping between the two countries.

The conclusion of this agreement was achieved when Chairman (Verik) and Chief Technician (Oleg) of the Soviet Shipping Registry came to Korea on 20 November and signed the agreement on 21 November at the office of the Korean Shipping Registry with Chairman Choe Pyong-su.

Since the mutual business proxy agreement on the inspection of ships between Korea and the Soviet Union was concluded, it is possible for the Korean Shipping Registry to directly act as proxy in the manufacturing inspection of Soviet ships that are being built in our country; in the regular inspection of ships that are being repaired; and in the inspection of machines and materials for shipbuilding that can be exported to the Soviet Union. Therefore, we anticipate not only vitalizing exchanges between the two countries through the proxy agreement of the registration of shipping, but also anticipate the possibilities of the Soviet side's increased use of our country for ordering newly built ships and for repairing ships.

This year, the Soviet Union has already placed an order for six bulk carriers made by Hyundai Heavy Industry and is continuing its efforts to conclude an agreement on placing orders of newly built ships. About forty ships have been repaired in Ulsan and Pusan already.

Previously, the inspection of these newly built ships and the repair of ships were done by the Soviet side's own inspector whom they sent, or through a foreign proxy (Lloyd's Shipping Registry, the American Shipping Registry) agent that the Soviet Union designated.

**Ultra-Right Party Supporters Plan 7 Dec Rally**

SK2811043489 Seoul *YONHAP* in English 0301 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (OANA-YONHAP)—Some 50 former South Korean cabinet ministers, businessmen and retired generals pledged Monday afternoon to take the forefront in "protecting liberal democracy" and "eradicating leftist forces."

"Liberal democratic forces should hold together to cope with leftist industrial peacebreakers," said Kim Yong-kap, a former government administration minister, predicting that next year the nation will face an economic crisis due to labor disputes.

Kim was addressing the second preparatory meeting of the provisionally named "Pan-Democratic Movement Council for Reforms," which describes itself as a conservative right-wing civil movement.

Kim founded his prediction of an upcoming "economic crisis" on the allegation that the National Council of Labor Unions, which is expected to come into being early next year, will directly lead to reduced investments, increased lay-offs and price hikes.

Social and political concerns will ignite the economic crisis, said Kim, who stepped down from office early this year over a statement outspokenly urging rightists to wage a war against leftists.

He also said the political outlook is gloomy because of the people's rising distrust in the ruling Democratic Justice Party and because the divided opposition parties pursue only their own interests.

So far about 850 people have registered as sponsors of the organization, which will be formally launched in February after a rally Dec. 7, Kim said.

Sponsors include former Labor Minister Choe Myong-hun and another 14 former cabinet ministers, opposition party leader Yi Man-sop, 13 former lawmakers, former National Assembly speaker Yi Chae-hyong, some judges and a sprinkling of ex-generals.

**Chong Issue May Cause 'Division' in DJP**

SK2811032689 Seoul *THE KOREA HERALD* in English  
28 Nov 89 pp 2, 7

[News analysis by staff reporter Sim Yong-su: Support for Representative Chong H.Y. Worsens Ruling Party Dispute]

[Text] The leadership of the ruling Democratic Justice Party [DJP] appears to be reconsidering its strategy to persuade party lawmaker Chong Ho-yong to resign because of the unexpected organized resistance from Chong and his followers.

Stung by the Chong camp's show of might last week, the leadership is apparently looking to party president, President No Tae-u, to take over the risky job of talking Chong into voluntarily giving up his National Assembly seat.

The leadership seems to have given its plan to obtain at least Chong's consent to his voluntary resignation during No's absence to immunize No from controversy over his step-down, a reliable party source said.

No angrily reacted to the intraparty conflict last week during his stopover in Lausanne, saying that he did not

feel like reading local newspapers (because he was so disgusted with the conflict in his party).

The ruling party has pushed for Chong's ouster for a compromise with the opposition over the liquidation of the ex-President Chon Tu-hwan's government's problems, widely known as the "Fifth Republic questions."

A decisive moment for the party leadership's change of its plan seemed to be the signature-collection campaign last week by ruling party lawmakers supporting Chong, the Army general-turned politician and No's classmate at the Military Academy.

At least 20 lawmakers, many of them from Chong's home province of southeastern Kyongsangpuk-to, signed a petition to oppose the party leadership's plan to make Chong a political scapegoat for the compromise with the opposition.

Many of them reportedly avowed that if Chong was forced to resign, they will take collective action against the party leadership.

Some of Chong's supporters openly asked Chong to break away from the party and to start a new political party.

Despite such an angry protest by Chong's supporters, the content of the petition was mild.

In the petition which was obtained by this paper yesterday, the signatories claimed that Chong's resignation is unfair because it is against his will, and the party leadership should not give up its basic position opposing any action against Chong which will be taken without fair judiciary procedure.

Chong's camp hinted that its ongoing campaign to "save Chong" is more than the content of the petition, saying that it will make public the ultimate aim of the drive after No returns home from his 16-day trip to Europe Dec. 2.

The party leadership has so far tried to play down the resistance from the Chong side at least outwardly. But internally the leadership is taking seriously the Chong camp's challenge.

The leadership's utmost concern is over the possibility of Chong's inaugurating his own party in case the pressure on him to resign continues.

The desertion of 20-plus party lawmakers may not be a fatal blow for a party which holds 125 out of the 299 National Assembly seats with the three opposition parties split.

What is notable is that most of the likely defectors are from Kyongsangpuk-to, the key powerbase of the ruling camp.

In the past presidential elections, ruling party candidates won one-sided support from the populous southeastern province which decisively helped the ruling party win

over Kim Tae-chung whose key political bastion is the archrival southwestern Chollanam-to.

Chong's resignation has been set by the opposition as one of the key conditions for settlement of the Fifth Republic questions, with testimony by ex-President Chon Tu-hwan before the National Assembly.

The opposition grievance against Chong is linked to his alleged role in the brutal crackdown on pro-democracy civilian uprising in Kwangju in 1980 by combat troops, at the cost of nearly 200 lives widely known as the "Kwangju incident."

At the time, Chong was commander of the Army's airborne elite Special Warfare Force which has been charged with using excessive force against the civilian protestors.

The ruling party leadership looked particularly embarrassed that its effort to remove Chong is widely seen as a power struggle between Chong and a handful of senior party officials, including Pak Chol-on, No's relative and first state minister for political affairs.

Such an observation is based on the widespread speculation that Chong and Pak will eventually contest for the nomination by No to run in the next presidential election.

The prosecutor-turned politician, widely known as the Korean version of Henry Kissinger for his secret diplomacy with the East-bloc nations, is known to have a major faction in the T-K [Taegu-Kyongbuk-to] group, like Chong.

The T-K means the vast group of politicians and bureaucrats from the southeastern Kyongsang-to which bred the Republic's four presidents, including last President Pak Chong-hui. Chong's followers warned that if Chong was forced out of the National Assembly, they will launch campaign to make Pak meet the similar fate.

The uncomfortable relations between Chong and Pak was confirmed by Chong's rejection of invitation from Pak to play golf Sunday.

Rejecting Pak's invitation, Chong reportedly told a party lawmakers Saturday, "Why should I meet a person trying to put a bell on my neck?"

Pak who has led the campaign to oust Chong has often been described by the press as "a courageous mouse which volunteered to put a bell on the neck of the cat," a description derived from Aesop's fable.

Now the Chong's question seemed to become a problem which cannot be solved without No's involvement, though No has meticulously tried to distance himself from the controversy.

**Talks Between Opposition, Ruling Party Fail**

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[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—Talks between South Korea's ruling and opposition parties yielded no agreement Monday on how to liquidate the remnants of former President Chon Tu-hwan's government.

By failing to agree, the 14 senior officials of the four parties made it virtually impossible to produce a basic compromise by Dec. 10, the deadline for completing negotiations on such issues as what action to take against general-turned-politician Chong Ho-yong.

It also means the ruling party's bid to reach a political settlement of the issue during President No Tae-u's absence to protect him from the fallout may be frustrated. No is now in London on a two-week European tour.

Problems surrounding Chong, an influential ruling party lawmaker under pressure to resign his National Assembly seat by elements inside and outside his party, have been major obstacles to a political settlement of the Chon government issue.

Opposition negotiators demanded the ruling party clearly state its stand on the Chong issue, claiming its proposals at the official meeting differ from those presented at behind-the-scenes negotiations.

Officials from the ruling party, contradicting repeated news reports that they are pressing Chong to resign for a compromise with the opposition, stated that the party's official position on the issue remains unchanged.

They insisted in the meeting that Chong face legal action instead of forced resignation in connection with the military suppression of the 1980 Kwangju civil uprising.

Ruling party negotiators instead demanded the opposition present proposals to make a breakthrough in the negotiations.

The retreat of the party leadership from its flexible stand comes amid reports that it is reconsidering its strategy to oust Chong because of harsh resistance from him and his followers.

Opposition parties said the ruling party should be responsible for the lack of progress in the negotiations and threatened to link the liquidation issue to the deliberation of the budget bill of 23 trillion won (34.2 billion U.S. dollars) for 1990.

They said they would not cooperate to approve the state budget by the legal deadline of Saturday unless the ruling party took concrete action against key Chon figures, including Chong.

In the wake of such striking differences over the Chong issue, negotiations are virtually suspended.

It may now be inevitable for No, who returns Dec. 4 from Europe, to take over the task of deciding the Chong problem, probably persuading Chong, his military academy classmate and long-time friend, to voluntarily surrender his assembly seat.

Chong, consecutively Army chief of staff, defense minister and home minister during Chon's authoritarian rule, is regarded as one of key figures who helped No succeed Chon. The leader of the largest faction in the ruling party, he is said to be supported by the military and to have presidential ambitions.

Chong has said he may resign if No asks him to despite his repeated proclaimed stand to remain firm against requests from "anybody" to step down, branding such pressure "extra-constitutional."

Chong was commander of the special warfare forces when they were deployed into Kwangju to break up anti-government demonstrations in 1980, but he denies any responsibility for the bloody military action on civilians that left nearly 200 people dead by official count.

Chong instead demands the retirement of top opposition leader Kim Tae-chung, who is most vehement in pressuring Chong to resign to take "minimum moral and political responsibility" for the bloodshed in Kim's political bastion.

The parties were unable even to agree to meet again, drawing massive criticism from the people for their counterproductive political strife over the liquidation issue, which has become a political millstone around No's neck.

**DJP Fears 'Bombshell' During Chon's Testimony**

**SK2811040089 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
28 Nov 89 p 2**

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-nim]

[Text] "Former president Chon Tu-hwan has nothing to lose. He is ready to testify before the National Assembly without any conditions." A key aide to the disgraced former president made the remarks on the occasion of the first anniversary of Chon's seclusion at Paektam-sa Buddhist temple on Mt. Sorak last Thursday.

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28 Nov 89 p 2*

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-nim]

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Chon was reported to have told a senior administration official that he will not wait until after late this year for the settlement of the question.

He also told a leading novelist, Yi Pyong-chu that he wants his testimony to be telecast live to the whole nation.

His remarks which are different from what has been known to political circles thus far attracted keen reactions from the ruling and opposition parties.

After weeks of tug of war in May senior officers of the ruling and opposition parties agreed to have Chon's testimony videotaped and relayed to the people later, in the face of insistence on this by the ruling Democratic Justice Party [DJP].

Rep. Choe Chae-uk, a key aide to DJP chairman Pak Chun-kyu, told reporters, "Former president Chon's expression of willingness to testify in a live telecast needs to be watched."

"He seems to have judged that it would be difficult for him to return to Seoul to live a free life without making a sincere testimony which is live telecast," Rep. Choe analyzed.

It is very natural that Chon's testimony should take place right now if he is so eager to give it. Why isn't it being realized?

The ruling DJP insists on several procedural preconditions such as the videotaping and the honorable treatment of Chon for his testimony.

However, aides to Chon denied that former president Chon had cited these several preconditions. Instead, they said that they were put forth by the DJP for its own political purposes.

They then suspected that top leaders of the incumbent regime are trying to scuttle Chon's testimony which they fear will contain something unfavorable to President No. No was a classmate of Chon at the Korea Military Academy and helped the latter take power through the Dec. 12, 1979, military incident which occurred in a "power vacuum" following the assassination of president Pak Chong-hui in the same year. Chon picked his life-long friend No as his successor and helped him to win the 1987 presidential election.

However, their relations turned sour after President No took office in February, last year.

Chon is learned to have often expressed ill-feeling against No over his maltreatment.

More feared by the ruling party than ever is the possibility that supporters of Chon will try to rally behind him to return their treatment by the No Tae-u administration. This would accelerate internal confusion within the ruling camp over the settlement of "Fifth Republic questions."

Attention is also being attracted to whether former president Chon will make a "bombshell revelation" during the projected testimony. "He will reveal what he

came to know during his rule as they are," another aide to Chon said. "All depends upon questions to be thrown by lawmakers," he added.

"Bombshell announcements" may include the possible distribution of a tremendous amount of political money by Chon to some opposition leaders and No's role during the political upheaval after the assassination of Pak Chong-hui on Oct. 26, 1979.

Notable are the reactions of the two opposition leaders, Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam. Kim Yong-sam of the Reunification Democratic Party asserted that Chon's testimony should take place as soon as possible prior to the treatment of Rep. Chong Ho-yong and that Chon should reveal the alleged distribution of political funds to opposition leaders if it is true.

Kim Tae-chung of the Party for Peace and Democracy, however, insisted that Chon's testimony and treatment of Rep. Chong should be tackled in a single package.

#### Party Considers Removal of Chong, Pak Chol-on

SK2911010889 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
29 Nov 89 p 2

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-nim]

[Text] A new approach to solving the thorny issue involving Rep. Chong Ho-yong of the Democratic Justice Party [DJP] is under study by top leaders of the ruling camp. Ruling party officers said that this solution would be ready and pushed for after President No Tae-u returns home from his 18-day visit to five European countries on Dec. 4.

It features the simultaneous removal of Reps. Chong and Pak Chol-on, also state minister for political affairs and a relative of President No Tae-u, plus a drastic reform in the ruling party and the administration. Pak is known to be a major supporter for Chong's ouster.

The DJP leaders' turnaround came as President No's deputies failed to create an atmosphere which would help Rep. Chong resign "voluntarily": in connection with his alleged role during the 1980 Kwangju bloodletting. An aide to DJP chairman Pak Chun-kyu said that it would be inevitable for the President to oust Reps. Pak Chol-on and Chong Ho-yong at the same time because Rep. Chong and his supporters staged an organized revolt against the move to unseat him, suspecting that it is designed to render him "impotent" in preparation for the next president election in 1992.

The showdown between key DJP officers and Chong's supporters over the removal is, therefore, very serious.

In particular, discontent over the exercise of influence by No's relatives, including Pak and Kim Pok-tong, elder brother of First Lady Kim Ok-suk, is widespread among senior members from regions other than Taegu City and Kyongsangpuk-to province as well as some T-K [Taegu-Kyongpuk-to clique] members.

Supporters of Rep. Chong have demanded that Pak Chol-on, one of possible contenders for the next presidential election, first should be removed from the DJP to counter the move to drive out Rep. Chong, denouncing the 48-year-old political novice as causing factionalism.

In business circles, Kum Chin-ho, a brother-in-law of President No, has been, regarded as another "shadow man." Kum who served as trade-industry minister under president Chon Tu-hwan, is concurrently serving as an advisor to the Korea Foreign Trade Association.

"President No may be considering removing those relatives in question to calm down the widespread internal discontent. To that end, Kim Pok-tong will likely be advised by the President to take a long-term overseas trip," one DJP officer revealed.

President No said in a press conference in Switzerland last week that he will "make positive efforts to usher in a bright new decade by putting an end to the ugly controversy over Fifth Republic problems" by the end of this year.

The DJP officer interpreted No's remarks as indicating his will to take measures to solve the Chong Ho-yong question which he entrusted to key DJP officers.

Also remarkable is Rep. Pak Chol-on's remarks indicating his readiness to tender resignations as state minister for political affairs and Assemblyman. Pak, a former prosecutor, was elected to the Assembly in 1988 from the national constituency under the proportional representation system.

The DJP officer observed that another "proxy" of President No is likely to sound out Rep. Chong's reaction to the projected approach. The most probable intermediaries include Sin Hyun-hwak, former prime minister and a senior alumni with Chong Ho-yong of Kyongpuk High School.

Timed with the last-ditch efforts to settle the Fifth Republic questions, the President is likely to conduct a major reshuffle in the DJP and the administration along with disciplinary actions against those who created intra-party confusion.

Otherwise, President No may become a "lame duck" earlier than expected and lose his grip on the DJP, considering that a dozen lawmakers from his powerbase in Taegu and Kyongsangpuk-to province are staging an organized revolt this early in his five-year term.

#### \* DJP Moves To Eliminate Fifth Republic Problems

41070174 Seoul IRYO SINMUN in Korean  
10 Sep 89 p 9

[Article by Yim Hui-kyong: "One-sided Solution Through 'National Assembly Vote,' 'Special Committee White Paper'"]

[Text] In a few days, the National Assembly will begin its September regular session, which is expected to become a turning point in the process of elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic. It appears that the National Assembly will once again be involved in a whirlwind of Fifth Republic irregularities at the beginning of its session as the DJP [Democratic Justice Party] rushes to search for a strategy for terminating the activities of five National Assembly special committees by the end of the September parliamentary session. The five special committees, which have been active for more than a year, are the Special Committee for Investigation of the Fifth Republic Irregularities, the Special Committee for the Kwangju Incident, the Special Committee for National Reunification, the Special Committee for Investigation of Election Fraud, and the Special Committee for Legislative Amendment and Repeal.

#### Atmosphere of Conflict in Political Circles

The DJP plans to follow the principle adopted at the party leaders' meeting last May regarding elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic. The principle concerns its position that it would limit parliamentary testimony of the two former presidents, Chon and Choe, to one occasion and that the National Assembly would follow the procedure to charge Representative Chong Ho-yong, who was a main character on the stage of the Fifth Republic, with perjury.

It also deals with the means for compensating the victims of the Kwangju incident—compensation through special legislation and converting the Kwangju Officer Training School into a public park.

On the other hand, the PPD's [Party for Peace and Democracy] positions are as follows: The six central leaders of the Fifth Republic such as Yi Hui-song, Chong Ho-yong, Chang Se-tong, Ho Mun-to, An Mu-hyok, and Yi Won-cho are to be charged by the National Assembly and prevented from holding public office ever again; parliamentary testimony must be given by the two former presidents, Chon and Choe; and a public apology from the government and special legislation for compensation for those involved in the Kwangju Struggle for Democratization. However, the resignation of Rep Chong Ho-yong from public office is their ultimate goal.

The RDP [Reunification Democratic Party] seemed to be uninterested in having the National Assembly bring charges against the core leaders for a while. However, recently, it has shown as much hawkishness as the PPD as it has appeared to have adopted the elimination of irregularities of the Fifth Republic as its foremost task by demanding the resignation of Rep Chong Ho-yong from public office.

The NDRP [New Democratic Republican Party], which attracted the attention of political circles with the rumor of a merger with the DJP this July, appears to have taken a wait-and-see policy with its "best alternative theory." Even though the NDRP seemed to take a position of

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Attention is also being attracted to whether former president Chon will make a "bombshell revelation" during the projected testimony. "He will reveal what he

came to know during his rule as they are," another aide to Chon said. "All depends upon questions to be thrown by lawmakers," he added.

"Bombshell announcements" may include the possible distribution of a tremendous amount of political money by Chon to some opposition leaders and No's role during the political upheaval after the assassination of Pak Chong-hui on Oct. 26, 1979.

Notable are the reactions of the two opposition leaders, Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam. Kim Yong-sam of the Reunification Democratic Party asserted that Chon's testimony should take place as soon as possible prior to the treatment of Rep. Chong Ho-yong and that Chon should reveal the alleged distribution of political funds to opposition leaders if it is true.

Kim Tae-chung of the Party for Peace and Democracy, however, insisted that Chon's testimony and treatment of Rep. Chong should be tackled in a single package.

#### Party Considers Removal of Chong, Pak Chol-on

SK2911010889 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English  
29 Nov 89 p 2

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-nim]

[Text] A new approach to solving the thorny issue involving Rep. Chong Ho-yong of the Democratic Justice Party [DJP] is under study by top leaders of the ruling camp. Ruling party officers said that this solution would be ready and pushed for after President No Tae-u returns home from his 18-day visit to five European countries on Dec. 4.

It features the simultaneous removal of Reps. Chong and Pak Chol-on, also state minister for political affairs and a relative of President No Tae-u, plus a drastic reform in the ruling party and the administration. Pak is known to be a major supporter for Chong's ouster.

The DJP leaders' turnaround came as President No's deputies failed to create an atmosphere which would help Rep. Chong resign "voluntarily": in connection with his alleged role during the 1980 Kwangju bloodletting. An aide to DJP chairman Pak Chun-kyu said that it would be inevitable for the President to oust Reps. Pak Chol-on and Chong Ho-yong at the same time because Rep. Chong and his supporters staged an organized revolt against the move to unseat him, suspecting that it is designed to render him "impotent" in preparation for the next president election in 1992.

The showdown between key DJP officers and Chong's supporters over the removal is, therefore, very serious.

In particular, discontent over the exercise of influence by No's relatives, including Pak and Kim Pok-tong, elder brother of First Lady Kim Ok-suk, is widespread among senior members from regions other than Taegu City and Kyongsangpuk-to province as well as some T-K [Taegu-Kyongpuk-to clique] members.

Supporters of Rep. Chong have demanded that Pak Chol-on, one of possible contenders for the next presidential election, first should be removed from the DJP to counter the move to drive out Rep. Chong, denouncing the 48-year-old political novice as causing factionalism.

In business circles, Kum Chin-ho, a brother-in-law of President No, has been regarded as another "shadow man." Kum who served as trade-industry minister under president Chon Tu-hwan, is concurrently serving as an advisor to the Korea Foreign Trade Association.

"President No may be considering removing those relatives in question to calm down the widespread internal discontent. To that end, Kim Pok-tong will likely be advised by the President to take a long-term overseas trip," one DJP officer revealed.

President No said in a press conference in Switzerland last week that he will "make positive efforts to usher in a bright new decade by putting an end to the ugly controversy over Fifth Republic problems" by the end of this year.

The DJP officer interpreted No's remarks as indicating his will to take measures to solve the Chong Ho-yong question which he entrusted to key DJP officers.

Also remarkable is Rep. Pak Chol-on's remarks indicating his readiness to tender resignations as state minister for political affairs and Assemblyman. Pak, a former prosecutor, was elected to the Assembly in 1988 from the national constituency under the proportional representation system.

The DJP officer observed that another "proxy" of President No is likely to sound out Rep. Chong's reaction to the projected approach. The most probable intermediaries include Sin Hyun-hwak, former prime minister and a senior alumni with Chong Ho-yong of Kyongpuk High School.

Timed with the last-ditch efforts to settle the Fifth Republic questions, the President is likely to conduct a major reshuffle in the DJP and the administration along with disciplinary actions against those who created intra-party confusion.

Otherwise, President No may become a "lame duck" earlier than expected and lose his grip on the DJP, considering that a dozen lawmakers from his powerbase in Taegu and Kyongsangpuk-to province are staging an organized revolt this early in his five-year term.

#### \* DJP Moves To Eliminate Fifth Republic Problems

41070174 Seoul IRYO SINMUN in Korean  
10 Sep 89 p 9

[Article by Yim Hui-kyong: "One-sided Solution Through 'National Assembly Vote,' 'Special Committee White Paper'"]

[Text] In a few days, the National Assembly will begin its September regular session, which is expected to become a turning point in the process of elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic. It appears that the National Assembly will once again be involved in a whirlwind of Fifth Republic irregularities at the beginning of its session as the DJP [Democratic Justice Party] rushes to search for a strategy for terminating the activities of five National Assembly special committees by the end of the September parliamentary session. The five special committees, which have been active for more than a year, are the Special Committee for Investigation of the Fifth Republic Irregularities, the Special Committee for the Kwangju Incident, the Special Committee for National Reunification, the Special Committee for Investigation of Election Fraud, and the Special Committee for Legislative Amendment and Repeal.

#### Atmosphere of Conflict in Political Circles

The DJP plans to follow the principle adopted at the party leaders' meeting last May regarding elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic. The principle concerns its position that it would limit parliamentary testimony of the two former presidents, Chon and Choe, to one occasion and that the National Assembly would follow the procedure to charge Representative Chong Ho-yong, who was a main character on the stage of the Fifth Republic, with perjury.

It also deals with the means for compensating the victims of the Kwangju incident—compensation through special legislation and converting the Kwangju Officer Training School into a public park.

On the other hand, the PPD's [Party for Peace and Democracy] positions are as follows: The six central leaders of the Fifth Republic such as Yi Hui-song, Chong Ho-yong, Chang Se-tong, Ho Mun-to, An Mu-hyok, and Yi Won-cho are to be charged by the National Assembly and prevented from holding public office ever again; parliamentary testimony must be given by the two former presidents, Chon and Choe; and a public apology from the government and special legislation for compensation for those involved in the Kwangju Struggle for Democratization. However, the resignation of Rep Chong Ho-yong from public office is their ultimate goal.

The RDP [Reunification Democratic Party] seemed to be uninterested in having the National Assembly bring charges against the core leaders for a while. However, recently, it has shown as much hawkishness as the PPD as it has appeared to have adopted the elimination of irregularities of the Fifth Republic as its foremost task by demanding the resignation of Rep Chong Ho-yong from public office.

The NDRP [New Democratic Republican Party], which attracted the attention of political circles with the rumor of a merger with the DJP this July, appears to have taken a wait-and-see policy with its "best alternative theory." Even though the NDRP seemed to take a position of

cooperation with the opposition parties when it disclosed that "the agreements among the three opposition party leaders" meeting last March concerning the principles of parliamentary testimony by the two presidents, Chon and Choe, and the handling of the Fifth Republic core leaders were still valid. However, it is not yet clear which side it will support.

In this situation, the DJP plan, viewed from outside, seems to be to finish up the activities of the five special committees and to dissolve them regardless of consent from opposition parties during the upcoming the National Assembly, and to complete the issue of the elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic by next February at the latest, the second anniversary of President No's presidency. By next spring, when the wind of the local autonomy issue will begin to blow, the DJP hopes to have passed over the hurdle of the problem of the Fifth Republic irregularities.

Even though it is reported that the DJP puts the first priority on a 4-party-agreement to dissolve the Special Committee, the DJP is expected to search for a way to have a vote in the National Assembly by recruiting the NDRP members once Mr Chon has testified in the National Assembly "once and for all." However, if this approach is deemed impossible, as one high official puts it, the DJP will consider declaring a unilateral termination of further action on the Fifth Republic irregularities by issuing a white paper on the activities of the special committee up to that point.

The biggest stumbling block to such a DJP strategy is the issue of the resignation of Rep Chong Ho-yong from public office, which was the reason for the disruption of the party leaders' meeting last May, and on which the PPD and RDP are planning a direct attack in the course of their reoffensive strategy for eliminating the irregularities of the Fifth Republic. However, as long as the DJP is firmly resolved to handle this issue with a "charge of perjury by the National Assembly," there is little opportunity for further compromise.

Accordingly, the DJP affirmed its position that it would issue a white paper on the the elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic and declare a unilateral termination of the five special committees such as the Special Committee for Investigation of the Fifth Republic Irregularities and the Special Committee for the Kwangju Incident. As for testimony by Mr Chon, it affirmed its stance for a public explanation.

#### "Chong Ho-yong Issue," Biggest Stumbling Block

This measure deals with the following areas: If the opposition parties make a concession by permitting judicial handling of perjury in the National Assembly for the core figures, the DJP will try to successfully arrange parliamentary testimony by the former presidents. If, however, there is no agreement among the ruling and opposition parties, the DJP will announce a one-sided dissolution of the special committee at the end of the

National Assembly session; and Mr Chon will attempt an explanation by making a public announcement.

Mr Chon Chae-kuk, Mr Chon's eldest son, celebrated his first son's first birthday in Paektam Temple on 27 July, and upon his return began to convey the message, "My father is willing to testify," to leaders around him.

One opposition camp official said that behind the scenes negotiation led by Chairman Yi Chun-ku to persuade Mr Chon to make a trip abroad after a public explanation is taking place because parliamentary testimony has as a precondition that Chon will be "rescued from Paektam Temple."

In regard to this matter, President No said on 4 September that "the true elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic lies in the pursuit of democratization, which can offer a satisfactory end to the 1980's and a bright blueprint of the 1990's to the people."

At the Chongwadae dinner table for party staff members on the same day, President No is reported to have said the above and to have encouraged representatives to make an effort to finish up the investigation into the irregularities of the Fifth Republic.

It is interpreted that the reason why the DJP is launching such an offensive toward the dissolution of the special committees may be partly due to the confidence which it was able to enjoy during the public security administration issue and the Yongdungpo-UI district election. However, it was mainly due to the fact that the DJP understood how President No felt about dealing with the issue of one of the central figures of the Fifth Republic—that Rep Chong should resign from public office.

Rep Chong, who strongly opposed resigning from public office when the subject came up during the Party Leaders' Meeting last May, was officially told that "it was unavoidable" by President No when they met with each other at that time. One source said that President No gave Rep Chong an even "stronger" urging at several personal meetings up to July.

The emergence of hardliners during the recent DJP party reorganization also seems to shed light on the importance of such preparation for the accomplishment of such a strategy.

Party insiders interpret the emergence of new party whip Yi Han-tong following the resignation of the former party whip Kim Yun-hwan as signifying the introduction of "someone who carries out the directives of his superiors rather than acting through negotiations with opposition parties as far as the Fifth Republic issue is concerned." Therefore, it appears that party whip Yi's action can be a clear indication of the DJP's strategy on elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic.

**Idea of Compromise "Unacceptable"**

However, there are quite a few people with very different viewpoints regarding what kind of action Chairman Yi Chun-ku and Party Whip Yi Han-tong will take.

In light of the fact that Chairman Yi shares a similar political viewpoint with Rep Chong, his Korea Military Academy senior alumnus, Rep Chong's side is optimistic. However, when the issue of the Fifth Republic becomes very difficult, different from what was originally expected, one cannot exclude the possibility that Chairman Yi, a loyal aide to President No, will take a completely different approach to achieve smooth sailing in the 2d year of President No's administration.

Since Party Whip Yi Han-tong is also someone who "is recognized as someone who carries out the will of his superiors rather than insisting on his own ideas," one cannot but consider that President No's thoughts might be reflected through his actions.

It is also true that the pressure of all-out offensives of both the PPD and the RDP, which are in search of a vital outlet through the elimination of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic, cannot be lightly ignored. Even though some within the ruling party even mention a possible mutual compromise by making some concession in the process of legislative amendments which might be introduced by such a body as the Special Committee for Legislative Amendment and Repeal rather than the Special Committee for Investigation of the Fifth Republic or the Special Committee for the Kwangju Incident, there is little possibility that this will actually take place because there is no basis for such action.

In light of the political trend within the ruling party and that of general political circles, there is a strong indication that the issue of the Fifth Republic will not settle down according to the DJP's intention which is to dissolve the special committee within this parliamentary session, but will rather be held over to next year when there will be the local autonomy election. Such an aggravated collision course is guaranteed to give "material for a fight in the spring of 1990."

**Faculty Held by Students Freed by Police**

SK2811033889 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
28 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] Osan, Kyonggi-to—Forty-eight Hanshin University faculty members including the president confined on the campus by students were set free Sunday when police dispersed about 200 students by force.

At the request of the university authorities, about 1,200 riot police charged into the campus at 4:20 p.m. when students holding the school office refused to yield to police despite exhortations through loudspeakers.

A total of 146 students including An Ki-yong, 24, were hauled away to Hwasong Police Station, police said.

Police decided to seek arrest warrants for nine students who masterminded the confinement of the faculty members on charges of violating the law on assembly and demonstrations while booking 23 others without physical detention.

Last Friday, more than 200 students confined the professors in a chapel when they turned down students' demands that Prof. Chong Un-yong, 45, who was fired in 1986, be reinstated next year.

**'Mass People's Rally' Averted by Police**

SK2811033489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
28 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Thousands of radical student activists and dissidents fought with riot police in running battles on campuses and streets across the country Sunday as police foiled massive anti-government rallies dubbed the "'89 People's Rally."

The nation's major student and dissident groups including the National Alliance for Democratic Movement (Chonminnyon) and the National Council for Student Representatives (Chondaehyop) planned to stage the rallies simultaneously in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju and six other cities.

Organizers said earlier the projected rallies were aimed at crushing the government crackdown on the people's movement and at punishing those who masterminded the bloody suppression of the May 1980 popular uprising in Kwangju.

But Sunday's rallies were aborted, confronted with the physical intervention of determined police forces.

A strong police force in full combat gear, firing barrages of teargas shells, charged into Yonsei University at about 1:50 p.m., 10 minutes before the start of the '89 People's Rally on the university campus in western Seoul.

About 1,000 students and dissidents armed with Molotov cocktails and steel pipes waged a fierce battle with the tear gas canister-firing riot police.

**Student Now To Call for 'Alliance With Workers'**

SK2911025189 Seoul YONHAP in English 0150 GMT  
29 Nov 89

[By Kim Min-chol]

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 29 (YONHAP)—Volatile adherents of North Korean ruler Kim Il-song's dogma are being ousted from the leadership of South Korea's student movement by less doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists, putting an end to the three-year reign of a group of activists chanting "Yankee go home" and opening the way for a rival group calling for an "alliance with the workers."

For the first time, the populist "defenders of the rights and interests of low-income people" seized full control of the student leadership at Seoul National University by

winning the top posts in the student councils of seven of the university's nine colleges.

Since 1987, the National liberationists (NL), or chuchests, named for Kim's chuche ideology, demanding the immediate removal of foreign powers from Korean soil, have held the reins of the nationwide student movement but are now under heavy fire and definitely on the defensive.

The contest for control of the student movement next year is being decided on the campuses of Seoul's universities, where an intense power struggle is under way between the NL and the supporters of the so-called People's Democracy (PD) to elect the most student council presidents.

At Sokang University, west of Seoul, a leading activist school together with Seoul National, Yonsei and Korea universities, the liberationists defeated the PL supporters and non-activists by the unprecedently narrow margin of 79 votes to 97 votes.

At Yonsei and Korea, the liberalizationists also held their ground, but at Kugmin and Kwangun universities the non-activists grasped the student body presidencies.

"The non-activist group's rise is a greater threat to us than the PD supporters," an NL campaigner at Seoul national said.

"The NL supporters hold the same views as us on the recognition of modern South Korea despite a little feuding, but the non-activists don't accord with us at all," he said.

The decline of the anti-Americanists is rooted in the journey to North Korea of Yim Su-kyong as a delegate of "Chondaehyop," as the NL-controlled National Alliance of Student Representatives is called, after which posters denouncing the arbitrary decision of the organization appeared on campuses.

The PD attacked the NL in the posters for misunderstanding the situation and sending coed Yim to Pyongyang without consulting them.

Non-activists then attacked activists for subverting the student council into an exclusive organization for their own use and for staging only political protests against the government.

The NL's authoritarian, clandestine leadership has contributed to separating the group from the majority of students, a former activist said. Students are gradually being estranged from activists.

As of late August, according to National Police Headquarters, the average campus rally had a paltry 250 participants.

Many rallies were postponed or failed to take place due to lack of support, police said.

Activists suffered immense damage at Yonsei University a month ago, when Sol In-chong, a student of another college, was tortured to death because he had mingled with them although later found to be a student from other school. Sol was beaten to death by students who thought he was a police plant.

The incident deprived the activists of any semblance of moral authority, and thus destroyed the base for their leadership.

Another reason for their weakening grip on the leadership of the student movement is that most major activist leaders are wanted by the police.

Some 20 student presidents of 38 universities in Seoul under Chondaehyop are hiding to evade capture by the police on charges of violating the National Security Law or the Law on Assembly and Demonstration.

Famous activist leader Yim Chong-sok, president of Chondaehyop and of Hanyang University Student Union, Mun Kwang-myong, student president of Seoul National University, and Chon Mun-hwan, student president of Sokang University, are unable to use their full influence because of the police chase.

Most students are markedly less interested in radical political protest than their counterparts in the 1970s and mid-1980s. Instead, Korea's new breed of student tends to pursue interests in society such as a promising career as a businessman or banker.

The student movement no longer leads but is merely another aspect of dissent in South Korea, and its waning has accelerated the average student's apathy toward political problems.

Activist farmers established their own nationwide organization this year and laborers are trying to form the National alliance of unions in defiance of government opposition to protect their interests.

Some well-known reformists are working to found a progressive party to represent grassroot interests.

Eastern Europe's sweeping change for liberalization has also affected student thinking.

"PD supporters regard the changes in Eastern Europe as both a liquidation of Stalinism and as a restoration of human respectability," an activist said. "The chuchests, however, are silent on the communist nations' rapid change, clinging to Pyongyang's stiff rejection of the global turn. But the PD takes a negative attitude toward Pyongyang's closedness."

Throughout the history of the student movement in Korea, Seoul National University has led activist students, he said.

By wresting control of the Seoul National Student body from the radical NL, the PD will take over the nationwide student movement within two or three years, the former activist said.

With their emphasis on class struggle, the student movement will focus its ire against the government and generate great strength through ties between students and workers.

Slogans such as "shatter the government's suppression of the populist movement" will be heard more frequently than "Yankee go home" as their influence grows and the NL wilts.

#### \* Spread of Teachers Union Controversy Analyzed

*41070171 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
7 Sep 89 p 3*

[Article by Yim Chae-chong]

[Text] As the National Teachers Union [NTU] controversy spreads, NTU's auxiliary organizations—student headquarters and the "Joint Countermeasure Committee To Stop the Suppression of NTU and Realize True Education" [JCC]—and various organizations with different purposes in which students' parents are involved have come forward to present their sides, creating what appears to be a confrontation and arousing the concern of the public.

These groups are raising their voices and adding fuel to the state of struggle as the controversy becomes protracted without a settlement.

Consequently, the NTU controversy has taken on a war-by-proxy aspect, with dissidents and activist students on one side, and the administration and the established parent organization, which is against NTU, on the other.

NTU and JCC held a joint press conference on 5 September at the Catholic Farmers Hall in Taejon.

The key point of that press conference was an announcement that a "second national rally to stop the suppression of NTU and win its legitimacy" will be held simultaneously in 20 cities across the country, including Seoul and Pusan, at 2 pm on 24 September.

JCC is a pan-dissident, support-NTU organization formed immediately after the union's inauguration to provide indirect support for the NTU movement. Its chairman is Yi U-chong, president of the National Federation of Women's Organizations.

Its major member organizations include Chonminnyon [the National Democratic Alliance of Korea], Chondae-hyop [the National Council of College Representatives], the National Alliance of Farmers Movement, the National Conference of Regional and Industrial Labor

Unions, the National Council of Labor Movement Organizations, the National Literary Men and Writers Conference, and the Christian Social Movement Alliance.

In its initial response, NTU did not welcome JCC's support too much, according to explanations from both sides. Various analyses were published of circumstances at the time.

First of all, when NTU began its business in May, the domestic political situation was extremely strained because of the controversial public security issues, making it difficult for NTU to coordinate smoothly with dissident groups; at the same time, the dissident groups themselves were in disarray in the wake of the arrests of leaders, according to analyses.

Second, it is said that for NTU, which stands for educational reform basically away from political colors, it was difficult to readily accept support by dissident groups that are more or less politically oriented.

Third, at a time when not only industrial but also clerical and professional workers unions had mushroomed riding the tide of democratization generated by the 29 June 1987, statement of President No Tae-u, NTU had also possibly felt that there would be no difficulty in having its legitimacy recognized.

However, as the administration made clear its policy of absolutely not recognizing NTU, showing no signs of yielding a step from that stance but dismissing, firing or even arresting teachers involved, NTU began changing its attitude gradually.

Now that it had become clear that a legal NTU was not possible under the present government, NTU must have arrived at a conclusion that it should manage to stay alive even as an outlawed union in order to preserve a "live coal" to start a fire with in the future for the building of a legalized NTU. This sort of realistic awareness possibly played a part in the relationship between NTU and dissident groups.

Also, NTU had seemingly concluded that it is difficult for the union, which wilts in the face of official suppression, to secure broad public support independently. This conclusion apparently prompted NTU to be more active in seeking links with dissident groups which enjoy strong, spontaneous solidarity among themselves.

NTU Spokesman Hwang Ho-yong said that "we will respond favorably even now if authorities end the suppression and come forward for dialogue." "It all depends on the government," he insisted, "whether or not it will drive us into the streets or even into an antigovernment struggle."

Meanwhile, dissident groups centering on JCC take a different position. They see it as relatively easy to form a national consensus about struggle for NTU's legitimacy and, by defining this struggle as a major task in their struggle program for the second half of this year, they are

attempting to find a breakthrough in the current political situation caused by the public security issues.

JCC in a statement issued at the 5 September press conference declared that "the second national rally scheduled for 24 September will trigger a joint struggle of the masses of all strata to realize the revision or abrogation of various undemocratic, evil laws including labor-related laws and the National Security Law, not to mention struggles to force revision of the bad education laws and legalization of NTU."

The positions coming out of college student headquarters and the activist student movement groups is similar to that of dissident groups. Their strategy is, in principle, to wage simultaneously the struggle against a judicial action in the Yim Su-kyong case, the struggle for repeal of the National Security Law and the struggle to win legitimacy for NTU; realistically, however, it is likely that the NTU issue will be given priority because of the fact that it is exposed to less rejection by the general public.

On the other hand, a "national parents association for the practice of true education" is scheduled to hold an inaugural meeting on 22 September. Meanwhile, pro-NTU parents groups were already organized in Seoul and some other cities and they have been supporting the NTU movement.

Regarding such parents' activities, NTU officials made it clear that they do not positively encourage them although they agree that such activities could provide a momentum for parents to have a better understanding of the serious problems facing the nation's educational system.

In another development, parents led by the Federation of School Support Associations have lately stepped up their activities to prevent "pollution" of children's thoughts and feelings. Their activities are viewed as a positive move by parents to protect children. It is their right to have their children receive an education.

After all, the NTU controversy is escalating from confrontation between NTU and the Education Ministry into confrontation and antagonism not only between dissident groups and activist students, on one side, and the public security authorities, on the other, but also among parents.

With the situation thus escalating into what appears to be a war by proxy, it can be said that concessions and efforts by either side alone are not enough to settle it.

#### **Police Abort Massive 'Activist Farmers' Rally**

SK281124489 Seoul YONHAP in English 1227 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—Police aborted Tuesday a massive outdoor rally planned by a nationwide organization of activist farmers at a plaza near the National Assembly Hall to protest imports of foreign farm products.

Police, deploying more than 10,000 riot troops, sealed off the plaza, bus terminals, and railway stations.

At 124 checkpoints they set up across the country, police sent more than 2,200 farmers back home and arrested 117 others who attempted to come to Seoul to attend the rally.

After their Yido Plaza rally was aborted by police, more than 300 farmers gathered at the Farm Technicians' Building in downtown and held a brief rally.

It was the second time in two weeks that police aborted an outdoor rally farmers tried to hold at the Yido Plaza where an estimated 15,000 farmers clashed violently with riot police nine months ago leaving more than 100 people injured.

Last week, a similar rally of farmers at the plaza was also aborted by police. Over 1,000 farmers and students gathered instead on an eastern Seoul university campus and fought tear gas firing riot police, hurling rocks and firebombs.

Some 160 protesters went on to storm into the headquarters of the three opposition parties in downtown and staged overnight sit-ins.

#### **Union Calls Strike Demanding Leader's Release**

SK2911005689 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
29 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Suwon—Members of 32 district chapters affiliated with the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (Minjunojo) mounted a strike yesterday in a show of protest against the arrest of senior unionists in Anyang, Ansan and three other cities in the southern region of Kyonggi-to.

The unionized workers started the walkout at 12 manufacturing companies including Ujin Pipe Mfg. Co. at 9 a.m. denouncing that arrest of labor leaders was an unlawful crackdown on union activities.

The Suwon District Prosecutor's Office arrested Kim Hui-song, 24, chairman of Ujin Pipe's labor union, and five others last Thursday.

Demanding immediate release of the union leaders from police custody, the striking laborers also criticized the search and seizure of the offices operated by the dissidents for being a brazen-faced suppression of the legal and fair labor movement.

The prosecutors searched six offices plus the Ansan and Anyang labor councils last week.

The blue-collar employees of 20 other labor unions followed the suit of their colleagues in 12 companies yesterday afternoon.

**Ministries Warn Unionist Against Violent Strikes**

*SK2911004889 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English  
29 Nov 89 p 3*

[Text] Amid a string of dire warnings about the Korean economy, the government has renewed its tough policy against violent, illegal union activities.

The Labor Ministry warned union leaders against leading or instigating the seizures of work sites and sit-ins.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry mailed a letter to enterprises saying that management should promptly file criminal complaint against union leaders who resort to violence in order to settle labor-management disputes.

The government is ready to take resolute steps to preempt wildcat strikes by unionists next year, Labor Minister Choe Yong-chol warned.

Choe made the warning during a consultative meeting of the government and the ruling party Monday morning.

"Violence-ridden labor disputes have become the subject of public criticism and there is a pervading sense of crisis that a renewed rash of labor unrest next year would have a catastrophic effect on the national economy," he said.

The prospects for labor-management relationships for next year are uncertain, he said, as a radical labor organization called "Chonnohyop" [National Council of Labor Unions] would prompt the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the sole legalized nationwide union federation, to take a stronger stand against management.

Chonnohyop, yet to gain legal recognition, had already organized strikes by workers in many cities and areas on several occasions.

Choe said the nation could secure labor stability if the government tries harder to remove the structural factors of labor unrest by reinforcing education in labor-management relationships and improving working conditions.

The Labor Ministry will specify the scope and terms of collective bargaining, said the minister, adding that legal labor activities will be publicized to persuade unionist to maintain law and order.

However, Minister Choe warned that his ministry would take punitive measures against anyone found violating the law, be they part of labor or management.

The ministry has decided to promote education programs, including worker tours of Communist countries.

In a related development, the ministry of Trade and Industry sent out to industrial complexes and business organizations letters urging businesses to bring to justice the masterminds of illegal labor activities or third-party intervention in labor unrest.

The ministry said enterprises will be unable to restore productivity and their products' competitive edge in international markets unless industrial peace is secured, even if the government takes drastic measures to boost the economy.

The nation's six major business organizations, concerned about a possible escalation of labor unrest in 1990, resolved Nov. 16 to jointly fight labor unrest. They included the Korea Employers' Federation, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Korean Industries.

The business organizations agreed to create a joint body which will coordinate a reaction to labor unrest, saying that they would follow the principle of "no work, no pay."

The prosecution also earlier warned that it will not tolerate violence by labor activists, students or dissidents.

**Government, 'Haves' Receive Workers' Ire**

*SK2811041889 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
28 Nov 89 p 9*

[“News in Review” by assistant economic editor Kim Chum-tong: “Bizmen’s Efforts Needed To Boost Ailing Economy”]

[Text] Referring to the frequently inaccurate weather forecasts, the people used to joke, “Do you still believe the weather report?” These days the same goes for the economic predictions by the Cabinet economic team.

While many businessmen were worried about the overall economic slowdown, the Cho Sun’s economic team foresaw the opposite. They called the sagging economy “seasonal” and maintained that the economy was still in good shape and that it would rebound soon.

It was fortunate that now the economic ministers have realized the seriousness of the sickness of the economy that might plunge into an irrecoverable state in the not too distant future.

But the measures taken by Cho to salvage the sinking economy were seen by businesses as inadequate to treat the sickness.

Since the turn of the second half of this year, the exchange rate of the won against the major foreign currencies has remained stable and violent labor disputes have been seldom reported, but exports are running in the wrong direction. During the first 20 days of this month, shipments dropped 12.3 percent over the same period of last year.

If this trend continues to the end of this year, the nation will be hard to achieve \$62 billion in exports for the year, let alone the original target of \$70 billion and the revised June projection of \$67 billion.

The Trade-Industry Ministry strongly urged the trading firms to push up exports to attain at least the projected \$63 billion. The efforts, however, are not paying off.

Competition between such general trading companies as Samsung Hyundai and Daewoo commonly seen near the year-end in past years to become the top exporter, is out of sight this year because of the too-wide gap between the first runner and the runner-up.

During the first 10 months of this year, Samsung exported \$5,239 million worth of goods, followed by Hyundai with \$3,344 and Daewoo with \$3,243. Last year, the figures between Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo were neck and neck with \$5,659 million, \$5,435 million and \$5,055 million, respectively.

Blamable for the slowdown are the steep appreciation of the won, high wage hikes and the labor unrest.

Affected most by the stronger won have been the overseas sales of autos, and electric and electronics products. The Korean currency appreciated 15.8 percent last year and 2.5 percent against the U.S. dollar in the first half of this year, compared with the Japanese yen's depreciation of 2.5 percent and 13.1 percent during the corresponding period.

The stronger won made Korean cars, VCRs and TV sets more expensive overseas than Japanese products.

The average monthly working hour at manufacturing industries decreased 15.3 hours in two and a half years, from 237.7 hours in 1986 to 234.6 hours in 1987, 228.6 hours in 1988 and 222.4 hours this year.

Productivity or output per hour worked rose only 7.1 percent in the first half, compared with a 15.2 percent rise in 1986 and a 16 percent gain in 1987.

Wages had soared 18.7 percent in Korea as of July. Comparable figures are 5.2 percent for Japan, 6 percent for Singapore and 12 percent for Taiwan. Between 1986 and 1988, the average monthly pay of Korean workers rose \$245, compared with the increased figures of \$100 in Singapore, \$121 in Hong Kong and \$220 in Taiwan.

The important matter is that vitality and dynamism that have vigorously fueled the average double-digit yearly exports and sustained economic growth in the past decades seems to be disappearing.

The decrease of labor productivity means that workers dislike working partly because of a slightly better living standard and increased holidays mean no work hours.

But employers, the government and the haves are also, possibly more seriously, responsible for the situation. They, rather than helping boost willingness to work, have discouraged those who want to work hard and live honestly.

Unless businesses refrain from trying to make it by all means, even in violation of the laws and regulations and business ethics, the extravagant life tendency will not be cleared and they will not be supported by workers.

They should also drastically increase their investment in research and development (R&D) programs to catch up with Korea's trade rivals, namely the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia.

If the rich think of the poor and business conglomerates try to respect the hard working workers and try to be respected by the workers, the nation will not face gloom and recession and the 1990s will be another great period of prosperity.

#### Investment Ceiling for Manufacturing Raised

SK2811024689 Seoul YONHAP in English 0235 GMT  
28 Nov 89

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—Investing in South Korea's manufacturing sector will be easier than ever next year as the Finance Ministry decided Tuesday to lift the ceiling for automatic approval from 3 million to 100 million U.S. dollars.

The amended enforcement decree of the foreign capital inducement act, due to take effect Jan. 1, 1990, practically abolishes qualifications for automatic approval because no foreign investment has broken the 100 million dollar-barrier.

Investment in manufacturing has come to a virtual standstill in recent months, discouraged by frequent labor disputes and soaring wages.

The amended decree also canceled tax benefits for investments by Koreans living abroad and firms operating in the duty free zones.

Tax benefits will be confined to firms chosen by the Foreign Capital Inducement Deliberation Committee for their ability to enhance the international competitiveness of Korean goods.

The decree bars reduction of income and corporate taxes for eligible beneficiaries if they operate in the densely populated capital or its vicinity.

Instead, it exempts firms operating outside metropolitan areas from acquisition and property taxes.

#### Government Rules Restrict Investment in Vietnam

SK2811031089 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English  
28 Nov 89 p 2

[Excerpt] Korean businesses' attempts to take a foothold in the Vietnamese market have hit a snag due to the government's strict regulations.

In contrast, many Western business enterprises are making brisk efforts to go into Vietnam, which has taken economic liberalization measures following its troop withdrawal from Kampuchea, business sources here said yesterday.

The government disapproval of direct investment and branch establishment in Vietnam by Korean companies

seems in line with the U.S. economic sanction on the Southeast Asian country, triggering suspicion about Seoul's self-determination in its northern policy, the sources said.

**Hyundai Corp.** and **Samsung Co.**, two biggest general trading companies here, applied for the establishment of their branch offices in Vietnam last April and September, respectively, but failed to obtain government permission.

**Kolon, Sunkyong, Hyosung and Miwon** business groups have also promoted to set up branches or joint-venture plants but had to shelve their plans facing the government's tight control.

**Miwon Commercial Co.**, is competing to set up a local food seasoning manufacturing plant with a Japanese and a Taiwanese companies but sees little chance of winning the project as the government prohibits direct investment in Vietnam, the sources said.

**Kolon Business Group** has tried to establish a knit-wear factory and participate in offshore oil prospecting in Vietnam but has to accept an indefinite postponement of the projects until the government regulation relaxes.

Other Western businesses, however, have already increased their investments into Vietnam at a rapid pace since Vietnamese army withdrawal in September 1988 and foreign investment liberalization last January. [passage omitted]

#### \* High Tech Priorities for Year 2001 Debated

41070172 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
7 Sep 89 p 10

[Article by Yu Ul-sang: "A Challenge to High Technologies—a Report on the 'Public Hearing To Determine National Policy-Level Research Priorities'"]

[Text] Aeronautics, space, oceanic and transit technologies, which are all high technologies that mobilize technologies of various other areas, share the characteristics of having high added value and far-reaching effects. Also, since they demand huge research costs and highly specialized manpower, they are apt to end up being mere empty slogan.

#### Aeronautic Technology

This technology is divided into technology of aircraft proper and the related peripheral technologies. Under the announced basic strategy, Korea is to emerge from the present phase of low-level parts production, go through the phases of joint production and independent development and production, and ultimately advance to levels of international joint development and production.

To that end, in the areas of energy, aeronautical electronics and automatic control, the Space and Aeronautics Research Institute and other research institutes relying on government grants will, under the announced

plans, proceed with university-centered research as far as basic research is concerned, such as research of new materials and elementary technology. In other words, in the process of developing elements-innovating technology and joint-use technology, and of state-level integration of these technologies, the plans leave short-term system development—such as one involving technology exclusively applicable to parts—for the private sector to undertake.

#### Space Technology

The announced basic concept is to secure technological manpower and essential technology needed to produce domestically various types of satellites for future domestic use, and to complete 80 percent of the development of an ROK-made rocket for satellites by the year 2001.

Under this concept, the plans call for the first-phase development of space technology in two areas—scientific satellites and scientific rockets.

Scientific satellite research will be pushed to develop technology in these areas: satellite system and structural designing, posture and orbit adjusting, and tracking and controlling. Thus, the plans call for development of a small, 50-100 kilogram satellite during the first-phase period or by 1995, and a 100-200 kilogram satellite for scientific exploration and communication experiment during the second-phase period ending in the year 2000.

Meanwhile, scientific rocket research will be divided into these areas: system and structural designing, solid and liquid fueled jet system, and igniting, guiding and controlling technology. The first-phase plan calls for development of a rocket for aerial observation of the Korean peninsula, while the second-phase plan envisages the start of research and development of a rocket for actual use in the launch of a satellite.

#### Ocean Technology

The Ministry of Science and Technology plans to establish a research system centering on the Institute of Oceanography and embracing all industrial, university and other research institutes, and to spend more than 450 billion won in total by the year 2001 to push a six-point program—envisioning development of mineral resources at the deep sea-bottom of the Pacific, and of technology for Antarctic environmental and resources exploration, and development of a robot for sea-bed work and a deep sea-bed exploring vessel, creation of a national oceanic observation network, development of tidal power generating technology, and exploration and development of sea-bed oil resources.

These plans, if carried out smoothly, raise prospects for such gains as securing technology for detailed weather forecasting and fish school detection, increased productivity of oceanic life through development of new cold-resistant species, and a yearly production of 3 million tons of manganese nodules.

### **Transit Technology**

It is planned to create a transit technology committee centering on the Korea Mechanical Engineering Institute and other institutes, and to invest a total of 457 billion won by the year 2001 to develop new land, sea and air transit systems.

On land, it is planned to enter by 1997 into commercialization of a linear electric motor train with a 100-kilometer-class per-hour speed for mass transit, and to develop by the year 2001 a superspeed, linear electric motor train with a speed of 300-500 kilometers per hour that will make the Seoul-Pusan run in between 1 and 2 hours.

In the sea transit area, the plans also call for development by the year 2001 of a twin-hulled, 50-knot class superspeed boat capable of carrying 400 passengers, and in air transit, development of city-type helicopters for use between airports and downtowns.

### **Maritime Officials Disciplined for Lax Security**

*SK2811034689 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
28 Nov 89 p 3*

[Text] The National Police Headquarters [NHP] has disciplined 14 police officers in Cheju-to for the lax security situation found vulnerable as shown in the landing early last week of 12 Chinese citizens.

In the toughest action taken in connection with a single case in the 1980s, Supt. Nam Tong-sun, commander of Cheju District Maritime Police, and three ranking officers were relieved of their posts yesterday.

Two junior policemen were kicked off the force for dereliction of duty. One was in direct charge of a police box in Mosulpo Port that was supposed to check entries and departures of boats, and the other a sentry box near the point where the Chinese boat landed undetected.

Two officers, Senior Supt. Chong Yong-tuk, chief of the Maritime Police Force, and Commissioner Ki Se-ik, director of Cheju Provincial Police, were given written admonitions.

The NPH turned six others, including Supt. Kim Yong-chung, director of Seoguipo Police Station, over to a disciplinary committee for action.

The Chinese people, who said they were fleeing China for fear of being arrested for their alleged involvement in the pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing in June, arrived unchecked on the nation's southernmost island aboard a small chartered boat.

### **Prosecutors Release Updated List of Banned Books**

*SK2911072089 Seoul YONHAP in English 0550 GMT  
29 Nov 89*

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 29 (YONHAP)—An updated list of banned books was released by South Korean prosecutors Wednesday in a stepped up crackdown on editors, publishers and sellers of "subversive literature."

Prosecutors designated 138 books as forbidden, 87 more than listed by National Police Headquarters early this year, because they are seditious (containing leftist ideology) and ordered the arrest and thorough investigation of anyone circulating the books.

A prosecution guideline on the crackdown said authors, translators, editors, publishers and financial backers of banned books should be investigated or arrested in principle and sellers should be arrested if they resist confiscation of the books.

The guideline also said pseudonymous and anonymous authors should be tracked down and exposed.

"The stepped up crackdown is designed to foil the left-leaning forces' attempt to topple the government and protect people from North Korea's strategy of communizing the South," it said.

"Since the June 29 declaration for democratic reforms, seditious books, including those instigating class struggle and written by Kim Il-song, are being published and copied, flooding our society and riding over the mood of democratization," added the prosecution guideline.

**Burma****Diplomats Report Secret Trials of Dissidents**

*BK2911073989 Hong Kong AFP in English 0722 GMT  
29 Nov 89*

[By Michael Adler]

[Text] Bangkok, Nov 29 (AFP)—Repression of opposition figures continues in Burma amid reports that authorities are secretly trying political dissidents and sentencing them to long prison terms, with national elections only six months away, Rangoon-based diplomats said here.

In interviews over the past week they said that according to the reports most of these people were from the National League for Democracy (NLD), the main opposition party whose leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U have been under house arrest since July.

There is "no evidence senior people are being tried and sentenced," one diplomat said. But the envoys expressed concern that the elections promised by Burma's ruling junta for May next year would not (repeat not) be fair and that repression would continue against opposition figures.

The government has asked former Prime Minister U Nu, who heads the League for Democracy and Peace (LDP) party, to disown an interim government he declared during mass pro-democracy protests in September 1988. U Nu has so far not done this, the diplomats said. They said there were some 1,000 NLD people in jail, mainly from a crackdown which began in July, and that these mainly middle-level political organizers were the ones being handed jail sentences.

The charismatic 44-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Burma's independence hero Aung San, has not been formally charged. She was put under house arrest when authorities said her party was instigating unrest.

Burmese authorities have denied making political arrests. They have since August sentenced at least 11 people to death for beheadings during last year's pro-democracy unrest.

Generals seized power in September 1988 to end a nationwide strike and disturbances which had rendered impotent the military-backed socialist government ruling since a coup in 1962. The strike capped over a year of agitation for democratic rule and reforms to end worsening poverty in Burma, once one of Southeast Asia's most prosperous states.

The junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), has maintained martial law since taking power and has set up military tribunals with the power to hand down death sentences.

The most recent crackdown, in July, was to stop demonstrations celebrating key anniversaries marking the unprecedented national uprising in 1988, which brought millions into the streets daily for some six weeks in protest marches.

The diplomats estimated that from five to eight thousand people were arrested and that 3,000 were still in jail. They said some of the sentences were from 15-20 years. They refused to provide further details in order to protect those concerned. They said torture had frequently been used in Burmese prisons, from denying people sleep during interrogation to physical brutality such as electric shocks to the genitals.

The diplomats said the Burmese economy, one of the poorest in the world, is still struggling and "totally dependent on a flourishing black market."

Rice prices, which hit record highs earlier this year, were down but the prices for other staples were "astronomically high," one diplomat said. They said there continued to be frequent anti-regime incidents in schools. There were "hit-and-run demonstrations" in Rangoon last week, a day before Burma's national day on November 22.

In June the government began re-opening schools closed after last year's unrest, up to the high school level, but universities are still shut.

One Rangoon-based envoy said the crackdown begun in July has eased somewhat but that the population remains "cowed and afraid." "The government continues to rule by the gun and there is no reason this can't go on indefinitely," the diplomat said.

**Information Committee Holds 66th News Conference**

*BK291105089 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese  
1330 GMT 24 Nov 89*

[Excerpts] Minister of Trade Colonel Abel and the Information Committee of the State Law and Order Restoration Council held the 66th news conference with local and foreign journalists at 1300 today in the reception hall of the Ministry of Defense. [passage omitted]

Minister Col Abel began by discussing his trip abroad. He said that he visited Malaysia from 8 to 12 November, the Republic of Korea from 13 to 17 November, and Japan from 17 to 22 November at the invitation of the governments concerned. He explained that the main objective of the three-nation tour was to hold detailed discussions on improving bilateral relations, economic cooperation, development of trade enterprises, industrial investment matters, and commercial banking.

In Malaysia, Col Abel held talks with Prime Minister Mahathir, the defense minister, the planning and finance minister, the transport and communication minister, the deputy minister for trade, chairmen of various banks, and other leading business figures. [passage omitted]

In the Republic of Korea, the colonel said that he met the foreign minister, the deputy trade minister, the chairman of the Import and Export Bank, the chairman of the Bank of Korea, and members of the Industrial Enterprises Association, all of whom he held cordial discussions with. He was also able to visit many of the well developed industrial enterprises. [passage omitted]

In Japan, Trade Minister Abel met the foreign minister, the deputy minister for industry and trade, the vice chairman of OECF [Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund], the director general of the Asian Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the director general of the Finance Department. He said that during these meetings he discussed in detail the real social, economic, and political situation in Myanma [Burma]. He said that questions were put to him and that he answered these questions as well as he could. Because of this, everyone was able to learn the truth.

During Col Abel's visit to Japan, the Japanese foreign minister explicitly and repeatedly said that Japan has no intention of interfering in Myanma's internal affairs. Talks were also held on continuing some Japanese-assisted projects which had already been started. Col Abel said that the Japanese then asked about the political situation in Myanma with regard to opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He told them that they should not look at this situation on an individual basis. He asked them why they asked only about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and not about the remaining 202 political parties. The discussions and dialogues held between Col Abel and the Japanese foreign minister were published in the ASAHI SHIMBUN and YOMIURI dailies.

Col Abel went on to say that Myanma will be holding multiparty democratic general elections on 27 May 1990. He said that all political parties will be able to participate in the forthcoming elections and will get equal rights. He went on to explain that it is not right to focus attention on only one person, and the Japanese side accepted this. He explained to them that the matter is an internal affair of Myanma. The Japanese side responded by saying that they did not wish to comment on the internal affairs of Myanma. [passage omitted]

Next Col Abel answered questions raised by several journalists. [passage omitted]

At this point, the Information Committee of the State Law and Order Restoration Council explained the signing of the production sharing agreement on a joint venture between Myanma and the BHP oil exploration company of Australia. [passage omitted]

Continuing, the Information Committee talked about the seizure of narcotics. The committee explained that on 14 October at about 0900 a platoon from the 19th Light Infantry Regiment while on security duty came across four suspicious looking persons carrying knapsacks in the jungle about 8 miles east of Namhkam. One escaped, but the other three, with four knapsacks, were caught when they were asked to stop for questioning. In

the four knapsacks were 24 packets of Triple A-Double Mythical Lions Globe heroin packed in plastic bags totaling about 12 kg. A receipt issued by the KIA [Kachin Independence Army] in return for taxes paid at a rate of kyat 2000 per kg of heroin, totaling kyat 24,000 for 12 kg of heroin; 2 receipts for the handling and possession of heroin; one certificate for permission to travel; 2 personal letters written to the KIA 4th Brigade Headquarters; and 74 kyat 15 currency notes totaling kyat 1,110 were seized. [passage omitted]

The Information Committee went on to explain that it is evident from the seizure that the KIA is taking taxes from heroin traffickers while encouraging and helping them.

Next, the Information Committee answered questions raised by local and foreign journalists. In response to a question from the ANTARA correspondent, the committee spokesman said that the market value for 1 kg of heroin is about U.S. \$1 million. In response to a question from the News and Periodicals Enterprise regarding the opening of schools, he said that as mentioned in previous news conferences, colleges are being prepared for opening as soon as the situation permits. [passage omitted]

An AP correspondent next asked a question about the processing and transportation of heroin. In response, the spokesman said that the Triple A-Double Mythical Lions Globe heroin is being processed in an area controlled by the KIA 4th Brigade. With the approval of the KIA, traffickers are transporting and selling this heroin. In response to a question about heroin processing raised by the JIJI correspondent, he went on to explain that the BCP [Burma Communist Party] is also processing heroin in collaboration with the KIA. [passage omitted]

The news conference ended at 1420.

## Cambodia

### Party Directive Issued on Front Anniversary

BK2911091189 Phnom Penh Domestic Service  
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 29 Nov 89

[“Directive of the party Central Committee Secretariat on the celebration of the 11th anniversary of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation which is currently called the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense, 2 December 1978-2 December 1989”; signed by party General Secretary Heng Samrin; dated 27 November—read by announcer]

[Text] The 11th founding anniversary of the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense [KUFNCD] formerly known as the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation takes place at a time when our revolution is advancing toward a high point in the campaign to implement the national reconciliation policy in which our own forces are enhancing their superiority in the political, military, and security

fields in order to assume the tasks of building and defending the motherland and the achievements of the society.

For this reason, the celebration of this 11th founding anniversary of the KUFNCD must aim at successfully serving the following objectives and requirements:

#### I. Objectives and Desiderata:

A. Continue to stimulate even greater hatred and condemnation against the crimes committed by Pol Pot and his closest men and to resolutely oppose the return to power in Cambodia by the genocidal regime. Expose and grasp even more profoundly the maneuvers of the Cambodian reactionaries of all stripes and their masters who have exploited our national reconciliation policy in order to sabotage the social achievements and lives and happiness of our people.

B. Clearly demonstrate the correct lines and policies of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP], to display the all-round development of our revolution in the past years, and to clearly grasp the fact that the strength of solidarity of the Cambodian people both inside and outside the country within the ranks of the KUFNCD is becoming a firm and powerful power stimulating the cause of building a Cambodian society which is advanced and developed, to enable all cadres, party members, combatants, and people to more clearly understand the need to further strive to fulfill national tasks in this new historic stage.

C. Publicize the diplomatic struggle in the current stage which is a very tense and fierce stage that calls for all to have a correct stance and views and to be able to analyze the development of our revolution in the past year together with the tricky schemes of the three Cambodian reactionary groups which have obstructed the outcome of the International Conference on Cambodia held in Paris, France.

D. Constantly expand the spirit of unity among the entire nation and the spirit of proletarian internationalist solidarity with an aim of successfully realizing the common strategic tasks and the three revolutionary goals as well as the resolutions set forth by the 2d Congress of the party cadres throughout the country.

#### II. Forms of Organization and Implementation:

A. The party, state, and front institutions and mass organizations at all levels must publicize broadly and in an in-depth manner among the masses the all-round position of strength and of victory of the Cambodian Revolution in the past 11 years and the targets of the imminiate tasks according to the concrete conditions in each locality by paying attention to enhancing the people's awareness so that they are well aware of the national reconciliation policy and the stance and goodwill of our party and state in settling the Cambodian problem through political means. This is in order to enable our people to have a firm revolutionary stance and view,

thus they will not have any illusions nor be misled by the enemy maneuvers. It is imperative to strive to successfully implement the three key tasks, that is to vigorously stimulate the ideological work in this new stage among the cadres, personnel, workers, combatants, and people, thus turning the party-state lines, policies, and resolutions into practical deeds. Enhance the spirit of mastery and self-reliance and enhance absolute confidence in and firm internal unity on the lines of the KPRP. Build and strengthen villages and communes to make them really advanced and strong in all conditions and all circumstances. Build and expand the Armed Forces in terms of quantity and quality, thus they are determined to fight and firmly defend the motherland in all conditions and all circumstances.

B. Encourage the masses to vigorously stimulate [words indistinct], thus creating big feats for contribution to welcoming the 11th founding anniversary of the front on 2 December and the historic victory day of 7 January. The most important point is to pay attention to stimulating workers to expand their creativity, talent, and thrift in production within factories, enterprises, worksites, and units, with an aim of increasing the production output and work quality and efficiency. Encourage the peasantry to enhance the food production and animal husbandry in order to help build national economy and improve livelihood and to help each other in overcoming shortages of food caused by natural disasters. Timely check the illegal logging and fishing. Stimulate youths to effectively fulfill their duty by willingly serving in the regular, regional, and militia units for the defense of the motherland. Persuade women to more effectively implement their tasks in service of the combat, the proselytization campaign, and rear battlefield policy, and to pay attention to agricultural production. Strive to enhance the role of patriotic intellectuals by persuading them to vigorously participate in the revolutionary movement with a lofty sense of awareness. Pay attention to persuading Buddhist monks, the elders, and temples' committee members to take part in educating and persuading the people to join in defending the country, persuading the misled persons to return to the fold, giving assistance to the building of social and cultural buildings, and implementing the party policies, state laws, and Buddhist precepts. Pay attention to enhancing the spirit of patriotism and solidarity among all fraternal nationalities by continuing to correctly implement the policy toward ethnic nationalities, creating favorable conditions for them to learn how to read and write, enhancing their cultural activities, and improving their livelihood with an aim of expanding their combative tradition in contribution to defending and building the motherland and protecting the revolutionary gains.

C. Stimulate all people to join in building the Armed Forces both in terms of quantity and quality in order to advance toward totally assuming the tasks of defending the border and the interior of the country with our own forces in place of the Vietnamese Army volunteers who were totally repatriated at the end of September 1989.

Further strive to build army units and solve livelihood problems for members of the Armed Forces so that they are strong enough to fight and win over the enemies of all stripes.

D. Pay attention to effectively implementing the rear battlefield policy by always linking the frontline with the rear and expanding the spirit of harmony between the army and people.

E. Cadres at all levels and in all sectors and the Armed Forces must respect the people's right to mastery and defend and protect the people's livelihood by using as a base the correct implementation of the five-point policy aimed at encouraging the people to join in developing national economy.

F. Get-togethers must be held in central ministries and institutions, army units, factories, enterprises, agricultural worksites, schools, mutual-assistance groups, monasteries, and mosques. Meetings must be held in Phnom Penh capital and in provinces and cities. Safety and thrift must be ensured during meetings. Organize seminars at higher education units and institutions in Phnom Penh. National mass media must organize propaganda service in an in-depth manner through all forms and means available.

G. After implementing this directive, the front committees at all levels must send their reports to the KUFNCD National Council to be summed up and furthered to the party Central Committee Secretariat.

**Slogans:**

1. Welcome the 11th founding anniversary of the KUFNCD!
2. Long live the 2 December spirit!
3. The entire people, united around the party, pledge to successfully implement the resolutions of the fifth party congress!
4. Long Live the bond of solidarity of Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and Socialist Countries!
5. Emulate in creating feats to welcome the 11th anniversary of the 7 January national day!
6. Long live the KUFNCD!
7. Long live the State of Cambodia!
8. Long live the glorious KPRP!
9. Absolutely oppose the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime!

[Dated] Phnom Penh, 27 November 1989

[Signed] Heng Samrin, General Secretary for the Party Central Committee Secretariat

**'50 Enemy Soldiers' Killed in Svay Chek 27 Nov**

*BK2911134989 Phnom Penh Domestic Service  
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 29 Nov 89*

[Text] Here is a report from the frontline:

According to frontline news sources, despite being repeatedly trounced and forced to run away from the battlefield, the three reactionary Khmer groups have so

far stubbornly refused to give up their dark designs. Their insane intention was to try to capture a number of positions and use them as springboard from which to loot foodstuffs and conduct sabotage against our people and motherland. However, all their risky adventures were seriously frustrated by our frontline armed forces working in close cooperation with the regional forces and local militia units.

As a matter of fact, on 27 November our armed forces in the Svay Chek area killed 50 enemy soldiers on the spot and wounded some others whom they dragged away in their flight, including their commander. We also seized a large number of weapons and other war materiel.

In the Treas area, our armed forces also killed 13 enemy soldiers, wounded 10 others, and captured a large amount of arms and war materiel.

These great successes won by our armed forces are being enthusiastically applauded by our people. These successes also more clearly show the superiority of our armed forces over the enemy of all stripes. At present, all major strategic positions in all localities of the province are under the firm control of our armed forces positioned in those areas to ensure stability and safety for the people.

**Phnom Penh Security Boosted; Assault 'Stalled'**

*BK2911024089 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
29 Nov 89 p 5*

[By Kawi Chongkitthawon]

[Text] Phnom Penh—Security in and around the capital city has been tightened following a series of explosions last week, Cambodian official sources said.

The sources said a hand grenade exploded on Sunday night in the city. No one was injured. Immediately after the bombing, all roads in the capital were blocked and all vehicles thoroughly searched.

Last Tuesday night a hand grenade was thrown near the defence ministry following an attack the previous night not far from the royal palace. No one was injured in either attack. Local media did not report on any of the three explosions.

The sources said last Saturday that four suspects, identified as military officials, had been arrested over the two grenade explosions.

A government official said it could be the act of an enemy trying to destabilize and demoralize people living in Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge radio on Sunday claimed that it was responsible for the explosions.

Security around Phnom Penh remained tight last night with the 9pm-5am curfew still strictly enforced.

A diplomat said in the past grenade attacks were caused by frustrated war invalids who had not received adequate compensation from the government. The government does not have sufficient rehabilitation programmes for the young war veterans, many in their early 20s, to help them return to normal life.

—Meanwhile, an assault by Western-backed guerrillas against a government outpost in north-west Cambodia has been stalled by marshy ground, supply difficulties and rocket barrages, guerrillas said yesterday.

An officer of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) told reporters at the Thai border that guerrillas were unable to dislodge government forces from Svay Chek in Banteay Meanchey Province after eight straight days of fighting.

He said the KPNLF attackers were having trouble fording a canal and manoeuvring into positions to hit government rocket launchers and artillery supporting the army.

Diplomats said supply lines from Thailand, about one day's march to the west, were having trouble keeping up with the guerrillas' needs.

The KPNLF said on Monday its forces had overrun government positions at Svay Chek and were in control of 70 percent of the town, an important defence point for the provincial capital Sisophon 25 km to the south.

Thai officials said scores of men had been killed or wounded at Svay Chek in the past 48 hours and that fighting was expected to continue.

An AFP dispatch from Hanoi said that four ~~communist~~ rebels were arrested Saturday after grenade attacks on the road from the city to the airport, quoting the officials in Phnom Penh.

The grenade attacks were the first in several years in the capital and came as the resistance was engaged in offensives in Cambodia.

The officials denied a resistance claim that it had taken control of Svay Chek, north of Sisophon, the capital of the northwestern province of Banteay Meanchey.

### Noncommunist Guerrillas Unite in Attack

*BK2911131589 Hong Kong AFP in English 1243 GMT 29 Nov 89*

[Text] Bangkok, Nov 29 (AFP)—The two non-communist Cambodian resistance factions are staging a joint assault on the strategic northwest town of Svay Chek near the Thai-Cambodian border, guerrilla sources said here Wednesday.

They said Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) forces had joined with fighters loyal to former Cambodian ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk in a bid to seize Svay Chek, which was being defended by Cambodian Government troops.

The KPNLF said Sunday that it had that day taken most of Svay Chek, a small town but important as a key access point to Sisophon, a district capital about 400 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of Phnom Penh.

They said they would soon take the whole town.

A KPNLF source said Wednesday: "We have control of only about 70 per cent of Svay Chek area and the town has not completely fallen." "We now control a major military base in the town and the enemy have withdrawn two kilometers (1.2 miles) from the southern part of Svay Chek," the source said. KPNLF forces are loyal to former Cambodian Premier Son Sann.

Phnom Penh troops, according to a Sihanoukist source here, were now regrouping between Treas village and Svay Chek. He said the two resistance factions were attacking the government-held positions.

"We hope to achieve a total victory very soon on Svay Chek," the Sihanoukist source said.

The official Cambodian news agency SPK said in a dispatch monitored here Wednesday that Phnom Penh troops had killed 81 Khmer Rouge and KPNLF guerrillas on November 21 during fighting at Nimit village and Svay Chek. Three KPNLF fighters were arrested and a large amount of arms and ammunition were captured, it said. The report could not be confirmed immediately.

On another battle front, the KPNLF source said Phnom Penh troops had now returned and occupied the two villages of Soriya and Nimit which were captured by the guerrillas earlier. Nimit and Soriya are located some 12 kilometers (7.2 miles) west of Sisophon along Highway 5.

The Sihanoukist source said forces loyal to the prince had been able since Saturday to control a total of 25 kilometers (15 miles) of strategic Highway 6 which runs between Phnom Penh and the northwestern province of Siem Reap. "The highway is completely cut by our forces and there is no traffic along the highway," the source said.

The KPNLF and Sihanoukist forces are allied with the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge in a UN-recognized alliance fighting against Hanoi-backed Phnom Penh troops.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia nearly 11 years ago and ousted the Khmer Rouge, held responsible for killing hundreds of thousands during a fanatical Maoist-style rule in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.

Hanoi announced that its troops had completely left Cambodia by the end of September, but the resistance has claimed that Vietnamese soldiers had been left behind to bolster inexperienced Cambodian Government forces. Khmer Rouge radio monitored here Wednesday said that 4,550 Vietnamese "fresh reinforcements" were brought in from Vietnam to Phnom Penh and two other provinces of Kompong Cham and Kampot earlier this month.

The radio said that the troops wore "uniforms to disguise themselves as the puppet troops."

### Measures To Solve 'Khmer Rouge Problem' Viewed

*BK2811091389 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0430 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Political commentary: "Can We Prevent the Khmer Rouge From Returning to Power?"]

[Text] Recently, Vietnam and the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian group launched a most vociferous propaganda campaign about the threat of the Khmer Rouge. For instance, they said that the Khmer Rouge would once again massacre the Cambodian people, that the Khmer Rouge are a danger to the Cambodian people and an obstacle to the settlement of the Cambodian problem, and so on.

The intensity of this propaganda campaign about the Khmer Rouge danger was intensified when a call was made for the dissolution of the Vietnamese-installed communist regime and the formation of an interim quadripartite government that would include the Khmer Rouge party. In fact, it is obvious to all that in launching the scare campaign about the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam and the Vietnamese-installed ex-Khmer Rouge group [words indistinct] intend to keep the communist regime in power in Cambodia.

For this reason, let us see if there are any measures to counter the Khmer Rouge problem should we come to the point of dissolving the Vietnamese puppet regime.

The Khmer Rouge problem is a problem to be solved. There are, however, sufficient measures to cope with this Khmer Rouge problem. These measures were proposed by His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and have already been accepted by the Khmer Rouge themselves and China which is the backer of the Khmer Rouge. These measures call for the armies of all Cambodian factions to be disarmed or to be equally reduced to 10,000 men each, the dispatch of UN peacekeeping force to Cambodia to help maintain security for the Cambodian people, the formation of an interim government to replace the Vietnamese-installed communist Heng Samrin regime, which should be dissolved, and the holding of free elections in Cambodia under UN supervision. The government emerging from the elections would mandate the UN peacekeeping force to stay in Cambodia for a 5-, 10-, or 20-year term as necessitated by circumstances. Consequently, there is no point indicating that the Khmer Rouge would be able to grab power and start massacring the Cambodian people again.

Through free elections held without pressure from any quarter, the Cambodian people will certainly not allow the Khmer Rouge to come back to power. The Khmer Rouge problem can be solved through only one way: Vietnam should agree to dissolve the puppet regime and

let the Cambodians decide their own destiny through free elections under UN supervision.

In conclusion, there are sufficient preventive measures to block the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. The deadlock rests in the Vietnamese and the group of puppet Cambodians who want to keep this Khmer Rouge issue for their propaganda purposes to fool other people. Therefore, the current greatest obstacle to the settlement of the Cambodian problem is not the Khmer Rouge issue, but the refusal by Vietnam to dissolve the regime it has installed in Cambodia using the Khmer Rouge pretext to continue its occupation of this country.

### VONADK Presents Memorandum on SRV Genocide

*BK2811083189 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 26 Nov 89*

[Text] Dear compatriots and combatants, in this morning's political indoctrination program, we present a memorandum entitled "Who Commits Genocide Against Cambodia?" which reads as follows:

Memorandum: Who Commits Genocide Against Cambodia?

Prologue:

So far, we have never raised any question pertaining to the great misery and suffering of the Cambodian people under Vietnam's controlling yoke because we have had the goodwill to find a comprehensive political solution to bring an end to Vietnam's war of aggression in Cambodia. However, Vietnam has never relented in raising this genocide question every time and in every forum to cover up its policy, on the one hand, and crime of genocide in Cambodia and, on the other, to block the settlement of the Cambodian problem.

At the recent Paris international conference, Vietnam again raised this question as a pretext:

1. To legalize its acts of aggression against and its occupation of Cambodia and legitimize the Vietnamese puppet regime.
2. To oppose UN control and verification that would have prevented Vietnam from continuing to hide its various forms of aggressor forces in Cambodia.
3. To oppose the creation of an interim quadripartite Cambodian government headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and intended, in concert with the United Nations, to control and verify that Vietnam would not continue to conceal its aggressor forces in Cambodia, as well as to organize free elections under UN supervision.

For these reasons, we deem it our duty to raise this issue and clearly analyze it for the scrutiny and judgment of world opinion.

Chapter I: On the Aggressive, Expansionist, Annexationist, and Genocidal Nature of Vietnam's War in Cambodia

Vietnam's war of aggression in Cambodia is not typical of the colonial war prevalent in the past.

It should be recalled that in imposing their yoke on a country, the colonialists sent their troops within the limits necessary to colonize that country and used the natives to run it. The main objective of these colonialists was to use local manpower to amass natural resources as raw materials and ship them back to their own countries, and particularly to provide for the needs of industrial consolidation and expansion, and then turn the colonized country into a market to absorb the export of their industrial products.

Vietnam's aggression against and occupation of Cambodia are meant to annihilate the Cambodian nation and Cambodian race and to turn Cambodia into a Vietnamese province. In order to realize this objective, Vietnam has conducted a military, economic, political, and cultural war with the intention of committing genocide against Cambodia and dissolving Cambodian society, the Cambodian economy, and all Cambodian political forces as well as Cambodia's cultural and historical heritages in order to realize the total Vietnamization of Cambodia. The Vietnamese authorities have continued implementing the same strategy of Vietnamizing Cambodia as that used by the Hanoi leadership on Kampuchea Kraom [former Cambodian territory annexed by Vietnam] in the 19th century.

**1. In order to realize this objective, what forces did Vietnam employ?**

A. It employed military forces totaling some 200,000 men. At the end of 1978, Vietnam mustered 200,000 men and launched them in a large-scale invasion against Cambodia to wipe out the administrative power of Democratic Kampuchea [DK]. After wiping out the DK administration, the Hanoi authorities employed this 200,000-strong army as a security force in the country itself to enable it to crack down on and suppress the resistance forces according to the slogan "Destroy and Eliminate" in a bid to organize a new administrative apparatus for Cambodia.

B. It immediately employed 50,000 Vietnamese civilian administrators. If Vietnam used so many Vietnamese civilian administrators to run Cambodia it is because it did not have any Cambodian supporters or political basis in Cambodia. Consequently, Vietnam had to manage state affairs in Cambodia entirely by itself, employing the 200,000 Vietnamese military personnel and 50,000 Vietnamese civilian administrators.

The so-called People's Republic of Kampuchea exists on paper only. The puppets Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, and others constitute a facade.

**2. How did Vietnam implement its policy of all-round genocide against Cambodia?**

A. It massacred Cambodians. The Vietnamese aggressors perpetrated countless frightening genocidal crimes against the Cambodian people and sowed devastation on them.

During the 1978-79 dry season, in the first phase of their large-scale invasion from December 1978 to May 1979, some 500,000 innocent Cambodians perished in the most pitiful manner: killed under the tracks of Vietnamese tanks or strafed to death by Vietnamese machineguns.

During the implementation of their blitzkrieg strategy, the Vietnamese troops looted Cambodian rice and shipped it back to Vietnam. They destroyed what they could not take in a bid to starve Cambodians to death. According to their plan, they intended to crush the resistance forces in Cambodia to the last man. For this reason, during the 1979 rainy season, from May to October 1979, nearly 500,000 other Cambodians perished from famine. These statistics can be found in UN Document No A42/376.

In 1985, more than 100,000 innocent Cambodians were forcibly sent by the Hanoi authorities for K-5 labor along Cambodia's western border. Of these 100,000 men, 30,000 died, got injured, or became crippled.

Also in 1985, Vietnam sent another 200,000 Cambodians for K-5 labor in Cambodia's central regions, causing 10,000 of them to die or become crippled, and so on.

In 1986, the Vietnamese aggressors forcibly drafted 70,000 other Cambodians again for the K-5 corvée, causing 10,000 to die.

Moreover, since 1981, the Vietnamese authorities had been using toxic chemicals to commit genocide against Cambodia. Nearly 60,000 innocent Cambodians fell victim to these toxic chemicals, including 30,000 who perished or became chronically afflicted.

**B. The Policy of Vietnamizing Cambodia:**

1) In human terms: At present, Vietnam has sent more than 1 million colonists to grab fertile land in Cambodia. They are geographically distributed as follows:

The first part includes 14 districts, namely: Peam Ro, Peam Chor, and Trabek Districts, Prey Veng Province; Svay Rieng, Prasot, Chantrea, and Kompong Rou Districts, Svay Rieng Province; Kampong and Tuk Meas Districts, Kampong Province; Kirivong, Prey Kabbas, and Kaoh Andet Districts, Takeo Province; and Kaoh Thom and Leuk Dek Districts, Kandal Province. In these districts, the Vietnamese enemy has sent their colonists for settlement at an average of 75 percent of the population, or 35,000 persons, in each district. There are approximately 450,000 Vietnamese colonists in all the 14 districts.

The second part covers Phnom Penh and its suburbs. The Vietnamese enemy sent for settlement in this part some 150,000 Vietnamese colonists.

The third part includes the coastal areas of Koh Kong Province and Kompong Som; S'ang District, Kien Svay District, Lvea Em District, and Ponhea Loe District in

Kandal Province; Romeas Hek, Samraong, and Rumbuol District in Svay Rieng Province; and Ponhea Krek District in Kompong Cham Province. Here, the Vietnamese enemy sent Vietnamese colonists for settlement at an average of 30 percent in each district. In total, there are some 150,000 Vietnamese colonists in all these districts.

The fourth part: along the Upper Mekong River from Roka Kaong right of Phnom Penh upstream to Kompong Cham and farther to Sambo District in Kratie Province, the Vietnamese enemy sent some 150,000 Vietnamese colonists for settlement.

The fifth part: along the Tonle Sap River upward to Chhnok Tru, Baribo District, Kompong Chhnang Province, the Vietnamese enemy sent some 80,000 Vietnamese colonists for settlement.

The sixth part includes all regions other than the above-mentioned five parts, such as Pursat, Battambang, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, Kompong Thom, Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and Mondolkiri Province. The Vietnamese enemy sent some 250,000 Vietnamese colonists for settlement there.

Throughout the country, the overall figure of Vietnamese colonists sent for settlement in Cambodia by the Hanoi authorities from 1979 to May 1989 was 1.25 million.

According to Vietnam's original plan, within 10 years after Vietnamese troops entered Phnom Penh, Vietnam had to fundamentally complete the Vietnamization of Cambodia, that is, as of 1989 the number of Vietnamese colonists, including pure-blood Vietnamese children and half-blood Vietnamese-Cambodian children, should be equal to or slightly exceed the number of Cambodian people.

This was the plan of Le Duan and the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The implementors of this plan were Le Duc Tho, Pham Hung, (Ha Xo), and Vietnam's CP/48 Committee which was in charge of the Phnom Penh puppet regime and its communist party. This was a plan of genocide against Cambodia and of Vietnamization of Cambodia through the use of Vietnamese military and civilian forces as pressure and the sending of humans in the form of Vietnamese colonists to mutate Cambodians and transform Cambodia's economy, social structure, culture, views, ideas, mores and customs, costumes, language, and traditions along Vietnamese lines.

However, Vietnam has not been able to fully realize its original plan because of the resistance put up by the Cambodian people under the leadership of the Cambodian national resistance forces and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK] with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk at the head. Without the struggle waged from 1979 to 1989 by the Cambodian people, the Cambodian national resistance forces, and the CGDK, Cambodia, though named the People's

Republic of Kampuchea, would have already become a Vietnamese province and the Cambodian people a minority in Vietnam.

It should be further stressed that the Vietnamese colonists making residence in Cambodia are not normal refugees, nor are they Vietnamese boat refugees like those in Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian countries. Neither are these Vietnamese colonists similar to other alien residents taking asylum in other foreign countries. These Vietnamese colonists are both politically and militarily organized.

In most regions in Cambodia still ravaged by fighting, these Vietnamese colonists are organized into groups of 10-12 families and armed with machineguns or even B-40's. These armed Vietnamese colonists join the aggressor Vietnamese troops occupying Cambodia and protecting the puppet regime in conducting activities to counter the Cambodian national resistance forces. There are some 60,000 armed Vietnamese colonists of this type.

Moreover, the Hanoi authorities have also sent concealed political and military cadres and soldiers specializing in intelligence gathering and subversive activities to live among these Vietnamese colonists. The number of political and military cadres and soldiers of this type is around 50,000.

## 2) On the political front:

In its plan to systematically swallow Cambodia, not only has Vietnam tried to set up administrative and demographic configurations, but it has also based its foundation on the Vietnamese military and administrative forces to press for changes in Cambodia's political and ideological grasp by spreading the views that there are three brothers—Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos—that their special solidarity will last for tens of thousands of years, that Ho Chi Minh was the father of Indochina, and that the Vietnamese Army is invincible, that Vietnam is the manager of Indochina, and so on.

## 3) On the economic front:

Vietnam's aggression against Cambodia has also upset Cambodia's economy. Fish in Tonle Sap Lake and in all major fishing grounds throughout Cambodia are under the exclusive control of the Vietnamese. Forests have been extensively exploited by Vietnam and all logs shipped back to Vietnam. Cambodia's forestry by-products such as resins and lianas of all kinds have also been stripped and shipped back to Vietnam. All the small woods have been savagely cut down and burned into charcoal to be shipped to Vietnam. All this has seriously affected the sylvan and natural geographies to the point of causing weather changes in Cambodia, turning it from a rain-rich country into a dry, regular drought zone.

Most factories both in Phnom Penh and the provinces were dismantled and shipped to Vietnam. Even doors

and window panes, frames, boards, and beams have been stripped down and shipped to Vietnam. The Vietnamese colonists in Cambodia shipped and sold these materials in Vietnam and the Vietnamese nationals in Vietnam also came into Cambodia to pull the buildings down and shipped or trucked them back to Vietnam, especially in various border provinces such as Takeo, Kampot, Kandal, Prey Veng, and Svay Rieng.

Both domestic and foreign trade, large or small, is under the control of the Vietnamese. Large and small trading shops and barber's shops both in Phnom Penh and the provinces are generally in the hands of Vietnamese.

#### 4) Culture, Education, and Training:

All schools must have Ho Chi Minh pictures displayed in each classroom so that Cambodian students can pay respect to Ho Chi Minh as the father of Cambodian children, the father of Indochina. Slogans such as "The three brothers Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos bound by special solidarity for tens of thousands of years," and so on are also displayed in the classrooms. School curriculum is also based on that of Vietnam. Vietnam's theory and political ideology of an Indochinese federation is an important part of the curriculum at all levels. Pupils and students are compelled mainly to study Vietnamese. Text books of whatever subject have been prepared so that they would serve the essence of Vietnam's Indochinese federation strategy. Cambodia's history has also been modified to serve the essence of this strategy.

#### 5) Geography:

Vietnam has gradually dismantled Cambodia's frontiers, both overland and maritime, in the spirit of the Vietnamese-puppet treaty drawn up by Vietnam. According to this treaty, Vietnamese nationals may enter or exit Cambodia and settle in Cambodia at will without requiring passports or visas. Vietnam signed this treaty with its puppets in the same way as it did with Laos in 1977. The Vietnamese-Phnom Penh puppet treaty and the Vietnamese-Lao puppet treaty are border dissolving treaties between the three countries in line with a specific design to simultaneously change the territorial, political, and demographic geographies by sending Vietnamese colonists for settlement in Cambodia and Laos in a planned and systematic manner.

All this shows that Vietnam has come to annex Cambodia gradually, swallowing the Cambodian territory, people, and race. If Vietnam succeeded in this design, what would Cambodia become? What changes would Cambodia's political, defense, trade, and social structure, culture, mores and customs, and life-style undergo?

Would this not be the comprehensive Vietnamization of Cambodia?

#### Chapter II: Witnesses:

##### 1. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of the Cambodian national resistance forces and president of DK:

A. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of the Cambodian national resistance forces and president of DK, said in his speech while discussing the Cambodian situation at the 37th UN General Assembly on 26 October 1982:

All of us are aware that Vietnam has sent huge numbers of its troops to invade and occupy Cambodia and has brought Vietnamese colonists to take up residence in various regions in Cambodia after expelling Cambodians from their own villages. In so doing, Vietnam's intent is none other than to realize its goal of incorporating Laos and Cambodia into an Indochinese federation with Vietnam as the overlord. The Vietnamese Communists have been tenaciously trying to bring this Indochinese federation into being.

B. In a news conference in Bangkok on 6 August 1986, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, drew the attention of the international community to Vietnam's attempt to Vietnamize Cambodia, saying: The international community must continue to focus mainly on the Vietnamization of Cambodia through the sending of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese nationals to take up resistance in important regions in Cambodia.

C. In his speech made on 20 October 1986 before the 41st UN General Assembly session when it discussed the situation in Cambodia, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk stressed the true nature of the treaty between Vietnam and the Phnom Penh puppet regime as follows:

These agreements and treaties are no different from the meetings or conferences of the three Indochinese countries: they are smokescreens set up in an attempt to legitimize the Phnom Penh puppet regime and to legalize the Vietnam's gradual annexation of Cambodian territory.

D. Recently, in his interview with the Voice of America on 6 September 1989, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of the Cambodian national resistance forces and president of DK, once again recalled this danger as follows: Vietnam has now announced that it will completely withdraw troops by the end of September this year. In reality, Vietnam has deceived us; it has fooled the world. As a matter of fact, it will withdraw at most some 20,000 or 30,000 of its troops. But how about the some 100,000 soldiers concealed or disguised as Cambodian soldiers in the Hun Sen-Heng Samrin army and in the various provinces and districts of Cambodia who serve Vietnamese colonialism and those roughly 1 million other Vietnamese civilians in our country who have been taking our Cambodian territory and trying to turn our country into a Vietnamese colony? If the patriots do not fight these Vietnamese colonialists, in the future Cambodia will experience the great danger of being annihilated like our Kampuchea Kraom which has already been lost to Vietnam. The Vietnamese came to Kampuchea Kraom and they virtually wiped out our Cambodian race there. Therefore, should we remain careless toward Vietnam and the Hun Sen-Heng Samrin regime, whose policy is to serve Vietnam as the overlord

over all Indochina, in the not too distant future Cambodia will become a country overwhelmingly populated by Vietnamese who would turn our country into another Kampuchea Kraom, into a province or a part of a huge Vietnam.

**2. His Excellency Son Sann, prime minister of the CGDK:**

His Excellency Son Sann, prime minister of the CGDK, has also frequently reminded us of the danger posed by the more than 1 million Vietnamese colonists in Cambodia.

A. In an interview with XINHUA broadcast by Radio Beijing on 10 August 1988, His Excellency Son Sann stressed as follows:

The Vietnamese colonists form one-fifth of the Cambodian population, or over 1 million, and of these Vietnamese colonists, one-fifth are armed. In reality, they are Vietnamese soldiers in civilian clothing. If these Vietnamese do not pull out along with the Vietnamese troops, it means that Vietnam did not really withdraw completely from Cambodia.

B. In his message over the Voice of the Khmer on 14 September 1989 before his departure for the 44th UN General Assembly, His Excellency Son Sann stressed as follows:

I would like to caution you, dear compatriots, against these Vietnamese colonists. When it took over Champa [ancient empire in Central Vietnam] in the 14th century and later on our Kampuchea Kraom in the 18th-19th centuries, Vietnam also resorted to the same scheme. That is, it sent its people into our Kampuchea Kraom. When we resisted because too many of them came in, Vietnam sent its troops to attack us. After attacking us, Vietnam sent more of its people into our land. At first, there were few of them. As the number kept increasing, we resisted. When we resisted, the Vietnamese attacked. When we stop resisting, they sent in more people and became the majority. For this reason, we lost our Kampuchea Kraom.

Vietnam is doing the same thing in Cambodia again. The compatriots should know that the Vietnamese colonists in Cambodia are not here just to stay. They come to plunder our land, our property, and our businesses. Many of them are Vietnamese war veterans coming here at the order of Hanoi to see to it that they rule all of Cambodia. In this way they are trying once again to turn Cambodia into a Vietnamese province.

**3. ASEAN joint statement on Cambodia issued in Kuala Lumpur 1985:**

Following are excerpts from the ASEAN foreign ministers' joint statement issued in Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985:

All ASEAN foreign ministers noted with serious concern the oppressive conditions under which the Cambodian people have to live under Vietnamese occupation, especially the practice of compelling civilians to work in the war zones in the country, which has caused many deaths

and injuries among these people. They shared the serious apprehension of the Cambodian people about the dangers of continuing demographic changes in their country as a result of a steady inflow of Vietnamese colonists. They also continued to be concerned at the ongoing process of Vietnamization in Cambodia. They noted that increasing dissatisfaction with Vietnamese colonization has continued to drive masses of Cambodian people to the Thai-Cambodian border.

**4. The resolution of the UN General Assembly:**

There is a sentence in the UN General Assembly resolution: The UN General Assembly is seriously concerned by the report that foreign troops occupying Cambodia have caused serious changes in the demographic composition in Cambodia.

UN General Assembly resolution No A43/19 was supported by 122 votes against on 19 votes.

**5. The confession of a Vietnamese soldier named Le Thuong, born on 1 January 1960 in Hue, Binh Tri Thien Province. Vietnamese Soldier Le Thuong confessed:** When I was in the Army, I saw many Vietnamese soldiers of Regiment 2 in Phnom Penh being ordered to study Cambodian. After learning Cambodian, some Vietnamese soldiers were assigned to work in the village, commune, district, and provincial administration while others were incorporated into the Heng Samrin army units of Brigades 92 and 93. These Vietnamese soldiers replaced their Vietnamese Army uniform with a Cambodian army uniform. Such are the tricks of the Hanoi authorities to fool the international community. When Vietnam announced that it withdrew troops from Cambodia, I saw that only the wounded and disabled were withdrawn. Besides that I saw only the rotation of troops from the front to the rear and those from the rear to the front.

The objective of disguising Vietnamese soldiers as Heng Samrin soldiers in Brigades 92 and 93 was to continue occupying Cambodia and incorporating Cambodia and Laos into an Indochinese federation. This measure was also aimed at preparing the ground in case elections are to be held in Cambodia. The Hanoi leaders also sent many Vietnamese nationals to live in Cambodia. Some of them are construction workers, traders, carpenters, or petty businessmen. All of these people belong to secret organizations. They meet every month or every fortnight.

These Vietnamese nationals have already been granted Cambodian citizenship and enjoy the full rights of all Cambodian people. They have been organized into groups called groups of patriotic Vietnamese residents for Cambodia. They will take part in elections organized by the four parties.

This document has been recorded as UN Document No A14/92.

**6. Confession by a Vietnamese colonist named Ho Tac The, 28, former resident of Ward No 4 of Rach Cu**

**Town, Kien Thanh District, Rach Gia Province, South Vietnam.** Ho Tac The confessed: I reached Cambodia on 28 July 1988. I lived in Phnom Penh, Kompong Chhnang, and Battambang.

A. Concerning the issue of Vietnamese soldiers disguising themselves as Cambodian soldiers of the puppet regime, Ho Tac The said: In Phnom Penh, inside the Vietnamese command Vietnamese soldiers are dressed as Cambodian soldiers and speak Cambodian. At the technical school near the fuel depot there is a large Vietnamese position called Barracks No 16. This is an important concentration area for the reception of Vietnamese troops freshly arrived in Phnom Penh before they are assigned to different fronts in Cambodia.

In Kompong Chhnang, there are some 1,200 Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodian army uniform mixing with Cambodian soldiers at various positions along a stretch of 3 km of road linking Kompong Chhnang Town with the airfield. These soldiers speak Cambodian. At all these positions it is forbidden to move around without permission.

B. Talking about Vietnamese colonists holding Cambodian identification cards, Ho Tac The said: In Phnom Penh, Vietnamese nationals live along the Tonle Sap River from the Chrouy Changva Bridge to Kilo Lek Pram Muoy near Barracks No 16. These Vietnamese are organized into groups of 100 people each and are secretly armed. Other Vietnamese nationals live in the Phsa Chas downtown area. The Vietnamese nationals have built many living quarters north and south of the Chrouy Changva Bridge along the Tonle Sap River.

In Battambang, along the river and near the old market near the town stands a large position for the reception of Vietnamese soldiers before their being sent to Cambodia's western border. Many Vietnamese nationals live near this position. These Vietnamese meet once a week. They are organized into an association of patriotic Vietnamese residents for Cambodia and are granted Cambodian citizenship. These Vietnamese pay a monthly contribution.

This document is circulated as UN Document No A44/92.

#### 7. Reports by a number of journalists and researchers:

A. (James Bates) wrote in the 14 April 1983 THE WASHINGTON POST: There are now 200,000 Vietnamese troops occupying Cambodia. Following behind these Vietnamese troops and in line with a policy written in Hanoi, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese immigrants are taking up residence in Cambodian territory. One can see very few examples in history of the practice of racial extermination, such as Hitler's slaughtering of the Jews, that is a policy of national extermination. And now the Cambodian people are being wiped out.

B. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE correspondent, Charles-Antoine de Nerciat, wrote on 22 April 1985: The number of Vietnamese residents living in Cambodia has grown steadily. A short walk along the Tonle Sap River

would reveal that Vietnamese nationals are living mile after mile along the river banks. In Phnom Penh, Vietnamese families have opened up small shops one after another, row after row. Around the capital city of Phnom Penh some villages are entirely inhabited by Vietnamese while others count the Vietnamese as the bulk of their inhabitants.

C. Mrs (Esmeralda Lucy Ulich), a doctor, wrote in an article entitled "Daily Life in Cambodia" and published in the April-June 1988 issue of the magazine "Indochina Report:" The history of Cambodia has been rewritten from a new viewpoint. Friendship between Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos is noted by Vietnam as a fact of life in this century. High school students and civil servants must learn Vietnamese.

In a book written by Mrs Marie Alexandrie-Martin under the title: "Vietnamization of Cambodia: A Quiet Racial Extermination" the gist of which was published in the July-September 1989 issue of the magazine "Indochina Report," it is said: During political training courses, Cambodians are taught that there is no frontier between Cambodia and Vietnam, for the two countries are brothers. A Cambodian civil administrator said that during political indoctrination, Vietnamese experts told trainees to forget about the old border and think only of the current one as the new Cambodian border, that is, the border occupied by Vietnamese troops.

#### Chapter III: Consequences of Vietnam's policy of genocide in Cambodia:

The policy of genocide that Vietnam has implemented in Cambodia for the past nearly 11 years has borne very serious consequences for the Cambodian nation and people.

The sending of more than 1 million Vietnamese colonists to grab fertile land in Cambodia has caused great misery, suffering, and separation to the Cambodian people as these Vietnamese colonists have robbed them of their fields and orchards and driven them out of their hometowns, turning them into refugees drifting without support inside their own country or forced to flee to foreign countries.

Moreover, although because of the Cambodian people's struggle under the leadership of the Cambodian national resistance forces and CGDK headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Hanoi's original plan to Vietnamize Cambodia has failed to succeed fully, these more than 1 million Vietnamese colonists have brought a great demographic change in Cambodia. At the same time, because Vietnam has relied on its military forces backed up by its civil administrative forces, there is as a result a major and profound change in the thinking, views, culture, mores and customs, life-style, dresses, language, traditions, and so on, in other words there is a major and profound change in the Cambodian national society of unforeseeable future consequences. This has caused the international community to focus its attention on the demographic change in Cambodia and to express its

concern in the successive UN General Assembly resolutions on the situation in Cambodia.

Hong Kong has a population of 5 million. There are only 50,000 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. What complications have these relatively few Vietnamese refugees inflicted on Hong Kong in the economic, social, and even security fields? What concern have these 50,000 Vietnamese refugees caused to Hong Kong? What would Hong Kong's worries be like should Hong Kong be strapped with 1 million Vietnamese refugees like in Cambodia?

And what security, economic, and social concerns have the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand done to the Thai Government? Other countries in Southeast Asia that have granted asylum to Vietnamese refugees also experience the same problem. Even Japan which is an economic superpower is still worried by the presence of a small number of Vietnamese refugees fleeing to Japan.

After seeing such facts, can we grasp the seriousness of the problem that the presence of more than 1 million Vietnamese colonists has posed on tiny Cambodia with a population of only 7 million. The problem is posed not in the security, economic, and social fields alone, but also on the very survival of the Cambodian nation itself.

**Chapter IV: If the Hanoi authorities succeed in their scheme of genocide against Cambodia, what consequences would there be on Southeast Asia?**

As already explained in Chapter I, Vietnam's original plan was much greater in scope than this. According to Vietnam's original plan, by 1989 the number of Vietnamese colonists in Cambodia should be equal to or slightly more than of the Cambodian people. Moreover, Vietnam's plan to swallow Laos is closely related to its plan to swallow Cambodia. The 1977 Vietnam-Laos treaty was a treaty to annex Laos. However, Vietnam could not swallow Laos so quickly without swallowing Cambodia first. If it succeeded in completely swallowing Cambodia according to its 10-year plan, Vietnam would quickly push on and succeed in swallowing Laos.

Therefore, according to Vietnam's original plan, Vietnam should have realized its scheme of becoming the sovereign over all of Indochina between 1983 and 1989. If Vietnam succeeds in its plan, what pressure would Vietnam's political clout and human influence exert on Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the Strait of Malacca? How would the Soviet Union's strategy in this region be strengthened and expanded?

Hanoi has always had a bad reputation for not respecting and abiding by treaties and agreements it has signed. For example, Vietnam promised to Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and made an official announcement with a specific note in writing saying that it would respect the status of Cambodians in Kampuchea Kraom as a minority people enjoying the right to preserve their national traditions and living mores and customs. However, Vietnam does not keep its promise and formal

pledge. Cambodians in Kampuchea Kraom have been devoured almost entirely by Vietnam: even the names of their ancestors, parents, and children have been Vietnamized, the names of their villages and districts have been Vietnamized, and virtually everything has been Vietnamized.

At present, thanks to the struggle of the Cambodian people and Cambodian national resistance forces and the support of the whole world, Vietnam's policy of genocide in Cambodia and its international consequences have been contained. Its design to swallow all of Laos has not been successful yet. For this reason, Vietnam's southward push has been stalled. This, however, does not mean that the danger of Vietnam's genocidal policy both in Cambodia and the region has already been overcome. Should there be a slip-up enabling Vietnam to turn black into white and victims into perpetrators of genocide against Cambodia while white-washing Vietnam, which is the real perpetrator of genocide against Cambodia, Vietnam will certainly succeed in realizing its design in Indochina and Southeast Asia. If Vietnam succeeded in so doing, what serious change would the balance of force undergo and what consequences would Southeast Asia and the rest of the world experience?

**Conclusion:** The assessment of the international consequences of Vietnam's genocidal policy is not a matter for guesswork. It is a danger that can occur, without doubt. Should there be a slip-up enabling Vietnam to turn black into white and victims into perpetrators of genocide against Cambodia, Vietnam which is the perpetrator of genocide against Cambodia, would be acquitted. Only by grasping this reality can we see that the struggle of the Cambodian people, the Cambodian national resistance forces, and the CGDK is a struggle against the policy of genocide against Cambodia, for the survival of the Cambodian nation as well as for the prevention of the Vietnamese-Soviet strategy. As for the world's assistance to the struggle of the Cambodian people and national resistance forces, it is an act of support to enable the Cambodian people to survive as well as an opposition to the Vietnamese-Soviet attempt to swallow other countries.

As for the future struggle of the Cambodian people and national resistance forces and the world's assistance to the struggle of the Cambodian people and national resistance forces in the future, they are also imbued with the same strategic significance as mentioned above.

The Cambodian people and CGDK headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk would like to express deep thanks to friendly peoples and countries, especially the ASEAN countries, for giving noble support and assistance to the fighting Cambodian people. This support and assistance constitutes a powerful encouragement for the Cambodian people to continue their struggle for the survival and durability of their nation and for their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We would like to appeal to these friendly countries to continue supporting and assisting this struggle until a correct,

comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian problem can be found. According to this solution, Vietnam should withdraw all types of its aggressor forces, including their concealed and disguised forces, from Cambodia under an effective control of the United Nations. An interim government equally administered by the four parties should be formed with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk at the head. This interim government, together with the United Nations, shall have the duty to control the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and verify that no Vietnamese forces are concealed in Cambodia and the duty to organize free democratic elections under UN supervision to let the Cambodian people decide their own destiny. The Cambodian people and international community cannot accept the Vietnamese-installed government. Only a national government democratically elected by the Cambodian people is acceptable to the Cambodian people. To enable the Cambodian people to freely elect their national government, all types of Vietnam's aggressor forces should be completely withdrawn from Cambodia and an interim quadripartite Cambodian government headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk should be formed.

[Dated] 23 October 1989

[Signed] Press Department of the Foreign Ministry of the CGDK.

### **Laos**

#### **Cambodian Party Delegation Arrives 24 Nov**

*BK2511103489 Vientiane KPL in English 0904 GMT 25 Nov 89*

[Text] Vientiane, November 25 (KPL)—A delegation of the Propaganda and Training Board of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea Central Committee [PRPK CC] led by its head, Ney Pena, Politburo member of the PRPK CC arrived here on Nov 24 for a working visit.

The delegation was met at the airport by Somlat Chanthamat, secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and head of its Propaganda and Training Board, and other senior officials.

Long Kem, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the State of Cambodia to Laos, was also present at the airport. During its stay here the delegation will meet with the Lao side to exchange views and discuss matters relating to the ideological field.

#### **Vientiane-Ho Chi Minh Regular Flights Begin**

*BK251111289 Vientiane KPL in English 0909 GMT 25 Nov 89*

[Text] Vientiane, Nov 25 (KPL)—The Lao Aviation Company launched the first Vientiane-Ho Chi Minh-Vientiane regular flight on Nov 23. The flight is scheduled for every Thursday.

According to Then Phouanphanit, director of the Lao Aviation Company, the opening of this new route will contribute to the promotion of the further cooperation between the two countries.

The event was held on the same day at Tan Son Nhat Airport, Ho Chi Minh City. The Ho Chi Minh-Vientiane-Ho Chi Minh flight by the Vietnam Aviation Company is scheduled on every Sunday.

The Lao Aviation Company now has regular flights with Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Phnom Penh of the State of Cambodia, and Bangkok of the Kingdom of Thailand.

#### **Kaysone Phomvihan Greets Bulgarian Party Leader**

*BK1711122389 Vientiane KPL in English 0923 GMT 17 Nov 89*

[Text] Vientiane, November 17 (KPL)—General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Kaysone Phomvihan recently sent a message of congratulations to Petur Mladenov over his election as general secretary of the Communist Party of Bulgaria [CPB].

The message expressed conviction that in assuming this noble post, the general secretary of the CPB will do his best to contribute to the national development at the new stage for the well-being and prosperity of the Bulgarian people.

The message also expressed hope that the relations between the parties, states, and peoples of the two countries would be further developed.

#### **Phoumi Vongvichit Greets Bulgaria's Mladenov**

*BK2411061989 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1200 GMT 23 Nov 89*

[Text] On 23 November 1989, Comrade Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, sent a message of congratulations to Comrade Petur Mladenov, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia. The message reads as follow:

On the occasion of your election as chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, on behalf of the Lao people and in my own name, I would like to convey warm greetings and best wishes to you, comrade. I am convinced that with your contribution, the relations of fraternal friendship, solidarity, and cooperation in many fields between the two countries and two peoples of Laos and Bulgaria will be further strengthened for the interest of peace and socialism. I wish you, comrade, good health and success in performing your honorable cause.

#### **Envoy Arrives To Monitor Refugee Repatriation**

*BK2311103189 Vientiane KPL in English 0915 GMT 23 Nov 89*

[Text] Vientiane, Nov 23 (OANA-KPL)—Mr Jack Thompson, goodwill ambassador of the Australian/

UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] goodwill mission, arrived here on November 22.

Mr Jack Thompson, who is well-known in the Australian film making business, has been following the voluntary repatriation of Lao refugees, particularly in the northern Bokeo Province of Laos. He spoke with optimism about the programme which he qualified as an international effort worthy of praise.

This programme of repatriation of refugees in Bokeo Province is being supported by the Australian Hunter Valley area in the State of New South Wales.

#### **Friendship Delegation Leaves for Cuba**

*BK2311095689 Vientiane KPL in English 0911 GMT 23 Nov 89*

[Text] Vientiane, Nov 23 (KPL)—A delegation of the Laos-Cuba Friendship Association headed by Khambou Sounisai, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, minister of public health and social welfare, president of the Laos-Cuba Friendship Association, left here on Nov 22 for Cuba.

The visit to Cuba made at the invitation of the Cuba-Laos Friendship Association is designed to expand the time-honoured relations and cooperation between Laos and Cuba.

#### **Philippines**

#### **Manglapus Neither Confirms, Denies Resignation**

*HK2911030389 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus neither confirmed nor denied that he tendered his resignation to President Aquino. Manglapus made the comment yesterday in reaction to Speaker Ramon Mitra's call for the foreign affairs secretary to quit his post following the issuance of travel documents to Eduardo Danding Cojuangco and his family last October 24 in Los Angeles.

Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus, meanwhile, said the government (?slip) which allowed the close ally of the late former President Marcos to return to the country will not [word indistinct] the president for the exiled Marcos kins. Mr Manglapus said the government would release an updated hold order list of Filipinos banned from returning home.

#### **Manglapus Warns U.S. To Meet Terms of Bases Pact**

*HK2911025989 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus warned Manila would be disinclined to discuss a new treaty for U.S. military bases here if Washington failed to meet the terms of a previous accord. He accused the U.S. Government of failing to implement three terms of a 1988

bilateral accord governing compensation for Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base for 1990 and 1991, the last 2 years of the 42-year lease. U.S. Embassy officials could not be reached for comment. The two countries are to begin talks in mid-December on prospects for a new bases treaty after the current agreement runs out in September 1991.

#### **Coalition Wants Manglapus Off of Bases Panel**

*HK2811044389 Manila BUSINESS WORLD in English 28 Nov 89 p 12*

[Text] A newly formed anti-bases coalition called for the removal of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus as head of the RP [Republic of the Philippines] negotiating panel on the U.S. bases.

In a press conference yesterday, the MAALAB (Makabayang Manggagawa Laban sa Base [Anti-Bases Nationalist Workers]), composed mainly of progressive groups, including the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU [1 May Movement]) and the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan [New Nationalist Alliance]), branded Mr Manglapus as "a tested mouthpiece of U.S. interests."

Although MAALAB made no specific recommendation on who should comprise the negotiating panel, KMU chairman Crispin Beltran dropped the names of Representatives Bonifacio Gillego of Sorsogon, Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato, Nikki Coseteng of Quezon City, Lorna Verano Yap of Pasay City, and Senators Wigberto Tanada and Joseph Estrada as acceptable Panelists.

For her part, Eva Rosales of the Anti-Baseng Koalisyon Demokratiko (ABAKADA [Anti-Bases Democratic Coalition]), claimed that the \$160-million U.S. commitment to the Philippine Aid Plan (PAP) is "not new money" but actually the amount appropriated for the Economic Support Fund (ESF) under the Manglapus-Shultz agreement last October 1988.

Ms Rosales also refuted claims by U.S. ambassador Nicholas Platt that the U.S. bases contribute \$1 billion yearly or 7 percent to the gross national product (GNP). She cited a study by the UP [University of the Philippines] School of Economics which maintained that the U.S. bases' contribution to the GNP is not more than 1.9 percent.

#### **War Economy**

The 1.9 percent is a contribution to a "war economy," she added, noting that business around the bases prospered particularly during the Vietnam War.

Besides, Ms Rosales said, houses of some 60,000 families within the bases community are being threatened with demolition allegedly because of their "filth and squalor."

If there is to be any negotiation on the U.S. bases, Ms Rosales said, it must be on their phase-out not later than Sept 16, 1991.

On the dislocation of those employed in the bases, Ms Rosales said military facilities within the U.S. itself, which used to employ around 87,000 people, were able to generate 130,000 jobs when converted to peace-related industries "I don't see any reason why we can't do that in the Philippines," she said.

In its resolution, MAALAB also asked the Government to immediately serve the notice to termination to the U.S. bases agreement and the Mutual Defense Pact, and to hold the talks in the Philippines to insure "full transparency."

MAALAB, which boasts of at least one million followers, will be launched officially this Nov 30, in time to commemorate the birth of national hero Andres Bonifacio.

### Ruling Party Views Reports on Bases Sell-Out

*HK2511032789 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 24 Nov 89*

[Text] The administration party branded today as irresponsible statements by anti-U.S. bases advocates which claimed the executive department had sold out Philippine sovereignty even before the scheduled exploratory talks this year between the two countries on the fate of the U.S. bases.

Senator Neptali Gonzales, president of the ruling Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino [Struggle of Philippine Democrats] or LDP, reiterated that the government stand on the U.S. bases issue should be anchored on national interest. Gonzales said that while their party has taken a stand in favor of a new treaty, they were subtly divided on the terms to accompany the treaty, particularly on expiration period.

Gonzales said it would be likewise irresponsible for others to accuse Australia, Singapore, Spain, West Germany and England for selling their sovereignty because they maintain U.S. bases.

### Said To Favor Bases Extension

*HK2511085789 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 25 Nov 89 pp 1, 10*

[By staff member Cristina Pastor with a report by Julie Javellana]

[Text] The consensus emerging in the ruling Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) [Struggle of Philippine Democrats] is towards favoring extension of the 1947 military bases agreement, and for an annual cash compensation of at least \$500 million, party president Sen. Neptali Gonzales said yesterday.

But Gonzales told the 'Kapihan sa Alps' [Alps Coffeeshop] breakfast forum that while the position of the party appears to be firming up, some members are encouraged to speak out differing views.

He also clarified that his partymates were inclined to vote for an end to U.S. bases, but would seek an "orderly transition" for the facilities beyond the 1991 expiration.

Gonzales said there was "no incompatibility" between terminating the bases by 1991 and a gradual phaseout "whether you call it transition, withdrawal or extension."

The party, he also said, has yet to decide on the length of the extension period, but his personal opinion is that a "medium term" of two to six years would be acceptable.

But if further extended, the new agreement could lapse on June 12, 1998 to celebrate the centenary of Philippine independence, a proposal first advanced by Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos.

"The bases are still important," said Gonzales, the successor of Speaker Ramon Mitra, who resigned the LDP leadership after complaining his congressmen were not getting enough attention from Malacanang.

At the same time, the senator from Mandaluyong said the superpowers could not turn their backs on the "swift, dramatic changes" unfolding in Eastern Europe which would require a "new strategic modus vivendi."

Gonzales quoted extensively from Soviet embassy counselor Aleksandr Losyukov who said in a recent statement that "new methods must be worked out to guarantee that the removal of U.S. bases in the region will not lead to imbalances." Gonzales said the Kremlin "accepts the fact" that it would take 10 to 15 years before the Soviets adopt a new approach toward regional security and its presence in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay.

In light of these developments, he said the Philippines should negotiate the bases agreement "not on the basis of balance of power and Cold War assumptions" dating back to 1947 when the accord was first signed.

The Government, he said, must "play its cards right...and negotiate on the basis of current needs."

He stressed the importance of compensation without which there would be no need to proceed with the negotiations in December.

"If it is not acceptable to us, there is no sense in negotiating," he said.

An "acceptable" cash compensation, according to him, was an amount not lower than the terms and conditions in the 1988 agreement reached by Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus and then Secretary of State George Shultz. The Philippines was able to secure \$962 million in cash for the remaining two years including a "soft component" in the form of debt relief, military sales credit, and trade access.

When asked if \$500 million a year was good enough, Gonzales said it was.

"Certainly we can never agree to terms and conditions lower than what we are receiving now, that is aside from the so-called imaginative portion," he explained.

He continued, "if we play our cards right, it can be greater."

Meanwhile the Association of Major Religious Superiors (AMRSP) yesterday, demanded the closure of U.S. military facilities here because they make a mockery of Philippine sovereignty and lead Filipinos into sin.

In a statement the religious group called the U.S. bases "symptoms of corruption and "the structures of sin" because it creates conditions which spread prostitution among women and children.

The AMRSP praised anti-bases organizations, which it said were "our signs of hope."

"The workers among our people who seem to benefit from the presence of these bases because of the job opportunities they offer are in fact oppressed, exploited and deceived," the statement said.

#### 'Dim' Prospects for Border Talks With Malaysia

HK2411092189 Manila *THE MANILA CHRONICLE*  
in English 24 Nov 89 p 8

[Text] Prospects for the fourth round of border talks between Manila and Kuala Lumpur appear dim again, and the Philippine panel has prepared itself for the "worst scenario," a Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) official said yesterday.

The official, who refused to be identified, said among the indications that Malaysia is not inclined to agree to the modus vivendi proposed by Manila for the disputed area, is the reduction in the number of Malaysian delegates from 12 to eight.

"If for example the expert in maps is not coming, how can anything come out when the bone of contention is the identification of the neutral area," the official said.

If nothing happens during next week's talks, the DFA will recommend that the talks be suspended and negotiations be coursing instead through diplomatic channels, the official said.

Even as this developed, Malaysia has deployed eight patrol crafts to Sabah to patrol seas near the disputed area.

"Malaysia has all the aces," the DFA official lamented. Aside from its naval presence in the area, Malaysia has not yet ratified the law of the sea convention which Malaysia already has.

The official explained that even if the Philippines has a strong legal basis for the claim, (because its claim is based on territorial rights while Malaysia bases its claim on the Economic Zone provision, and under the law of the sea, territorial claim takes precedence over the economic zone) it cannot compel Malaysia to agree to its

proposal because Malaysia has signed but not yet ratified the law of the sea convention.

Malaysia appears also to be waiting for the dropping of the Philippines claim to Sabah before it would agree to resolve the border issue, the official said, adding that the Malaysian panel in the past talks has taken its time in responding to Philippine proposals.

Relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila have been strained by the border dispute, the claim to Sabah, and the arrest of Filipino fishermen in the disputed area.

Foreign Secretary Rual Manglapus and President Aquino have battled for the dropping of the Sabah claim to normalize ties with Kuala Lumpur, but the initiative has been opposed in the Senate.

#### Malaysia's 2d Largest Naval Base Planned

HK2811045589 Manila *PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER*  
in English 28 Nov 89 p 8

[Text] Malaysia's second largest naval base will be built in Kota Kinabalu, state capital of Sabah, the Malaysian daily *NEW STRAITS TIMES* reported.

The news report came on the eve of the resumption of talks between Manila and Kuala Lumpur on overlapping maritime boundaries at the Century Park Sheraton Hotel.

The *NEW STRAITS TIMES* quoted Laksamana Madya Tan Sri Abdul Wahab Nawi, Malaysian Navy chief, as telling reporters that the new naval base will be built on a 140-hectare site near Kota Kinabalu.

The Malaysian Navy chief made the disclosure at the launching of a two-week Royal Malaysian Navy exhibition in Kota Kinabalu last week.

Kuala Lumpur's biggest naval base is in Lumut facing the Strait of Malacca.

The Navy chief did not reveal the exact location of the new military facility but said Kota Kinabalu has been found to be the "most strategic location" for the naval base, and that "an area somewhere around Kota Kinabalu is the most suitable site."

He said the base will be able to accommodate a large number of ships and equipment with modern facilities.

Envisioned to be the main base for Malaysia's South China Sea operations, the new facility will accommodate about 2,500 men.

The construction of the Malaysia Navy's \$12-million forward base in Sabah will start in January.

He said he hoped that with the naval base, security patrols in Sabah and Sarawak waters can be stepped up.

In Manila, meanwhile, Rodolfo Severino, Philippine ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, told diplomatic reporters yesterday that he expects "progress" in the two-day talks

where the two countries will explore the possibility of an interim arrangement on the overlapping claims.

The 12-man Philippine panel is headed by Jorge Coquia, legal adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).

The other members of the panel are Justice Undersecretary Eduardo Montenegro, Defense Undersecretary Leonardo Quisumbing, Ambassador Rodolo Arizala of the DFA office of Asian and Pacific Affairs, Jose Ordóñez of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Renato Feir of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, Nestor Padalhin and Hellen Barber of the DFA Southeast Asia division, Mario Manansala of the Cabinet committee on the law of the sea, Second Secretary Virginia Gafud of the Philippine embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Wilando Jimenez of the Coast and Geodetic Survey office and Ambassador Severino.

The foreign office has yet to announce the composition of the Malaysian panel which was scheduled to call on Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus this morning prior to the start of the talks.

The first and third rounds of maritime talks were held in Kuala Lumpur early this year. The Philippines hosted the second round of discussions where the Philippine panel proposed that no arrests should be made in the disputed area pending a resolution of the overlapping claims.

The Philippines also proposed that the disputed area be declared a "common fishing ground" for both countries.

#### **Senator Deplores Planned Base**

*HK2911041989 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE  
in English 29 Nov 89 pp 1, 9*

[Text] Senate Majority Floor Leader Teofisto Guingona yesterday deplored as a "veiled threat" Malaysia's reported plans to put up a \$12-million naval base in Sabah next year.

Guingona said the reported plans to build the base in Kota Kinabalu at a time when Philippine and Malaysian panels were resuming border talks were unwelcome. "That is a veiled threat in that we begin talks today on the border dispute," the senator said.

Kuala Lumpur and Manila resumed yesterday talks on a modus vivendi to temporarily resolve the border dispute. The bone of contention was the identification of "neutral grounds" within disputed areas.

The Malaysian navy chief has said the base, which would be built in January, would increase patrols in the Sabah and Sarawak waters.

Guingona said a status quo should prevail until the border talks are finished. He stressed Filipino fishermen should be allowed to fish on disputed waters.

"Filipino fishermen had been fishing in these waters for many years unmolested. Philippine boats plied the area for long without intervention," he said in a statement.

As such, he said the arrest of 49 Filipino fishermen by the Malaysian coast guard last year was illegal and that no similar incident should occur while the two countries are trying to resolve the dispute. Guingona said the Philippine Navy should also be allowed to patrol these waters.

The fourth round of negotiations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila resumed amid pessimistic projections from the Philippine panel that nothing will again come out of the talks.

A panel member pointed out that Malaysia appears to be hedging on a decision on the matter because it wants the Philippines to first drop its claim to Sabah.

#### **CHRONICLE Publishes Plebescite Results**

*HK271104189 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE  
in English 27 Nov 89 pp 1, 6*

[By correspondent Bernadette Tio]

[Text] Only four of 13 provinces in the South will constitute the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao but they face daunting organizational problems, Commission on Elections [Comelec] officials said yesterday.

Only the provinces of Lanao del Sur, TawiTawi, Sulu and Maguindanao voted in the November 19 plebiscite in favor of the Organic Act granting self-rule, Comelec Chairman Hilario Davide told reporters after the last votes were canvassed at the Comelec Headquarters in Manila. Official Comelec returns showed nine other provinces and nine cities overwhelmingly rejected the law created by Congress to meet demands by the estimated four million Filipino Muslims for autonomy.

Critics have however questioned whether the autonomous government will be viable. The four Muslim-dominated provinces that approved the plan are among the most impoverished in the country, with poor communications and transportation. They also are not contiguous.

Among the four who opted to join the autonomous region, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao are on the main Southern island of Mindanao while Sulu and TawiTawi are islands scattered to the southwest.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, one of the authors of the law, conceded the four provinces are far apart. But he added, "It's a start, although not the kind of step I would have wanted. We were looking forward to a 10-province autonomy at least."

Davide for his part avoided comment on criticisms that the plan merely would fence off a poor region. The question of viability, he said, was for Mrs Aquino and Congress.

Comelec official results showed that of the total 3,559,884 registered voters, 1,419,741 voted "no" and only 549,159 voted "yes."

Among the areas which rejected the Act Basilan province and the cities of Cotabato and Marawi are all Muslim-dominated. In predominantly Christian areas, voters rejected the plan by margins as great as 40-to-1.

The votes in favor were 125,338 to 43,885 in Lanao del Sur, 76,717 to 45,670 in Maguindanao, 99,911 to 35,245 in Sulu and 40,596 to 15,125 in TawiTawi.

The final tally showed 55.31 percent of the 3.5 million voters in the 13 provinces and nine cities voted in the referendum, with 72 percent rejecting the Act.

Asked about the low turnout, Davide said: "This is a democracy, and in a democracy you only count the votes that are cast because you are also given the freedom not to vote." He added however that "as far as the commission is concerned, we are fully satisfied with the election."

Vicente Delima, executive director of the elections commission, said the law creating the autonomous region "Was aimed for good but certain queer results followed" the referendum.

Delima said some issues remain unsettled, such as where to put the permanent seat of the regional government. The law creating the region makes Cotabato City the temporary seat, but Cotabato voted against joining the autonomous region.

The number of assemblymen is also in question, Delima said. The law provides for three assemblymen from each voting district, but non-joiners Cotabato City and Marawi both are parts of provincial districts.

"How many regional representatives will the districts (in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao) be entitled to considering that the cities are not included in the autonomous region?" he asked.

Delima said the regional governor, vice-governor and assembly members should be elected before Feb 17.

**Official Tabulation of The Results of The November 19, 1989 Plebiscite on The Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. [Republic Act] No. 6734)**

Province/City	Total No. of Registered Voters	Total No. of Established Precincts	No. of Precincts Canvassed/Functioned
	3,559,984	13,349	13,032
<b>Provinces:</b>			
Basilan	103,272	388	388
Cotabato	280,624	1,087	1,062
Davao del Sur	246,979	944	944
Lanao del Norte	175,751	686	659
Lanao del Sur	237,076	933	901
Maguindanao	267,824	996	928

Palawan	164,789	628	616
South Cotabato	316,043	1,173	1,171
Sultan Kudarat	153,589	550	533
Sulu	233,181	786	634
TawiTawi	99,039	332	331
Zamboanga del Norte	226,191	885	884
Zamboanga del Sur	405,392	1,567	1,568

**Cities:**

Cotabato City	58,184	206	206
Dapitan City	28,392	108	108
Dipolog City	39,532	149	149
Gen Santos City	103,549	361	361
Iligan City	108,549	387	387
Marawi City	40,269	143	143
Pagadian City	49,168	167	167
Puerto Princesa City	45,155	159	159
Zamboanga City	177,533	714	713

Province/City	Affirmative Votes (Yes)	Negative Votes (No)	Percentage Voter Turnout
	549,159	1,419,741	55.31%

**Provinces:**

Basilan	20,924	36,286	50.40%
Cotabato	26,734	114,568	50.35%
Davao del Sur	12,986	122,851	55.00%
Lanao del Norte	46,892	76,682	70.31%
Lanao del Sur	125,338	43,855	71.37%
Maguindanao	76,717	45,670	45.70%
Palawan	8,162	81,617	54.48%
South Cotabato	26,198	138,841	52.22%
Sultan Kudarat	5,601	70,827	49.76%
Sulu	99,911	35,245	57.96%
TawiTawi	40,596	15,125	56.26%
Zamboanga del Norte	5,872	136,766	63.06%
Zamboanga del Sur	14,543	211,782	55.83%

**Cities:**

Cotabato City	3,356	8,449	20.29%
Dapitan City	462	19,307	69.63%
Dipolog City	845	24,009	62.87%
Gen Santos City	8,223	33,577	40.37%
Iligan City	2,044	61,983	59.05%
Marawi City	10,399	12,204	56.13%
Pagadian City	4,774	20,149	50.67%
Puerto Princesa City	3,283	19,796	51.11%
Zamboanga City	5,299	90,152	53.77%

**3 Mindanao Provinces To Form Autonomous Region**

*HK2511061389 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan  
in Tagalog 0400 GMT 25 Nov 89*

[Text] The Commission on Elections [Comelec] will announce today the three provinces in the south which will form the Mindanao Autonomous Region. Comelec Chairman Hilario Davide Jr said that the three provinces are Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Tawi-tawi.

According to Davide, the election body will still have to decide on the fate of Sulu which was the fourth province where the "yes" vote prevailed in last Sunday's plebiscite for autonomy in Muslim Mindanao.

Meanwhile, Local Governments Secretary Luis Santos said that a congress or regional legislature for the new autonomous region will be established in its administrative center. He added that the creation of the autonomous region will be overseen by his department of local governments. He also said that according to the Constitution, an election should be held in the autonomous region 30 days after the plebiscite or in February next year.

Santos said that the election will decide the first group of executive and legislative officials in the autonomous region.

**'Massive Combat Operations' Launched in Mindanao**

*HK2711050789 Manila MANILA BULLETIN  
in English 27 Nov 89 p 22*

[By Mike Crismundo]

[Text] Cagayan De Oro City—Brig Gen Rogelio Villanueva, Northern Mindanao Army commander, ordered massive combat operations and special operations teams (SOTs) to pursue communist insurgents.

Villanueva also directed all field units to conduct thorough surveillance against Communist Party and New People's Army (NPA) leaders in the region, and stop their terroristic activities against the civilians and businessmen.

Listed by the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] in its "order of battle" (OB) are Ike de los Reyes, Jose Candilado, Florentino Bransuela, Ernesto Road, Onead Mandohinog, Maria Loida Toso Magpatoc, Fr Francisco Navarro, Ricardo Mejorada and Alfredo Mapano.

The directive was issued to Col Antonio Nale, Task Force Diamond Commander, Col Cristina Piol, 403rd Brigade commander, Col Cristobal Gurrea, 401st brigade commander and Col Eduardo Resos of the 402nd Infantry Brigade.

Villanueva's order came out following the recent attack of a police station in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur where three militiamen were killed.

**Aquino Appeal for U.S. Investment Discussed**

*HK2511083789 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines  
1300 GMT 24 Nov 89*

[Commentary by Vassiliy Pilikov]

[Text] The Philippines is in dire need of foreign capital to sustain the current economic development in the country highlighted by commodity exports. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector also needs huge amounts of foreign capital which at the moment goes mainly to the electronics and similar industries. And while these industries are not as developed as their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia, they enable the Philippines to export \$1.5 billion worth of semi-conductors, chips, and other electronic products annually.

According to BUSINESSWEEK, the Philippines received no less than \$125 million in foreign capital from January to September this year. This was lower than the promised \$2.5 billion. Even though foreign companies have been granted favorable conditions by the Aquino government they failed to deliver the promised goods.

There is another problem: While foreign loans are needed to promote the economy, debt payments inevitably force the country to tighten its belt, especially as it needs to allocate 40 percent of the budget to foreign debt servicing. This takes up a large bulk of export earnings.

Meanwhile, a glimmer of hope shone for the Philippines when foreign commercial banks agreed to reduce its foreign borrowings from \$1.7 billion to \$650 million. Manila now plans to obtain 1 billion by selling bonds to foreign buyers. It had earlier acquired a lower interest rate for its old loans. Nevertheless, total foreign debts remain at \$28 billion, making the Philippines one of the most heavily indebted countries in the Third World and the heaviest indebted in Southeast Asia in so far as per capita debt is concerned.

It is not surprising that the country's national economy is slowly coming under the control of foreign companies and banks. Multinational corporations make up three-fourths of all companies in the country, especially in the export industry.

Foreign loans from international institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also decreased considerably. When President Aquino visited the United States, she was able to make an appeal to American businessmen at the New York Stock Exchange. However, the president failed to convince them of the easier investment terms in the Philippines. U.S. newspapers reported that the businessmen were waiting for further political developments in the Philippines before making their move. THE NEW YORK TIMES noted in particular that they were awaiting the outcome of talks on the fate of U.S. military bases in the Philippines. The talks are slated to begin next month in Manila.

At the end of President Aquino's visit to the United States, she stated that her visit was a success because it brought new hope to the country's economy. True. She did receive promises from the World Bank where, unfortunately, the U.S. Government failed to act on her requests. The U.S. Congress only approved a \$250 million allocation which was long promised to the Philippines and actually forms part of an international aid program.

Another issue that remains vague is the question of diversifying Philippine exports to the United States. At the moment, Washington seems more intent on awaiting the outcome of talks in Manila next month. Earlier, President Bush had already announced that assistance to the Philippines will depend on the fate of U.S. military bases in that country.

#### **Editorial Opposes Funding for CAFGU Forces**

*HK2411103789 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE  
in English 22 Nov 89 p 4*

[Editorial: "Unnecessary Militarization"]

[Text] The Senate finance subcommittee has rejected a request by the Department of National Defense [DND] to give it increased funding to expand the Citizens' Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) from 62,000 to 77,000 members nationwide. Instead of giving the military the additional P197 million asked for by the military for the recruitment and training of more CAFGUs, the committee chairman, Sen. Ernesto Macea, proposed to give the amount to the Integrated National Police.

In the House, the AFP's [Armed Forces of the Philippines] request for 15,000 more CAFGU members was trimmed to 10,000 with the P55 million saved allotted to the INP [Integrated National Police] for the purchase of radios and vehicles.

These acts of Congress are consistent with the stance of many legislators questioning the constitutionality of the organization by the AFP of the CAFGU, and the validity of using paramilitary forces in the anti-insurgency campaign. Last year, the Senate slashed P200 million from the CAFGU's 1989 budget. For its part, the House human rights committee passed a resolution scrapping the P525 million proposed budget for the CAFGU.

The CAFGU, a DND invention, was organized in 1988, after the new Constitution decreed the disbandment of the abusive Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) and other paramilitary units in the country. In defending the CAFGU, the DND said that it was necessary to help the military combat the insurgency.

Even as questions about the constitutionality of the CAFGU remain unanswered, the AFP had been able to recruit and train 62,000 of them, with a budget of P384 million. To hear it from the military, it would seem as if the CAFGU has been a roaring success.

In his statement before the committee, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Renato de Villa said that the CAFGU has been used to occupy those rebel-infested areas that have been cleared by the AFP. In 1989 alone, the number of rebels dropped from 23,060 to 19,780, and the number of rebel-affected barangay from 7,852 to 6,933. To be able to maintain its upperhand in the anti-insurgency campaign, the military holds that it would need to expand the CAFGU.

Underneath the glowing reports of the AFP, however, is a trial of human rights abuses that have been traced to the CAFGU.

In areas where they operate, they have become the successors to the notorious CHDF. In fact, the core of the CAFGU are former CHDF members who have "qualified" for membership in the new group. It is also widely suspected that the CAFGU has become a grab bag of such outlawed armed groups as Right-wing vigilantes, private armies and religious cultists who have been legalized under the citizens' armed group.

In Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Surigao del Norte and Davao del Norte, the CAFGUs are known to be the de facto private armies of politicians and businessmen. In Negros, sugar planters have started a fund to maintain of these armed paramilitary forces and civilian volunteer organizations.

Still fresh in our minds is the memory of the drunken CAFGU member who lobbed a grenade at a coronation party in a barangay in Davao del Sur killing eight and wounding 57. There are other stories of CAFGU bands implicated in crimes from murder to robbery.

These, in spite of assurances by the military that the CAFGU would be different from its notorious predecessors. The CAFGU would be recruited from military reservists, we have been told, and they would be chosen only among able-bodied and responsible citizens endorsed by the communities they come from. They would undergo intensive training, be placed under the discipline of the Articles of War, be under the supervision of a military officer, and be paid allowances and medical and death benefits.

Its defenders would argue that today's paramilitary forces have been accused of fewer crimes and human rights violations than their murderous predecessors. But that would be missing the point. The point is, there should be no more CAFGUs. Civilians should not be armed for a war that the military should be fighting.

Instead of going through the expense of militarizing the civilian sector by organizing CAFGUs and CVOs, [civilian volunteer organization] we suggest that the AFP

spend its budget building up a professional military, well-trained, well-armed, well-paid and properly motivated to defend the Filipino people against all threats to their freedoms.

### Gross International Reserves Up, Below Target

*HK1711045389 Manila BUSINESS STAR  
in English 17 Nov 89 pp 1, 3*

[By Bayani S. Cruz]

[Text] The gross international reserves (GIR) of the Central Bank (CB) improved slightly last month although the new level is still way below the target set earlier in the Memorandum of Economic Policy (MEP) submitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Statistics released by the CB yesterday showed that the GIR rose by \$295 million to \$1,831 billion from the level recorded in September.

This new GIR level is still way below the \$3,485-billion original gross reserve target for end-1989 set in the MEP. The GIR is made up of foreign exchange, gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), and foreign investments held by the CB.

This initial target has already been scaled down to \$2,450 billion, but with still two months to go, monetary authorities have to raise this by \$619 million. The GIR account showed a fluctuating pattern since January this year, but its month-on-month increase ranged from a low of 4.6% to an extraordinary high of 11.4%.

According to a senior CB official, the year-end GIR target had to be adjusted because of reductions in the expected inflows of foreign loans towards the end of this year.

When the MEP was drafted early this year, the cut in the inflow of foreign loans had not yet been taken into account, the official said.

Computations made by the CB originally expected a total of \$1,354 billion in foreign loans to enter the country within this year, the official said. But the release of these loans have been reset to early next year.

These additional loans are on top of the \$260 million representing the remaining tranches (installments) of the three-year extended fund facility (EFF) from the IMF.

The rise in the October GIR level has been traced to substantial gains posted by all its components. Gold reserves went up from \$985.72 to \$1,831 billion; SDRs (an international monetary unit pegged to a basket of currencies) swelled from \$320 million to \$910 million; foreign investments grew from \$417.75 billion to \$667.52 billion; and, foreign exchange which improved from \$133.04 billion to \$155.47 billion.

The \$1,831-billion GIR level is also a robust expansion from the \$1,543-billion GIR level posted in October last year.

During the last three years, the GIR level traditionally improves towards the end of the year because of seasonal rise in the foreign exchange inflows from salary remittances of overseas workers during the Christmas season.

The October GIR level also shored up the overall GIR position of the banking system to about \$4.9 billion.

### Thailand

#### U.S. Terms for Science Pact Renewal Viewed

*BK2411030389 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
24 Nov 89 p 1*

[By Mukdawan Sakbun]

[Text] The United States is pushing for linkage between protection of its intellectual property rights (IPR) and the extension of the bilateral agreement on science and technology cooperation following its expiry earlier this year.

The standing demand by the US has been consistently turned down by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy, thereby stalling the five-year extension sought by the Thai side.

The continuation of the Science, Technology Cooperation Agreement—the umbrella agreement under which a US aid project was established following its signing in 1984—first became an issue for negotiation after the Thai side informed the US administration of its desire to extend it for another five years when it officially expired last April.

But subsequent negotiations have been deadlocked by the US condition to link the IPR issue with the continuation of the agreement, said Dr Sa-nga Sapphasri, permanent secretary of the Thai ministry.

In an exclusive interview with THE NATION, Dr Sa-nga said that the two sides finally agreed to postpone the expiry date of the agreement for six months to October this year.

"The ministry is not in a position to respond to the US terms and we leave it to the government and parliament to decide on the issue," Sa-nga said.

Ministry sources said that the ministry found it difficult to pursue the negotiations since the American side contended that the US administration was bound by a new Congress-initiated law requiring that signatories of such bilateral cooperation agreements must commit themselves to intellectual property rights protection of US work. Extension of the bilateral agreement is subject to ratification by the Congress.

However, US diplomats have confided that there was no political decision by the administration to push for the linking of IPR with the cooperation agreement but admitted that the Office of the US Trade Representative has been insisting on the condition. However, the US

Agency of International Development (Usaid) and the State Department appear more sympathetic to the Thai side in this case.

A Thai diplomat involved in the negotiations said, "I don't think it a discriminatory action by the US against Thailand because the same principle has been applied with bilateral cooperation agreements with other countries too."

Usaid/Thailand Deputy Director Stephen Mintz refused to comment on the issue while US Embassy spokesman James Williams could not be reached for comments yesterday. Usaid/Thailand Director John Ericksson was not in Thailand yesterday.

Science, Technology and Energy Minister Prachuap Chaiyasan told THE NATION that the trade-related issue of intellectual property rights should not be "mixed with" bilateral cooperation in science and technology.

He said that when he visited the United States when the agreement expired last April, he discussed the issue with the US Council of Scientists, an independent think-thank that advises the president on science and technology policy matters.

The council, the minister said, fully understood the Thai position and is expected to oppose any attempts to tie the continuation of the agreement with trade issues.

"The Council agreed with us and pledged to recommend to the administration in our favour. They said they did appreciate the problems (of developing its scientific and technological expertise) facing such a developing country as Thailand," added Sa-nга, who accompanied Prachuap on the US trip last April.

Ministry sources, however, said that some US agencies that Prachuap and Sa-nга contacted in the United States still insisted on the insertion of reference to the IPR issue in the agreement to be extended.

Prachuap said that he had earlier planned to raise the issue during Premier Chatchai Chunhawan's trip to Washington for talks with President George Bush and his secretaries this month. However, the trip was postponed indefinitely after Typhoon Gay devastated southern provinces of Thailand on Nov 4.

"I have no plan as yet to visit the United States or raise the issue until the US asks for it," the minister said.

Officials in the Science, Technology and Energy Ministry said that they felt it difficult to pursue the contention by the US that insertion of the reference to the intellectual property rights issue is bound by the new legislation.

"With this argument, the US side has left us no room to further negotiations," one official said of his personal view.

But Foreign Ministry's officials said that one possible leeway under consideration was to further postpone the expiry date.

"It's a hot potato and nobody, neither from the Thai nor the US side, would like to take up the issue and perhaps it might be a good idea for both to resort to continual postponement of the expiry rate, probably until April next year," one Thai diplomat said anonymously.

But even if no solution is agreed upon, the US scientific aid can still continue without the umbrella agreement, they said, referring to a separate agreement for Usaid to extend a loan of US\$26.5 million and a grant of US\$8.5 million to fund the establishment of the Science and Technology Development Board (STDB).

The aid project was signed in 1985 as a result of the Thai-US Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, which was concluded during former Premier Prem Tinsulanon's visit to the United States a year earlier. But Prachuap said the aid project was separate from the umbrella agreement and will expire in 1992.

Sa-nга argued, "We have been receiving US aid in this field since before the conclusion of the Thai-US Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement."

But the permanent secretary, indirectly admitting the prospect of less US aid in the long term, said, "If the US refuses to drop its conditions, then we will have to learn more self-reliance."

Under STDB, there are now three centres: the Bio-Technology and Genetics Engineering Centre, the Centre of Electronics and Computers and the Centre of Material Science and Technology. He pointed out that the three centres were formed before the conclusion of the umbrella bilateral cooperation agreement and the establishment of STDB.

#### Official Comments on Cambodian Resistance Claims

BK2911022589 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
29 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] Cambodian resistance factions will have to prove they can run territories seized recently from Phnom Penh troops, a senior Thai military official said yesterday.

Military Inspector-General Gen Phat Akkhanitbut, who is a former deputy supreme commander, said the situation in Cambodia at this stage is crucial to the resistance which have reported seizing several villages and towns from Phnom Penh forces.

He said they will have to prove they can consolidate their gains by setting up an effective administration to run the areas, such as Pailin and territory north of Ban Nimit.

Pailin, a gem-rich town opposite Chantaburi's Pong Nam Ron district fell to Cambodian resistance forces

last month. Nimit, opposite Aranyaprathet, served as an artillery base for Phnom Penh troops and has been under attack by the resistance.

The guerrillas' claims of territorial gains need to be reinforced with how effective they can run the areas and the population there, said Gen Phat.

Gen Phat, who is the army's expert on Cambodia, described the present fighting situation inside Cambodia as a "readjustment to reality."

He said one side would retreat in the face of an attack by the other to avoid losses.

Asked to comment on a reported move among international relief agencies to push for "neutral camps" for displaced Cambodian persons wishing to distance themselves from political conflicts in Cambodia, Gen Phat said that he agreed with the idea which he said he has shared for a long time.

"I myself have proposed that neutral camps be set up inside Cambodia," said Gen Phat.

He said the existence of neutral camps would relieve Thailand's burden in taking care of displaced persons on the border but admitted the idea would be difficult to implement under the present circumstances.

Gen Phat, however, said there is an on-going dialogue among parties concerned on the proposal.

"We are now organizing vocational training programmes for them (Cambodians) to prepare them for the future when they return home," he said.

—A Phnom Penh army officer said yesterday over 200 non-communist guerrillas of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front [KPNLF] have been killed by artillery and rocket fire in attacks on a strategic base in northwest Cambodia.

The officer, who would not give his name, told Thai reporters at the Thai-Cambodian border that government troops had been ordered to "open up a part of the front" to "allow the guerrillas to advance before closing in on them with artillery fire."

As a result the government artillery had inflicted about 200 casualties on the KPNLF at O-Smach and O-Thmar canals west and northwest of Nimit firebase close to Highway 5, he said.

The incident could not be confirmed by Thai military authorities.

Meanwhile, more than 30 rockets fired from across the Cambodian border landed in two villages of the Thai border district of Aranyaprathet yesterday, injuring three villagers and damaging five houses, a security source said.

The source said the rockets landed in Ban Saensuk and Ban Thung Ruangthong border villages about 15 kms from the district town. The rockets also killed two cows in Saensuk village.

On Monday at least 20 rockets landed in Thung Ruangthong village, injuring 5 people and destroying a two-rai rice field near the village.

### Neutral Camps Sought for Cambodian Refugees

*BK2711012589 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
27 Nov 89 p 1*

[Text] International relief organizations plan to lobby the Thai Government to allow them to set up "neutral camps" for displaced Cambodians as an alternative to the emerging trend of Cambodians from UN-assisted camps being forcibly moved into resistance-controlled areas inside Cambodia.

Informed sources in the relief organizations told THE NATION over the weekend that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) are planning to request that Thai authorities reconsider their recently-proposed plan to establish neutral camps.

Neutral camps were proposed last month at an international meeting of non-governmental relief organizations in Bangkok as a step towards a UN-organized voluntary repatriation of about 300,000 Cambodians in 10 resistance-controlled camps along the Thai border.

The UNHCR and ICRC formally conveyed the proposal to Thai authorities.

The neutral camps would house those who wish to distance themselves from the ongoing conflict inside Cambodia and wish to return home under the UN programme.

The sources said that due to the worsening situation in Cambodia, UNHCR and ICRC officials have quietly resumed lobbying with some Thai security units to convey their concerns to the National Security Council, the highest decision-making agency on displaced Cambodians.

The UNHCR and ICRC, the sources said, are very concerned over the recruitment of Khmer civilians from UN-assisted camps as porters for the resistance forces fighting Phnom Penh troops inside Cambodia.

There were reports last week that thousands of Cambodians in Khmer Rouge-controlled "hidden" camps south of Aranyaprathet had been moved to a newly "liberated" zone east of Thailand's Chanthaburi Province by the communist guerrillas.

"The trend is being noted with urgency by the international agencies," said one of the sources, who added that civilians in resistance-controlled camps will be the next

target for recruitment if fighting expands or if the resistance is able to set up permanent bases inside Cambodia.

"In the latter case, the fate of Cambodian civilians would be worse still, as they would be forced to move en masse into these insecure areas," said the source.

**Deputy Premier Reports Results of SRV Trip**

*BK2611025089 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
26 Nov 89 p 2*

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Phichai Rattakun yesterday hailed the success of his four-day official visit to Vietnam saying the two countries agreed on many economic issues including a joint fishing venture.

Phichai said both sides held extensive discussions on the issue and that the Vietnamese delegation will be invited here within the next two months for a signing ceremony once the draft was completed.

The accord will include the setting up of two joint fishing companies, one in each country, and establishing a contact point between the two country's Fisheries Departments.

The minister said the agreement would help solve the problems Thai trawlers have been facing including arrests of Thai crews and boat seizures for violating Vietnamese territorial waters.

Phichai led a Thai delegation to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh [City] where he met several Vietnamese leaders including Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and deputy prime minister for economic affairs Tran Duc Luong.

He said that he agreed to a Vietnamese proposal to review some of the earlier pacts signed, which were not so applicable to the current economic situation.

Hanoi also suggested establishing a joint commission on economic cooperation chaired by a ministerial authority to coordinate development and tackle any bilateral economic problems, Phichai said. He added that the improving ties between the two countries could eventually lead to such a commission.

Vietnam also agreed to lease a hectare (about 7 rai) of land in Hanoi for a Thai embassy and to increase the number of Thai Airways International flights to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The Thai national airline now flies three times a week to each of the two cities.

Thailand also requested that Hanoi review its current foreign investment law to help promote and protect bilateral investments.

**Political Role Possible for CPM Guerrillas**

*BK2611024089 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
26 Nov 89 p 1*

[Text] With a new name the currently outlawed Communist Party of Malaya [CPM] will be permitted to participate in political activities in Malaysia.

A well-informed military source said yesterday that Kuala Lumpur also agreed not to invoke its Internal Security Act against the CPM as well as its members.

The source said that secretary-general Chin Peng who has not been seen in the public for several decades is now in Thailand and had already met with Army Commander-in-Chief General Chawalit Yongchaiyut.

Chin Peng arrived in Hat Yai yesterday. Also present in Hat Yai is the Chinese Ambassador to Thailand.

The source quoted Gen Chawalit as telling the 67-year-old CPM leader that he thought the latter was dead a long time ago.

Chin Peng will sign two peace accords at the Lee Garden Hotel in Hat Yai on December 2, one with Gen Chawalit and the other with Malaysia's Defence Forces chief Tan Sri Dato Hahsim Mohamed Ali.

After the signing ceremony, the three men will announce a joint communique.

The source went on to say that 70 percent of the 1,100 members of the CPM and their dependents would remain in Thailand, with the rest going back to Malaysia. Each of those families that remain will be given 15 rai of land to make a living as well as a living allowance of 22 baht a day during the first two years.

Kuala Lumpur, meanwhile, also pledged 300 Ringgit a month for each returning family for two years and a plot of land.

Two months after signing the accords, the source said, the CPM would destroy their weapons in the jungle, an event to be witnessed by only Thai and Malaysian authorities.

Regarding the two Japanese stragglers, Shigeyuki Hashimoto, 72, and Kyoaki Tanaka, 76, the source said that the CPM has requested the Thai military to ask the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok to consider whether the two former Imperial soldiers would be treated as war heroes.

It also asked if the embassy could help the two Japanese after the disbanding of the guerrilla forces.

Fourth Army Region Chief-of-Staff Major-General Wiset Siriwanthanakun yesterday said at a press conference in Bangkok that Kuala Lumpur had no objection if the CPM wants to pursue political activities within the framework of the Constitution. He said that there would

be no problem for the CPM guerrillas and their dependents to settle in Thailand because several of them were born in Thailand.

The granting of Thai citizenship to the guerrillas was, however, a delicate matter and would be handled by the Foreign Ministry, he said.

### Sitthi Optimistic About Markets in East Europe

*BK2811114389 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in Thai 1030 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila said the changes in East European countries will benefit Thailand because markets in those countries will expand. These socialist countries will become major markets, especially during the current pivotal situation when they will need aid from the West. The foreign minister said this after receiving the Korean ambassador, who donated aid for typhoon victims in the south.

According to Sitthi, during his earlier visits to the CSSR, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR to promote trade, he realized that the volume of Thai trade with those countries was quite small and felt that trade and economic cooperation could be expanded. The government has assigned the Foreign Ministry to explore trade possibilities with these countries. Ministry officials are planning his visit to these countries, which could take place next year.

Asked about obstruction to trade with the East European countries, the foreign minister said many restrictive Thai regulations have been eliminated and the Immigration Division has been consulted in order to facilitate visits by businessmen from those countries. In any event, although we will gain new markets we will keep old markets by trying to resolve the trade protectionist problem.

### Government To Introduce Anti-Inflation Measures

*BK2811042589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 28 Nov 89 pp 1, 3*

[Excerpt] Amid growing criticism of its handling of the economy, the Government announced yesterday it will introduce a package of comprehensive measures aimed at pegging the country's runaway inflation at the "acceptable" rate of 5-6.5 percent.

Government Deputy Spokesman Likhit Hongladarom did not give full details of the measures but said that the package has already been drawn up and is scheduled to be tabled for the economic ministers' approval on December 11.

The package will involve short- and long-term monetary, financial and budgetary measures as well as official control on prices, quotas and production costs, he said.

To immediately relieve the low-income earners' burden caused by skyrocketing consumer goods prices, the Commerce Ministry's Anti-Hoarding and Profiteering Committee has convened to set up a direct sale system to enable the public to buy essential goods at low prices.

The move is expected to help bring down the prices of essential goods by some 10 percent, Mr Likhit said.

The long-term measures will be aimed at maintaining the country's monetary and financial stability and placing a systematic control on inflation, the deputy spokesman said.

He warned, however, that the impact of its introduction will be painful for some during the early stages.

He commented that there appeared to be some confusion between inflation and the problem of increasing prices.

"I'd like to point out that inflation and trade deficit have a direct impact on national economic stability. Although the increase in the prices of luxury goods may have some impact on the rich, the rise in the prices of essential consumer goods will adversely affect the low income earners. The Government will give priority to handling the latter problem which is more urgent," he said.

The Government has been criticised in several quarters over its alleged mishandling of inflation and Opposition Solidarity Party leader Narong Wongwan has announced that the problem will be one of the topics to be contained in the Opposition's no-confidence motion against the Government in the next parliamentary session.

Mr Likhit said the Government had conducted a survey on the opinions of members of the public, unionists, mass media people and academics between November 8-25.

Summarily, the people who responded to the survey felt that:

- The Government has not done enough legally and traditionally to solve the country's economic problems.
- It was more concerned with political problems than economic ones.
- It failed to tackle the people's bread and butter problem at its root cause which would have been effective in the long run. [passage omitted]

### Vietnam

### Thai Deputy Premier Notes Improved Relations

*BK2711133889 Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 27 Nov 89*

[Text] Thai Deputy Prime Minister Phichai Rattakun says the improvement of the Thai-Vietnamese relations will help solve any economic questions of both sides. Speaking in Bangkok on November 25th after returning from Vietnam, the Thai deputy prime minister said: Thailand and Vietnam have reached agreement on many economic questions, including a joint venture on fishery.

The two sides also made a thorough discussion on this question. A delegation of Vietnam will be invited to Bangkok in 2 months' time to sign the agreement.

### Thailand's Sitthi in Agreement

*BK2911103489 Hanoi International Service in English  
1000 GMT 29 Nov 89*

[Text] Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila will pay an official visit to Vietnam in early 1990. The announcement was made by the Thai Foreign Ministry recently. According to AFP, speaking to newsmen, the Thai foreign minister said that he would come to Hanoi and that, at present, Thai-Vietnamese relations have improved after Vietnam's complete pullout from Cambodia in late September.

### Province, Specialists Awarded Cambodian Honors

*BK2611150889 Hanoi VNA in English 1453 GMT  
26 Nov 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Nov. 26—The southern coastal province of Thuan Hai and its specialists have been awarded distinctions by the State of Cambodia for their contributions to Cambodia's national construction and defence.

The conferment of the "Defence" Order, on Thuan Hai Province and the "Friendship" and "Labour" Orders on its specialists, was made by Ook Moni, chairman of the People's Committee of the Preah Vihear Province (Cambodia), during a recent visit to Thuan Hai Province.

Speaking at the presentation ceremony, Ook Moni highly appreciated Thuan Hai's valuable assistance to his province and wished the friendship and cooperation between the two provinces further consolidation and development.

### Laos Confers Medals, Orders on 'Experts'

*BK2911110089 Hanoi International Service in English  
1000 GMT 29 Nov 89*

[Text] On the occasion of the 14th national day of Laos, the Lao Embassy in Hanoi on Wednesday [29 November] held a ceremony to confer Lao orders and medals on Vietnamese experts. Sixteen Vietnamese experts received the Freedom Order, the noble order of Laos, first, second, and third classes. Two other were awarded Friendship Order and Medal. All these experts have made positive contributions to Lao national construction and defense.

### Peace, Cooperation Zone in Southeast Asia Urged

*BK2911092889 Hanoi VNA in English 0727 GMT  
29 Nov 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA November 29—"Good conditions are ripe for the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia," said a Vietnamese representative at the November 27 debate on regional and

international security of the 44th United Nations General Assembly's Political and Security Committee in New York.

Noting that concerted endeavours of the countries in the region are needed to realize this objective, the Vietnamese representative, Nguyen Duc Hung, said: "The current favourable political atmosphere in Asia and the Pacific, strengthened by the improved relations between the Soviet Union and China, is making Southeast Asia one of the most promising areas in the whole region."

He further remarked that in Southeast Asia, which is one of the hottest zones on the globe in the recent past, peace and national independence and development have become the main trend as reflected in the concept advanced by the ASEAN countries and Laos of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region.

"The desire to translate this concept into reality is most clearly expressed by the prime minister of Thailand when he spoke of his intention to turn Indochina from a battlefield of the past into a marketplace at present," the Vietnamese representative said.

### Ministry Says Nguyen Van Linh 'Recuperating'

*OW2911133989 Tokyo KYODO in English 1322 GMT  
29 Nov 89*

[Text] Hanoi, Nov. 29 KYODO—Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Linh has been hospitalized because of illness, reliable sources said Wednesday. Premier Do Muoi has temporarily taken over from Linh as general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, the sources said.

Other sources said Linh has suffered from a stroke.

The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry had previously said that Linh, who is regarded as an economic reformer, had fallen ill but was recovering. A Foreign Ministry spokesman told the KYODO NEWS SERVICE in Hanoi that the general secretary had been in ill health, but added that he is recuperating with the attention of his physicians.

Linh visited East Germany on October 4 and returned to Hanoi on October 24. He reportedly was hospitalized in Hanoi after his return home and was later moved to a hospital in Ho Chi Minh City.

He has since not taken part in any public events, including the events commemorating the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Union's October Revolution.

It was not known when he suffered a stroke but one report said he was stricken shortly before he returned from East Germany.

**Communiqué Issued on By-Election Results**

*BK2811032389 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
1430 GMT 27 Nov 89*

[Communiqué of the National Assembly By-Election Committee on "outcome of the by-election of deputies to the Eighth National Assembly"—dated 27 November]

[Text] On 27 November 1989, the National Assembly By-Election Committee met to examine the outcome of the by-election of deputies to the Eighth National Assembly, which was held on the same day—19 November 1989—with the election of people's councils at all levels.

After reviewing the election situation and examining reports from eight constituencies, the Committee for By-Election of Deputies to the Eighth National Assembly noted that the by-election of nine deputies to the Eighth National Assembly was held in accordance with democratic principles and with the law on National Assembly elections, and achieved good results.

At all the National Assembly by-election stations, there was a high voter turnout. Those elected received votes ranging from 53.32 to 99.89 percent of the total valid votes cast.

The Committee for By-Election of Deputies to the Eighth National Assembly hereby announces the namelist of nine deputies elected in eight constituencies in the Eighth National Assembly by-election as follows:

**1. Ho Chi Minh City: Constituency No 2 comprising the First and Fifth Precincts:**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	2
—Number of registered voters:	317,813
—Number of actual voters:	315,281
—Voter turnout:	99.2 %
—Number of deputies elected:	2

Nguyen Vinh Nghiep, member of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Standing Committee and chairman of the City People's Committee, was elected with 228,084 votes, or 76.79 percent of the total valid votes.

Nguyen Thi Mai Thanh, director of the Refrigeration Engineering Enterprise, was elected with 192,649 votes, or 64.8 percent of the total valid votes.

**Constituency No 3 comprising the 10th and 11th Precincts:**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	1
—Number of registered voters:	298,082
—Number of actual voters:	297,574
—Voter turnout:	99.83 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Nguyen Van Tu, member of the party Central Committee and president of the Vietnam General Federation of Labor Unions, was elected with 145,791 votes, or 53.32 percent of the total valid votes.

**2. Haiphong: Constituency No 3 comprising Vinh Bao and Tien Lang Districts:**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	1
—Number of registered voters:	171,193
—Number of actual voters:	168,007
—Voter turnout:	98.13 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Phan Bai, member of the party Central Committee and chairman of the Vietnam Peasants' Association, was elected with 164,672 votes, or 98 percent of the total valid votes.

**3. Lang Son Province: Constituency No 1 comprising Trang Dinh, Van Lang, Cao Loc, Loc Binh, Dinh Lap Districts and Lang Son city.**

—Number of registered voters:	170,034
—Number of actual voters:	162,842
—Voter turnout:	95.77 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Nong Duc Manh, a Tay ethnic, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and head of the Central Nationalities Commission, was elected with 161,590, votes or 99.26 percent of the total valid votes.

**4. Hoang Lien Son Province: Constituency No 1 comprising Bat Xat, Bao Thang, Muong Khuong, Bac Ha, Sa Pa, Van Ban, and Bao Yen Districts and Lao Cay city.**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	1
—Number of registered voters:	198,640
—Number of actual voters:	195,931
—Voter turnout:	98.63 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy, commander of the 2d Military Region, was elected with 195,575 votes, or 99.89 percent of the total valid votes.

**5. Tien Giang Province: Constituency No 3 comprising Chau Thanh District and My Tho city.**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	1
—Number of registered voters:	239,202
—Number of actual voters:	237,601
—Voter turnout:	99.33 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Nguyen Kha, member of the provincial party committee's standing body and chairman of the Tien Giang

provincial Fatherland Front Committee, was elected with 218,803 votes, or 92.08 percent of the total valid votes.

**6. Hau Giang Province: Constituency No 4 comprising Chau Thanh and Phung Hiep Districts.**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	1
—Number of registered voters:	235,153
—Number of actual voters:	224,991
—Voter turnout:	95.67 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Dinh Thi Can, member of the provincial party committee and the Vietnam Women's Union Central Committee cum chairman of the Hau Giang provincial women's union, was elected with 121,426 votes, or 54.8 percent of the total valid votes.

**7. Minh Hai Province: Constituency No 1 comprising Vinh Loi, Hong Dan, and Gia Rai Districts and Bac Lieu city.**

—Number of National Assembly deputies:	1
—Number of registered voters:	328,525
—Number of actual voters:	320,848
—Voter turnout:	97.66 %
—Number of deputies elected:	1

Dang Thanh Hoc, member of the provincial party committee's standing body and acting chairman of the Minh Hai people's committee, was elected with 310,895 votes, or 96.88 percent of the total valid votes.

[Dated] Hanoi, 27 November 1989

**Vo Nguyen Giap at Technical Development Seminar**

*BK2611155589 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
2300 GMT 25 Nov 89*

[Text] From 23 to 25 November in Hanoi, the Institute for Scientific and Technological Research, Forecast, and Strategy coordinated with the Asia-Pacific Center for the Transfer Technology in holding a seminar under the theme "Development on the Basis of Technology."

Attending the seminar were Vo Nguyen Giap, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers; Dang Huu, chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission and rector of the Institute for Scientific and Technological Research, Forecast, and Strategy; Mr David Smith, representative of the UN Development Program; Mr (Nidia Jikaha), acting director of the Asia-Pacific Center for the Transfer of Technology; and a number of specialists from India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan.

At the seminar, the delegates discussed and exchanged experiences concerning technological development strategy and planning, the models of technological development of the developing countries, the combination of

technology with socioeconomic development, and the methods of acquiring technology in the formulation of a strategy for socioeconomic development in Vietnam.

**Visits State Mapping Department**

*BK2611102289 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
1430 GMT 24 Nov 89*

[Text] On the afternoon of 24 November, Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the party Central Committee and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, paid a working visit to the State Mapping and Survey Department on the occasion of its 30th founding anniversary.

After visiting a number of modernly-equipped cartographic workshops, the vice chairman expressed his satisfaction with the growth of the department in numerous aspects. He also commended mapping and survey cadres and workers for having defied difficulties and overcome many hardships and ordeals in traveling to remote areas along the borders and to various islands to satisfactorily fulfill the tasks of surveying and erecting boundary markers, thus contributing worthily to the defense of the country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap expressed the hope that all the leading cadres, the brother and sister cadres, and the workers of the State Mapping and Survey Department will develop the achievements they have scored in order to constantly improve their technical knowledge and satisfactorily apply the advanced science and technology of the world. He also hoped for the expansion of cooperation with other countries in the field of cartography, aimed at turning out more products of economic and technical value to support the country's socioeconomic development with ever better results.

**Attends Seminar on Ho Chi Minh**

*BK2911141589 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
1100 GMT 29 Nov 89*

[Text] The Vietnam Social Science Committee on 29 November held a seminar in Hanoi under the theme: "Ho Chi Minh: a National Liberation Hero and a Cultural Genius."

Attending the seminar were representatives from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Nguyen Ai Quoc Academy, the Hanoi University, Hanoi Teachers College No 1, the Hue Teachers College; representatives from Nghe Tinh Province—Uncle Ho's native place—and many others from the branches and sectors at the central level and in Hanoi.

Many professors, scholars, intellects, and scientific researchers from throughout the country participated in the seminar with almost 100 reports. Most of the reports focussed on the two most striking features of Uncle Ho's life and work under the themes: "Uncle Ho, a national liberation hero" and "Uncle Ho, a cultural genius."

Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, many members of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and leaders of branches and sectors at the central level attended and participated in the seminar.

This is one of the Vietnam Social Science Committee's major activities in preparations for the commemoration of Uncle Ho's 100th birth anniversary.

**Pham Van Dong Meets Ethnic Women's Delegation**  
*BK2911064089 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
1430 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] On 28 November at the Presidential Palace, Comrade Pham Van Dong, advisor to the party Central Committee, had a cordial meeting with a delegation of ethnic minority women from Son La Province. Also attending the meeting was Comrade Nguyen Thi Dinh, chairwoman of the Vietnam Women's Union.

The meeting took place in a warm atmosphere. Speaking on this occasion, Comrade Pham Van Dong concernedly inquired about the health, daily activities, and living conditions of ethnic minority sisters.

On behalf of local ethnic women, Lu Thi Tua, chairwoman of the provincial women's union chapter, briefed Comrade Pham Van Dong on our sisters' past achievements, especially in household economic development and child care.

At the recent elections to the people's councils at three levels, the number of female deputies of the people's councils at district and provincial levels accounted for 19 and 20 percent respectively of the number of deputies elected.

The chairwoman of the Bac Yen District women's union chapter reported to Comrade Pham Van Dong on the problems now facing our sisters in that remote mountain district due to the flooding caused by the Song Da hydroelectric power plant construction project, which affects the four villages there. Our sisters and their families have now moved to a mountain area and carried out slash-and-burn farming. Everyone is making efforts to overcome difficulties and stabilize production.

**New Economic Zones Developing Nationwide**  
*BK2611090489 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
0500 GMT 26 Nov 89*

[Text] As of September, localities throughout the country have mobilized more than 59,000 workers and 113,000 persons to build new economic zones in various provinces. Provinces in the Mekong River Delta have combined the worker mobilization with the Dong Thap Muoi and Long Xuyen quadrangle developing program, expanding 60,000 additional hectares for rice planting. These provinces increased their winter-spring rice output by 270,000 tonnes last year. Long An Province alone invested more than 2 billion dong to claim 6,000 hectares of virgin land for cultivation. In economic zones of Thai Binh Province efforts were made to develop 500 hectares of low-lying areas for shrimp rearing. Ha Son Binh, Vinh Phu, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, and other provinces have made great efforts in motivating the people to build more economic zones.

Cao Bang, Hoang Lien Son, and Bac Thai Provinces have not fulfilled state plan norms for economic zone building. However, capital investment for economic zones is still too low, amounting to only 0.63 percent of the total capital investment, while loans have been granted slowly. Organization is diversified at the central level, and some localities have belittled the tasks of sending people to and receiving them at new economic zones.

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